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CHAPTER I

THE NATURE OF FAITH

It has become increasingly popular in this age of anxiety to speak of the need for faith. In the expressions of the President of the United States and other political leaders are to be found exhortations to "have faith" in the face of world and national tensions. The columns of our daily newspapers, as well as the pages of some of the current "best-sellers," present the values of certain types of "faith" for overcoming personal anxieties and achieving social and economic success. In more explicitly theological circles "faith" has also assumed new importance with the contemporary rediscovery of the significance of "justification by faith." The need for Christian "faith" has been presented by various theological writers in relation to the anxieties of our age and to the perennial anxieties of all human existence.

The widespread usage of such an ambiguous term as "faith" does not tend to clarify its meaning. The confusion is compounded as both the emotional and intellectual attributes of faith are given widely varying meanings in different contexts. The purpose of this dissertation is to attempt to find some clarity in the midst of this confusion. The reasons for such an effort can be quickly stated. If faith is as important for our time as many writers have suggested that it is, then it seems worth while to seek to clarify its meaning. Further, if faith is such a desirable attribute of life, then (if we can gain some understanding of what faith is), it would seem important to study the forces in life which contribute to an effective faith as well as those forces which work against such a faith.

Two questions can now be formulated which will constitute the burden of this thesis: "What is the meaning of faith?" and "What is involved in the development of faith?" These questions, as thus stated, are very broad and include much that cannot be discussed in one dissertation. Limits must be defined, and within these limits only partial answers to partial questions can be presented.

Conceivably faith could be studied as a universal phenomenon to be found in various forms in all cultures and all periods of history. Our interest and our practical concern, however, is limited to that particular stream of culture which is called "Christian." Within the confines of the Christian tradition we are interested in surveying briefly some of the significant meanings that faith has had, and then we shall attempt to formulate a definition of faith which meets some of the important criteria of that tradition. Such a definition of faith can then be interpreted in the light of its theological context and in the light of psychological material which is relevant to its meaning and development. From such a study it may be possible to draw some implications for the role of the minister and the church in the development of faith.

Within the Christian tradition the word "faith" has had many different meanings and further limitation is necessary. The psychological aspects of this study suggest a limitation. We must be primarily interested in the human side of "faith" and in those aspects of human behavior which are involved in "having faith." This poses a rather artificial limitation of this study to what might be called the "process of having faith" as distinguished from the "content" of faith. Some working definitions can be formulated: the "process of having faith" includes all those reactions of personality which pertain to the response to "religious" stimuli which is called "faith;" the "content" of faith includes both the actual stimuli which evoke the response of "faith" and the intellectual formulations and interpretations which are associated with such stimuli (and may be part of such stimuli). In the Christian tradition, for example, we might say that God's revelation of Himself in Jesus Christ is the primary "content" of faith. The "process of having faith" is, then, the nature of the response which the individual Christian makes to this revelation. For our purposes the "process" includes both the actual response and all the developmental forces which influence the nature of that response.

As we have said, however, the distinction between "process" and "content" is an artificial one which cannot be consistently maintained. In the Christian response of faith, for example, the nature of the individual's response to God's revelations of Himself in Christ is at least partly determined by the nature of the revelation he has received. For many reasons the "religious" stimuli are not constant and vary widely both in the ways they are presented and the ways they are perceived.[1] Further, the "content" of the revelation of God in Christ is necessary for any definition of Christian faith because that content contains within it a criterion of what can be included in the range of responses called "Christian" and what cannot.

We might illustrate these two relationships between "process" and "content" in this manner: The kind of response a man makes to the God of Jesus Christ as perceived in the judgmental and legalistic aspects of Jesus' ministry may be quite different from the response he would make to the same God as perceived in the compassionate aspects of that ministry.

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[1] This is not to cast a reflection on the "constancy" of God, but to describe problems of communication and perception which seem to be inevitable in our human situation.

Assuming that the responses differ with the communication and the perception, then some criterion is needed to evaluate the different responses as to their relative degree of "Christian" faith. Here, theology must go beyond the "content" of individual experience to the "content" of the collective experience of the Church in order to define a criterion of faith.

The foregoing suggests that any definition of "Christian faith" must be concerned both with "process" and with "content." For practical purposes this study must emphasize the "process" but utilize "content" in order to evaluate and interpret "process." Those aspects of faith with which we shall be primarily concerned will be labeled in various ways. The labels which will be used include terms such as "faith experience," "faith response," "faith relationship," or, of course, "faith" without qualifying terms. Different shades of meaning will be attached to some of these in later chapters, but the same general meaning of the "process" of faith applies to all of them.

The emphasis on "experience," "response," "relationship," etc., indicates the psychological nature of part of this thesis. Such words belong to the general language of psychology[1] and refer to forms of human behavior which can be subjected to psychological analysis. The psychological emphasis which is proposed raises some important questions about the relationship of theology and psychology in a study of this kind. There are a number of dangers in a psychological approach to a theological symbol. Specifically, in a study of "faith" there are dangers that our symbol, described in psychological terms, may tend either to lose its theological or "Christian" meaning or to lose its theological value (by being subjected to psychological evaluation) even though it may retain much of its theological meaning. It is the hope of the author to avoid both of these dangers. There is also a danger that theological defensiveness will limit psychological rigor. The avoidance of this danger will be more difficult, but a careful definition of the relationship of theology and psychology may help.

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[1] For our purposes we hold to a broad concept of "psychology" as a carefully disciplined study of human behavior.

A brief statement of the purpose of this dissertation will define the general view of the relationship of theology and psychology which will be held here. We are concerned to define a theological symbol, "faith," and to identify its important experiential aspects in order that relevant psychological contributions may be utilized to make this symbol more meaningful. It seems obvious that the determinant orientation of our study must be theological. We begin with a theological symbol and its meaning within a theological context, and we seek to make this symbol "more meaningful" with the help of psychological material, but "more meaningful" to whom?--to persons who are familiar with the theological context. Two words are particularly applicable to our purpose--"communication" and "correlation." We hope to construct a "bridge" of "communication" between a theological context and relevant psychological theories and data in order to communicate meaning which is not to be found within the usual confines of theology. Such "communication" requires "correlation" of theological and psychological insights into the experiences involved in the faith response in order to arrive at a "more" of meaning. Beyond "correlation" and "communication," however, we hope to find some use for this "more" of meaning in application to some of the practical problems of the church and the ministry.

In our statement of purpose we have stated the primacy of theology as our place of beginning and ending and our *raison d'etre*. For us psychology must serve as a means to theological ends. This is our general view, but a brief discussion of two of the problems involved in the "correlation" of theological and psychological material may be helpful here. We shall present briefly a point of view concerning the problems of language and value.

The problem of language.[1]--Language is used to symbolize experience. The symbols of language have meaning in terms of the experiences they are intended to symbolize. The symbols cannot be adequately understood apart from a significant degree of participation in the experiences which give them meaning. The symbols have meanings which can be adequately communicated only within the community of those persons who have participated in the common experiences necessary for understanding their meaning. Thus, Christian symbols such as the Cross and the Resurrection, as well as words such as sin, grace, faith, salvation, etc., have meaning (in the sense of this word which is used here) only within the community of those who have participated in the common "Christian" experiences which are necessary for the understanding of these symbols. Interpretations of the meaning of these symbols may differ widely within the "Christian" community because of differences in experience and the problems of perception and communication involved in interpretation, but "meaningful" interpretation is not possible apart from participation in "Christian" experience. It is a task of Christian theology to try to define the nature and meaning of Christian experience and Christian symbols in terms of the history of that experience.

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[1] See Carroll A. Wise, *Religion in Illness and Health* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942) chap. viii for a discussion of the relation of language to experience.

In a roughly similar manner we can say that psychological symbols have meaning only for those who have participated in the experiences which the language of psychology is intended to symbolize. There is a "community" of those who have participated in the necessary experiences and who understand the psychological meaning of symbols, as there is a "Christian community" arising out of participation in common experiences. Communication between "communities" is inevitably limited except for those who participate sufficiently in the two or more communities involved in the communication to understand the meanings of the symbols being used. Individuals who participate both in a Christian community and a psychological community of meaning can attempt to build "bridges" between the two communities by which those who participate in only one of the communities may gain some understanding of the contributions of the other, but limitations of experience remain to inhibit this understanding. Inevitably the problem arises of those who "have ears to hear but cannot hear" because they lack the necessary background of experience. Education and "evangelism" of various kinds, however, function to meet this problem by seeking to communicate enough meaning to "outsiders" that they may be able to enter into the experiences of the "community" and become "insiders."

The problem of communication becomes very complex in those areas of human experience which are not subject to direct observation or measurement. Most of the experiences to which religious symbols are relevant are difficult, if not impossible, to define in concrete terms, to isolate, to analyze, or to measure. The symbols must remain ambiguous, showing variation in content from individual to individual and from one "sub-community" to another within the larger community of participation. Religious symbols point to meanings which can be identified by many within the religious community because of their common participation in identifiable experiences, but they point also to aspects of experiences which remain mysterious because of their relative inaccessibility to human methods of investigation. Religious symbols point beyond themselves to levels of experiences involving aspects of existence and the structure of existence which cannot be demonstrated to have objective validity but which are assumed to be real by the members of the religious community. Once the objective reality of God, Christ, the Holy Spirit, and other such symbols has been accepted these symbols provide for the community which accepts them a core of content transcending individual experience. Such a core of content is assumed to be unvarying throughout the ages and provides consistent norms for evaluating meanings given to the symbols of the community. The definition and interpretation of this core of content and the norms included therein are, of course, subject to human error and show considerable variation throughout the history of the community. The symbols used must inevitably point to large elements of mystery.

The problem of value.--As noted above, theological symbols are intended to symbolize human experiences which include a relationship to that which is called God by those who participate in these experiences. Implicit in the conceptualization of such experiences is a criterion of what God is and what God is not. It is a function of Christian theology to define, in so far as possible, the criterion of God which is given in a Christian relationship to God and to make this criterion relevant to other value judgments. This theological value system is, within the Christian community, primary--in principle, at least--to values derived from secular disciplines. It is possible, of course, to interpret this primacy of theological values in such a manner as to restrict the functioning of secular disciplines unnecessarily, but it is the view of the writer that such conflict can be overcome. Theological values are determinative for the Christian for questions of the meaning and value of human life. The "scientific" values held by many who work within the secular disciplines are determinative for questions of the nature and methods of knowledge, as knowledge is defined within a given discipline. An individual Christian may, without conflict, engage in the search for knowledge in accordance with "scientific" values and live in accordance with "Christian" values (which include the value of knowledge). Conflict arises, however, when scientific knowledge is presumed to establish values for life beyond its own definition of knowledge or when theological values are misused to limit the nature and method of scientific inquiry.

Any effort at communication which tries to make the contributions of a particular secular discipline, such as psychology, relevant to the needs of the Christian community should recognize the limitations and points of difference which have been noted here. Beyond these, however, there are positive points of correlation which provide strong reasons for attempting such an effort. Psychology, for example, becomes relevant as soon as words such as "trust," "dependence," and "love" are used in discussing a relationship to God or one's fellow men. Psychology has much to contribute to the understanding of such terms, although psychological content cannot be considered to exhaust their meaning. If the meanings of such terms, as used in a theological context, are to be adequate to the best knowledge we have available about human life, then their meanings should include the contributions of psychology. Further, if theological meanings are to be applied in relevant ways to human problems, then the contributions of psychology both to the understanding of human problems and the techniques of effective communication are important. We propose then, to make use of psychological contributions in at least three ways:

1. to provide meaning for psychological terms involved in theological concepts--specifically, theological concepts of faith;
2. to promote understanding of actual problems involved in the faith response;
3. to suggest possibilities for more effective communication of faith.

We have suggested a few of the aspects of the "correlation" of theological and psychological material which are important for this thesis. There are a number of other concerns, both positive and negative, which will be considered as they arise in later chapters.

PART I

THEOLOGICAL MEANINGS

CHAPTER II

SOME THEOLOGICAL EMPHASES IN THE MEANING OF FAITH

Limitations of Study

A careful survey of the nature of the faith response to God's revelation of Himself in Jesus Christ, as seen in the history of Christian thought and experience, would be a valuable project in itself. It would serve to give perspective for the contemporary confusion concerning the nature of faith. Such a project, however, exceeds the purposes which were suggested in the previous chapter. Attention can be called to a noteworthy effort in this direction which has been made by Stewart Means. His Faith, an Historical Study is an attempt to review some of the more significant developments in Christian thought in terms of the concept of faith.[1] The limits of this thesis require a more hasty approach. We need an historical survey which will touch upon the major emphases in Christian thought concerning the nature of faith. We need such a survey to suggest the terms and concepts and experiences within Christian tradition to which contemporary psychological insights may be relevant. We need such a survey to provide the basis for a working definition of faith which, within reasonable limits, is consistent with the main streams of thought in Western Christianity. For our purposes it is important to include enough historical material to prevent the omission of significant aspects of the faith experience from our study and to minimize the danger of overemphasizing aspects of that experience which may not be consistent with the historical stream.

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[1] Stewart Means, Faith, an Historical Study (New York: the MacMillan Company, 1933).

Our approach has been to examine the available literature on the history of the concept of faith and to formulate the emphases to be found there. Reducing these to five major points of view on the meaning of faith, we have chosen to organize our historical material around these five emphases. The material to be included under each point of view is presented for purposes of illustration and explanation. It is not intended to be exhaustive or definitive. The material discussed does, however, suggest some of the important problems which are relevant to later chapters and our working definition of the faith response. To complete the theological section we shall discuss some of the theological concepts which we believe are important to the understanding of our definition of faith, and we shall further limit and clarify the meaning of faith in relation to these concepts.

The Problem

The question of the nature of the faith experience might be restated, "What aspects of the personality are involved in 'having faith in God' and how do they function in this experience?" Related questions can be suggested, such as: "Is faith primarily a function of one aspect of the personality; does it involve more than one; does it involve the total personality?" "If it involves the total personality, how are the various aspects of personality related in the faith experience?" "Why have emphases varied in Christian thinking about the nature of this experience?" "Is a definitive concept of the nature of this experience possible?"

In this chapter we hope to suggest some answers to these and related questions. Any answers to be found here, however, will be partial at best. We see the problem as a complex one. For practical purposes we must emphasize concepts of the nature of the faith experience. Such concepts can be only partially understood in themselves. For the most part we approach them as fragments of thought artificially isolated from the context in which they were originally communicated. Such fragments, abstracted from context, are easily misinterpreted and but poorly understood. A framework of thought, moreover, is itself an artificial thing apart from the man who has communicated it. Thought proceeds in a context of experience, individual and social, which strongly influences its meaning and shapes the forms of its communication. Thought divorced from this context of experience has values of its own but may lose much of its depth and seriousness. The task, however, of comprehending both the total framework of thought and the experiential background is arduous and demanding beyond the scope of this chapter; but we recognize the complexity of the problem before us and the limitations which must be ours, and we seek to include as much as may be profitable for our purposes for the fragments to be discussed.

For the concept of faith, two of the problems which we have noted above are particularly significant. Some of the most important contributors to the understanding of the meaning of faith in the Christian tradition were men like Paul, Augustine, and Luther who found a very personal meaning for faith themselves. Faith for them was closely related to their own particular needs and anxieties. Their concepts of faith tend to vary because of differences in their needs and anxieties and their ways of meeting their problems. Such differences in experience are important in determining the differing emphases in the concept of faith. It is our view that they are not sufficiently different to invalidate the possibility of common meanings for faith, but they need to be understood if we are to find such meanings.

As variant as individual personalities are the theological "climates" of periods of history. Theological emphases tend to vary with needs of particular cultures at particular times in history. Thus we shall expect to see emphases concerning the nature of faith varying with the different kinds of faith which were important to different cultural situations. Through it all, however, we shall expect to see the faint outlines of a common stream.

At the center of the "common stream" of Christian thinking about the nature of faith we shall expect to find some kind of concept having to do with relationships with God and Jesus Christ. No matter how such relationships may be conceived, Christian faith, by definition, would seem to require some kind of relationship to Jesus Christ and the God revealed by Him.[1] There are, of course, writers within the Christian tradition who have tended to minimize or to neglect the relationship to Jesus Christ in their thought about faith in God. There are also forms of Christianity which have tended to stress only the relationship to Jesus. But such phenomena would seem to be distortions of the common stream of Christian thought and, implicit within their views of faith, contain assumptions concerning the nature of God which have been made possible by His self-revelation in Jesus Christ, whether they recognize these assumptions or not.

As suggested previously, we shall center our discussion of historical views of the nature of faith around five types of relationships. Wording of labels for these types is difficult and may be misleading, but we suggest as the five:

1. Faith as trust,
2. Faith as a personal relationship,

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[1] Much of Christian thought would suggest that there are not two or more relationships to God and Jesus Christ (and the Holy Spirit) but a unified relationship to "God in Christ" which includes relationship to the Spirit "who proceedeth from the Father and the Son."

3. Faith as a primarily intellectual response,
4. Faith as feeling,
5. Faith as acceptance of a "state of being."

Because these five types or attributes of relationship to God and Christ are sometimes found as distinctive emphases, they are listed separately, but they are not necessarily to be considered as mutually exclusive. They often overlap, and some form of all five aspects of the faith relationship are to be found in many writers.

Faith as Trust

We begin with that aspect of faith which seems to be closest to the root meaning of faith. Trust is a foundation stone of the religious life which is present to a significant degree wherever there is a vital and creative relationship with God, whether its presence is emphasized in thought or not. There are times and places in the history of Christian experience when faith as trust in God has been especially important and has assumed a paramount place in thinking about faith. We shall note some of these times, and we would suggest that our own time, because of the nature of the anxieties which we must face, is one of these periods. The nature of trust, both as a theological and a psychological phenomenon, will be of great importance for this thesis. Faith as trust is of sufficient importance to be discussed as a separate emphasis in the meaning of faith even though it is closely related to faith as a "personal relationship" and faith as acceptance of a "state of being."

The Old Testament.--New Testament Christianity was planted and grew in soil which was composed of a complex of elements, but the predominant elements derived from two cultures--the Hebrew and the Greek. Drawing heavily upon its Hebraic legacy, most New Testament thought emphasizes trust as the basic attitude involved in faith in God.

In Old Testament thought, according to William H. P. Hatch, faith

> ...is not to be confused with belief in the existence of Jahveh or with some conviction concerning him. Faith or trust is rather the devout man's attitude towards the living God, whose character is known to be such that he can be trusted to the uttermost.[1]

B. B. Warfield comments on the Hebrew verb which can be translated in the Old Testament as meaning "trust" or "believe." He describes it as being connected with words meaning "support" and "nourish," and says that the fundamental idea is stability or trustworthiness. That can be said to be "faithful" which

> ...holds, is steady, or can be depended upon, whether a wall which securely holds a nail (Isaiah 22:23,25), or a brook which does not fail (Jeremiah 16:18), or a kingdom which is firmly established (II Samuel 7:16), or an assertion which has been verified (Genesis 42:20), or a covenant which endures for ever (Psalm 89:28), or a heart found faithful (Nehemiah 9:8), or a man who can be trusted (Nehemiah 13:13), or God Himself who keeps a covenant (Deuteronomy 7:9).[2]

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[1] William H. P. Hatch, The Idea of Faith in Christian Literature from the death of St. Paul to the end of the second century (Strasbourg: Imprimerie Alsacienne, 1925), pp.4,5.

[2] B. B. Warfield, "Faith", A Dictionary of the Bible, ed. James Hastings (New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1899), Vol. I, p. 827.

Warfield describes faith in the Old Testament (with specific reference to Habbakuk 2:4 and Genesis 15:6) as "a profound and abiding disposition and ingrained attitude of mind and heart towards God," and the fundamental characteristic of this attitude is "trusting dependence on God."[1]

The story of Abraham and particularly the words of Genesis 15:6, "and he believed the Lord; and he reckoned it to him as righteousness,"[2] cast an influential shadow on the New Testament and Christian thought. The faith of Abraham in some ways became the prototype of the faith response to God. G. G. Findlay writes, "His heart's trustful response to Jehovah's promise made Abraham all that he has become to Israel and humanity; and the 'men of faith' are his children."[3]

It would be of interest to trace the development in the Old Testament of the kind of relationship of trust which was depicted in Abraham's relationship to God, particularly the various developments to be seen in the covenantal relationship. This we cannot do here, but we shall discuss the Pauline interpretation of this relationship shortly, and as a background for this we note briefly a dialectic implicit in the Abraham type of relationship which has asserted itself in many troublesome ways both in the history of Judaism and Christianity. Such faith implies trust in God Himself who can be trusted to keep His promises, but it also implies trust in human activity of some kind to fulfill whatever conditions may be considered necessary for men to receive the promise. Man responds with trust to God as God but also to some kind of trust which God is believed to demonstrate toward man e.g., a code of laws which man is trusted to obey or a Savior whom man is trusted to accept. The tension involved in this dialectic is to be seen throughout the Bible and religious history, and there have been many different kinds of attempts to achieve a balance.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Unless otherwise noted all Biblical quotations are from The Holy Bible-Revised Standard Version (New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1953).

[3] G. G. Findlay, "Faith", A Dictionary of the Bible, ed. James Hastings (New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1909), p. 256.

It is interesting and important to note that in the Old Testament faith, like many other word symbols, symbolizes an activity rather than a concept. The verb is found in various places, but the noun is found only twice. It is also significant that the activity of faith is sometimes found in a context of human struggle with fear and anxiety. This context is important for both the theological and psychological understanding of faith, and we include a few examples of this context as found in the Old Testament:

> When I am afraid,
>   I put my trust in thee.
> In God, whose word I praise,
>   In God I trust without a fear,
>   What can flesh do to me?[1]
>
> The Lord is my light and my salvation;
>   whom shall I fear?
> The Lord is the stronghold of my life;
>   of whom shall I be afraid?
> . . . .

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[1] Psalm 56:3,4.

Though an host encamp against me,
  my heart shall not fear;
though war arise against me,
  yet will I be confident.[1]

Blessed is the man
  whose trust is the Lord.
He is like a tree planted by water,
  that sends out its roots by the stream,
and does not fear when heat comes,
  for its leaves remain green,
and is not anxious in the year of drought,
  for it does not cease to bear fruit.[2]

Jesus.--Faith as trust in God was both exemplified in Jesus and communicated by him to his disciples, and it is often contrasted with anxiety as in the Old Testament thought noted above. Hatch comments upon the relationship with God which Jesus lived and taught:

> The relation between him and his Father was as simple as it was natural. God was wise and good, and faith or trust was the normal and right attitude of mind and heart towards him....
>
> Jesus became convinced that he was in the truth the promised and long-expected Messiah, and he demanded of his followers absolute loyalty to himself and his cause. But he did not on this account desire or ask them to trust in him. God should be the sole object of men's trust.[3]

All of Jesus' life, of which we have any record, is an example of such trust in God, but in these experiences fraught with great anxiety or spiritual anguish we see the greatest manifestations of trust--Jesus in Gethsemane praying, "My Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me; nevertheless,

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[1] Psalm 27:1,3.

[2] Jeremiah 17:7,8.

[3] Hatch, op. cit., pp. 5,6.

"not as I will, but as thou wilt;"[1] and Jesus on the Cross crying, "Father, into thy hands I commit my spirit!"[2]

Although Jesus attempted to direct his followers trust toward God, he, as the Messiah, provided a new basis for such trust. As C. H. Dodd suggests, this new foundation for trust was "the conviction that God through His Messiah was able to do what He had promised through the prophets."[3] Perhaps even more important, however, in the Synoptic Gospels is the fact that it was a personal response to Jesus which made possible for his followers the trust in God which Jesus taught and exemplified... In reference to lack of faith or "little faith" Jesus occasionally relates faith to anxiety. Some of the "do not be anxious" sections of the Sermon on the Mount, for example, might be summarized, "Why are you anxious?....O men of little faith?"[4] Lack of a trusting relationship with God, Jesus suggests, is reflected in personal anxiety.

Paul.--The meaning of faith to Jesus and his disciples is by no means exhausted by this brief discussion of trust and anxiety. Some of the other meanings to be found in the Synoptic Gospels will be discussed later, but we turn now to the man who gave to faith its most complex meanings, St. Paul. His concept of faith finds its roots in Greek as well as Hebraic soil, but the Hebraic emphasis on faith as trust is emphatically present. Dodd, in his commentary on Romans, writes concerning Paul:

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[1] Matthew 26:39.

[2] Luke 23:46. See Appendix A for further discussion of the faith exemplified by Jesus.

[3] C. H. Dodd, The Epistle of Paul to the Romans, (New York: Harper and Brothers, n.d.), p. 16.

[4] See Matthew 6:24-34. Compare Luke 12:28, Mark 4:40, Luke 8:25.

> The difference his conversion made, as he saw it, was not that his faith, formerly given to God, was now given to Christ, but that his faith in God was now for the first time the real thing--it was the faith of Abraham, as he would have said--a radical trust in God the All-Sufficient, leaving no place for human merit of any kind.[1]

What this means is suggested in these words:

> What Abraham's faith was, Paul discussed at length in Romans IV and he arrived at the conclusion that Abraham gave glory to God and felt convinced that He was able to do what He had promised....Paul therefore took the passage from Habbakuk "He who through faith is righteous shall live," Habbakuk 2:4 to mean that, though it was impossible to gain life by obeying the Law, it was possible to do so by simple reliance on God, in the conviction that He is able to give the blessing He has promised to men--and it is implied that He can be trusted to do so, for 'God is trustworthy.'[2]

Just what "simple reliance on God" means to Paul or to Dodd is not particularly clear, but Dodd's comments suggest that, for Paul, the activity of faith is an "attitude of pure receptivity in which the soul appropriates what God has done."[3]

> For Paul faith is that attitude in which, acknowledging our complete insufficiency for any of the high ends of life, we rely utterly on the sufficiency of God. It is

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[1] Dodd, op. cit., p. 17. [2] Ibid., pp. 14, 15.

[3] Ibid., p. 56.

> to cease from all assertion of the self, even by way of effort after righteousness, and to make room for the divine initiative. By such faith a man enters into life, in every sense in which that phrase can be used....For the sake of clearness I would add that it does not mean (as Habakkuk meant) fidelity or loyalty to God; for that might be thought of as in itself meritorious, and Paul would not have thought himself 'sufficient' for such a thing, until through simple faith he had received strength from God. Nor does it mean belief in a proposition, though doubtless intellectual beliefs are involved when we come to think it out. It is an act which is the negation of all activity, a moment of passivity out of which the strength for action comes, because in it God acts.[1]

For Paul trust in God is the foundation stone of the moral and religious life. Dean Inge describes Paul's view as "subjective trust in Christ's promises, plus all that such trust necessarily led to in an honest and consistent man."[2] Paul's emphasis on a radical trust in God as the foundation of the religious and moral life is understandable in the light of his pre-Christian struggle to justify himself before God by his obedience of the Jewish Law. This effort brought him a sense of moral failure, a feeling of bondage to the Law, and a fear of condemnation by the wrath of God. His experience of Christ was an experience of reconciliation with God and made a fundamental change in his life and his view of man's relationship to God. The contrast between his old and new religious attitudes was often symbolized by him as a contrast between "works" and "faith." "Faith" has to do with the attitude whereby a man appropriates to himself the reconciliation which God has wrought in Jesus Christ and begins to live his life in accordance with his new relationship to God. "Faith," in its context, is to be contrasted with any form of "works" by which a man seeks through his own efforts to achieve reconciliation with God.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 15, 16.

[2] William Ralph Inge, Faith and Its Psychology (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1910), p. 11.

The core of faith in the writings of Paul may be said to be "trust" but there are other elements of faith, including some Greek contributions to the meaning of faith, which are also important for Paul. These will be discussed under the other types of faith response which are included in this chapter. We pause, however, to quote what is probably the finest statement in the Bible of a trust which transcends all the vicissitudes of human existence:

> In all these things, we are more than conquerors through him who loved us. For I am sure that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor things present, nor things to come, nor powers, nor height, nor depth, nor anything else in all creation, will be able to separate us from the love of God in Christ Jesus our Lord.[1]

Other New Testament Views.--The emphasis on the attitude of trust is not as sharp and clear elsewhere in the New Testament as it is in the Synoptic Gospels and in the letters of Paul. Concerns for belief in Jesus as Christ, knowledge of God, and acceptance of a body of doctrine enter strongly into some of the later writings, but faith as trust is important in many other books of the New Testament. In Acts, although faith is based on belief that Jesus is the Messiah, it is still "primarily trust, and as such it involves self-surrender and loyalty."[1] A profound attitude of trust or "trusting hope" pervades the Epistle to the Hebrews. The interpretation of this epistle is difficult and varies with the interpreter's view of the cultural and philosophical background of the author. Chapters II and 12:1,2 provide an important treatise on faith beginning with the classical definition, "Faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen." The writer then describes various "heroes of faith" who by a trusting hope in God's promises dared to venture out into unknown lands or endured great trials because they desired "a better country, that is a heavenly one." Such trust is, then, in Hebrews, the power which makes possible what might be called adventurous or experimental living for the sake of God's purposes and God's promises. An emphasis on faith as trust and a trusting hope is also strong in I Peter.

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[1] Romans 8:37-39.

Martin Luther.--As we shall see, the changing emphases and concerns of Christian thought in the years following the writing of the canonical books caused other concepts of the nature of faith to overshadow the attitude of trust. The intellectual concerns of the Greeco-Roman world and later, the scholastic questions of the Middle Ages, resulted in new perspective on the experience of faith and new statements of its meaning, but a trusting reliance upon God and His promises remained important in religious living in a world fraught with anxieties. Martin Luther and the Protestant Reformation, however, focussed men's attention once more, upon the importance of trust in the concept of faith. In his struggles with his own anxieties Martin Luther came at last to the answer of St. Paul that "the just shall live by faith," and he held with great tenacity to the assertion that salvation is by faith alone. Luther's concept of faith, like Paul's, is very complex, but the cornerstone is trust:

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[1] Hatch, *op. cit.*, pp. 35,36.

> ...to have a god, truly means to have something in which the heart puts all trust....[1]
>
> All depends on faith. He who does not believe is like one who must cross the sea, but is so timid that he does not trust the ship; and so he must remain and never be saved, because he does not embark and cross over.[2]
>
> If man is to deal with God and receive anything from Him it must happen in this wise, not that man begin and lay the first stone, but that God alone, ...must first come and give him a promise. This word of God is the beginning, the foundation, the rock, upon which all works, words and thoughts of man must build. This word man must gratefully accept, and faithfully believe the divine promise, and by no means doubt that it is and comes to pass just as He promises. This trust and faith is the beginning, middle, and end of all works

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[1] "Larger Catechism," The J. N. Lenker Edition of Luther's Works (Minneapolis: The Luther Press, 1903-1910), Vol. XXIV, p. 47.

[2] "A Treatise Concerning the Blessed Sacrament and Concerning the Brotherhoods," Works of Martin Luther (Philadelphia: United Lutheran Publication House, 1915-1932) Vol. II, p. 25.

> and righteousness. For, because man does God the honor of regarding and confessing Him as true, He becomes to him a gracious God, Who in turn honors him and regards and confesses him as true.[1]

The relationship of trust to some other aspects of religious experience is suggested in these words:

> We should note that there are two ways of believing. One way is to believe _about_ God, as I do when I believe that what is said of God is true, just as I do when I believe what is said about the Turk, the devil, or hell. This faith is knowledge or observation rather than faith. The other way is to believe _in_ God, as I do when I not only believe what is said about Him is true, but put my trust in Him, surrender myself to Him, and make bold to deal with Him, believing without a doubt that He will be to me and do to me just what is said of Him.[2]

Because of the importance of Christ to him in his own experience Luther's confidence in God centered around what God had done and said in Christ. Thus Luther's view of faith emphasized trust in the character and promises of God revealed in Christ and proclaimed in the Bible, and for him this trust is the _sine qua non_ of the religious life. Other aspects of the believer's relationship to Christ were also important, however, as shall be noted later.

John Calvin.--John Calvin followed the core of Luther's thought, but gave it an intellectual bias in the manner in which he stated his understanding of the nature of faith. Here he stands with Luther:

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[1] "Treatise on the New Testament," _Works of Martin Luther_, Vol. I, p. 297 f.

[2] "A Brief Explanation of the Ten Commandments, The Creed, and The Lord's Prayer," _Works of Martin Luther_, Vol. II, p. 368.

> The schoolmen are altogether erroneous, who in the discussion of faith regard it as a simple assent of the understanding, entirely neglecting the confidence and assurance of the heart. Faith, therefore, is a singular gift of God in two respects, both as the mind is enlightened to understand the truth of God, and as the heart is established in it.[1]

But here he substitutes "knowledge" for Luther's "trust," "assurance," or "confidence"

> We shall have a complete definition of faith, if we say that it is a steady and certain knowledge of the Divine benevolence towards us, which being founded on the truth of the gratuitous promise in Christ, is both revealed to our minds, and confirmed to our hearts, by the Holy Spirit.[2]

Actually the emphasis seems to be the same in both Luther and Calvin. Calvin writes, "The knowledge of faith consists more in certainty than in comprehension,"[3] and he goes on to say that we have a sufficient certainty of salvation, when God Himself assures us of His love.[4] This sounds very much like Luther, but there is sufficient difference in language and the context of thought to account for some of the differences which have occurred in Calvinistic and Lutheran concepts of faith. It is also important that Calvin's concept of faith tends to be limited to this "steady and certain knowledge" and does not include some of the other aspects which Luther emphasized.

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[1] Calvin _Institutes_ iii.2.33. (Notes for classical references follow the form used in _A Manual of Style_ [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1949] pp. 143-144.)

[2] _Institutes_ iii. 2.7

[3] _Institutes_ iii. 2.15

[4] _Institutes_ iii. 2.28

Later views.--In this brief sketch of faith as trust in the character of God we shall not be able to survey the various developments following the Reformation. Some of these will be noted in relation to other concepts of the nature of faith. Trust, as the central component of faith, has continued to be important in the Protestant tradition, however. Other men, struggling with the contradiction between the "is" and the "ought to be" in their lives, have continued to find meaning in the "salvation by faith alone" concepts of Paul as mediated by Martin Luther and the Protestant tradition. They have sought relief from various anxieties and have found a significant measure of it in a newly awakened trust in God. John Wesley and his followers, for example, exhorted guilt-ridden souls "to flee from the wrath to come and be saved from their sins." To accomplish these ends they attempted to impart to those who heard them the kind of trust in God which Wesley experienced at Aldersgate:

> In the evening I went very unwillingly to a society in Aldersgate Street, where one was reading Luther's preface to the Epistle to the Romans. About a quarter before nine, while he was describing the change which God works in the heart through faith in Christ, I felt my heart strangely warmed. I felt I did trust in Christ, Christ alone, for salvation; and an assurance was given me that He had taken away my sins, even mine, and saved me from the law of sin and death.[1]

Such trust or "assurance" has been an important part of Methodism and other Protestant groups in which "justification by faith" has been understood. The content, of such trust, of course, has varied considerably.

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[1] John Wesley, The Journal of the Rev. John Wesley, ed. Nehemiah Curnock (London: The Epworth Press, 1938) May 24, 1738, sec. 14.

Faith has been interpreted as a far less radical kind of trust in movements which have emphasized the importance of human efforts in religion. This has been particularly true in various types of "modern" or "liberal" Christianity. The rediscovery of "sin" and the radical contradiction between the "is" and the "ought" in contemporary history, however, has been accompanied by a reemphasis upon faith as trust in God alone for salvation. Since Kierkegaard this trust has been thought of increasingly in relation to the basic anxieties of existence. This relationship of faith to anxiety in modern thought will be discussed in some detail later. A quotation from Reinhold Niebuhr may summarize some of the contemporary views:

> The ideal possibility is that faith in the ultimate security of God's love would overcome all immediate insecurities of nature and history...It is significant that Jesus justifies his injunction, 'Be not anxious' with the observation, 'For your heavenly Father knoweth that ye have need of these things.' The freedom from anxiety which he enjoins is a possibility only if perfect trust in divine security has been achieved.[1]

Summary.--In this survey we have seen that the attitude of trust was central to much of Old and New Testament understanding of the experience of faith in God. God is dependable, therefore God is to be trusted. The New Testament introduces unique evidence of the nature and ground of this dependability. It also, in the writings of St. Paul, exposes the futility of human efforts to reconcile the moral and ethical contradictions in human life and, thus, by contrasting the dependability of God with the dependability of man, increases the significance of trust in God. The core of meaning remains very much the same, but the content varies with the spiritual questions which are asked and the answers which are found for them. Other important variations are seen in the kinds of relationship with God which have resulted from faith as trust in Him. We turn our attention now to some aspects of that relationship.

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[1] Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1943), Vol. 1, p. 183.

Faith as A Personal Relationship

The natural concomitant of trust in God is some kind of personal relationship with Him growing out of the nature of that trust. In fact trust in God is already a personal relationship with Him. It involves more than an attitude or complex of attitudes. It involves a response of the total person to God who reveals Himself as trustworthy. For example, it includes some kind of decision as to the trustworthiness of God, even though such decision may be only partly conscious; it includes a willingness to take risks in demonstration of one's confidence in God; and it includes some kind of respect and love toward a dependable God. We have stressed the attitude of trust which is a basic attribute of faith. It is our view that other aspects of personal relationship develop in relation to the response of trust, and we shall dicuss this point of view more fully in our study of the development of faith in Part II. Our concern now is to look at some of the other aspects of the personal relationship with God which develop along with the trusting relationship. Ideally, we can say that the more fully God is trusted the more fully the total person can be related to Him. Our purpose here is to report an emphasis on faith in Christian thought as a relationship of the total self with God and to note some of the characteristics of this total relationship which will be important for our definition of faith and our correlation of theological and psychological insights. Various aspects of this total relationship will then be discussed later in our study of emphases on intellectual, volitional, and "feeling" concepts of faith.

Since Jesus Christ is both the Mediator of the faith relationship for the individual Christian and the pattern for such faith relationship, we begin this section with a look at the kind of relationship he lived and communicated to his followers.

Jesus.--Following the heritage of men like Jeremiah and some of the Psalmists, Jesus lived his relationship to God as a very personal thing. In human terms his fellowship with God has been symbolized as a father-son relationship. The exact nature of this relationship is one of the great mysteries of religious history, but there is much evidence in the New Testament that it was a close and intimate fellowship in which Jesus found renewal of his resources and guidance for his decisions and actions. On deeper levels it involved a complete identification of Jesus with the character and purposes of God as he understood them, and a complete reliance upon God for his personal security. Beyond anything which can be found in the Old Testament, Jesus' trust in God was expressed in a dynamic personal relationship with God. Theology has long struggled with formulations for this relationship. For our purposes, however, it is sufficient to note that the main stream of Christian tradition has held to the view that Jesus was one with God in the unity of Father and Son and Holy Spirit, but at the same time Jesus remained completely human and individual. This is a paradox beyond human understanding if it is to be expressed in logical terms, but what is important here is that on its human side it sets the ideal for Christian faith-relationships with God. The ideal is the close and complete communion and identification with God which is seen in Jesus the Christ, but in which the human personality does not become absorbed into the divine. Man remains man and God remains God; creature remains creature and Creator remains Creator. The gulf is bridged only in Jesus Christ.

The Christian response of faith to God, beginning with Jesus and his disciples, is deeply and comprehensively personal. Means writes:

> The primary truth of Christianity is that God declares himself in Christ as the Father. He is a Person, with all the characteristics of personality raised to their highest power. Man must be a Person else he cannot enter into any individual relations with this Father who is a Person. Here we move into the world of the spirit, of the highest reality, for nothing is so real as personality. Out of this central fact and this spiritual likeness springs the possibility of a

> communion, not accidental, occasional or peculiar but one which is the very heart of human life in its Christian interpretation.[1]

The nature of this personal response has been variously described, but the dual relationship of son and disciple can be used to express some of the more significant emphases.

Jesus expressed the ideal of sonship in two ways; first, in the relationship to the Father which he, himself, exemplified, and second, in the relationship which he taught was available to all men, particularly as depicted in the story of "The Prodigal Son." In this story it is a memory of a relationship with the Father and a trusting hope in the possibilities of a future relationship which make possible the return of the repentant and humble prodigal to his home. His return involves a free choice of voluntary obedience in the service of his Father. His homecoming implies a response of love and gratitude to the unmerited gift of pardon which he finds upon his return. The story does not depict the life which follows the return of the prodigal, but there is ample evidence in the New Testament[2] that the life of such a son would be one strongly motivated by a trusting love toward the Father and a deep loyalty and devotion freely offered to

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[1] _Op. cit._, p. 217.

There are, however, two dangers in Means' statement: (1) that it might be thought that God's revelation can be exhausted by the concept of personality, which denies God's transcendence of all human categories, and (2) that the radical discontinuity between God as Person and man as person, because of sin, might be overlooked.

[2] See, for example, Paul's discussion of sons and slaves in Galations 3,4,5.

His purposes. The story does, however, present the possibility of another type of sonship in the "elder son" who continues steadfast in his loyalty to his Father and enjoys a close, but less meaningful, type of relationship to Him.

Jesus and His followers.--The significance of Jesus, himself, to his followers introduces the element of discipleship into the personal response of the individual to God. In addition to being called to a new awareness and new actuality of being sons of God, the Christian is called to be a disciple of Christ. It is doubtful whether there is any essential difference between "sonship" and "discipleship" since Jesus embodied and taught the nature and meaning of sonship and adherence to him means acceptance of the life of sonship. However, the relationship of "disciple" to Jesus Christ has been important to his followers as the means by which one enters into sonship and is able to live the life and do the works of a "son"; consequently, both "sonship" and "discipleship" have been important aspects of the Christian's relationship to God. The requirements of being a disciple have been variously defined, but, in general, they include personal acceptance of the revelation of God in Jesus Christ and dedication to the purposes and motivations implicit in that revelation. "Sonship" might be described as the ideal relation to God, freedom-in-love as exemplified and taught by Jesus; but "discipleship" is an inevitable aspect of the personal relationship for at least two reasons--first, because of the mediated character of the Christian's relationship to God; and second, because of the effects of sin which make the ideal of freedom-in-love impossible to actualize completely in this life. Something of the "discipline" of a disciple is inevitable in a faith relationship, and this "discipline" may include extreme types of dutiful servitude involving bondage to "the law" and "the idol."

Both "sonship" and "discipleship" are ambiguous concepts which can include a multitude of attributes. How much of both of these types of relationships should be included in the definition of the faith-relationship to God? This question, in our research, seems to come down to a question of what kind of personal relationships various interpreters have chosen to include in their concepts of faith. A further attempt at definition will be made after a brief survey of some of the relevant contributions.

New Testament Interpretations.--Many writers agree that the faith seen in the New Testament includes some kind of commitment to God through Jesus Christ. Speaking in general about faith, G. G. Findlay writes that in the New Testament:

> It signified the unique attachment which gathered around the Person of Jesus--a human trust, in its purity and intensity such as no other man had ever elicited, which grew up into and identified itself with the possessor's belief in God, transforming the latter in doing so, and which drew the whole being of the believer into the will and life of his Master.[1]

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[1] Findlay, op.cit., pp. 256, 257.

The welding of two faith relationships into one, Findlay says, is exemplified in the experience of Thomas which led him to cry "My Lord and my God!" (John 20:28). Warfield's general comment is:

> The idea of faith is conceived of in the New Testament as the characteristic idea of Christianity, and...it does not import mere 'belief' in an intellectual sense, but all that enters into an entire self-commitment of the soul to Jesus as the Son of God, the Saviour of the World.[1]

Concerning faith as it is seen in the Synoptic Gospels, Dean Inge comments:

> "Faith" and "to believe" in the Synoptic Gospels means a spirit of simple receptiveness toward the Messiah and His message; a state of mind, which, unlike the righteousness of the Pharisees, requires no previous course of discipline in the meritorious actions. "Faith" is the primary motion of the human spirit when brought into contact with Divine truth and goodness. Its fruits are loyal self-devotion, even unto death, complete renunciation of all earthly ties, insofar as these could come between the disciple and his Master, untiring energy in service, and an enthusiastic temper, full of love, joy, and peace.[2]

Hatch gives a brief summary of the meaning of faith in the Book of Acts and stresses the relationship of trust to commitment:

> Faith is an attitude of mind and heart, and it is the distinctive characteristic of the followers of Jesus. It is based on the belief that he is the Messiah, but it is much more than mere belief. It is primarily trust, and as such it involves self-surrender and loyalty.[3]

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[1] Warfield, op.cit., p. 831.

[2] Inge, op.cit., p. 10.

[3] Hatch, op.cit., pp. 35,36.

An interesting project for study would be the changing nature of the faith-commitment to Jesus as seen in the New Testament, noting especially changes as the historical presence of Jesus became more remote and as the "end of the age" seemed less imminent. For our purposes, however, we are concerned only to note the emphasis on a personal relationship to God through Christ as it is found in the New Testament.

Paul.--In the writings of Paul there are some passages which can be interpreted as meaning that Paul's personal relationship to God in Christ was "mystical" in character. For example, he speaks of "revelations" which may have resembled experiences of "mystics,"[1] and there are those who would include him in the list of Christian mystics.[2] It is difficult to know what is meant by those who write of a "mystical relationship," and there seems to be little clear agreement among writers who so label Paul's relationship to God. We would suggest two general characteristics of a "mystical relationship" based on studies we have made in this area--a "way of life" or discipline which is intended to culminate in an experience of the divine which may be labelled in various ways ("union with God," "the beatific vision," "absorption into the Infinite," etc.) but which implies an immediate (as opposed to a mediated) knowledge or awareness of the divine; second, a religious philosophy based on such experiences of the divine.[1]

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[1] II Corinthians 12:1-8.

[2] see Hatch, op.cit., p. 10; Inge, op.cit., p. 11; Oscar Pfister, Christianity and Fear (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1944), pp. 231, 232.

In reading St. Paul we would tend to agree with those writers who deny such a "mystical" element in his relationship to God. Speaking of some of the passages which might be called "mystical," J. E. Rattenbury says:

> There is nothing of mystical absorption and fusion in his experience. His union with Christ was just an intimate companionship with an unseen friend.[2]

And James Stewart, discussing the nature of Paul's union with Christ comments:

> It was in the daily, ever-renewed communion, rather than in the transient rapture, that the inmost nature of Christianity lay.[3]

Oscar Pfister, seems to keep his feet in "both camps" by speaking of Paul's relationship to Christ as a "mystical love relationship" but one which maintains the distinction between subject and object.[4] There is, of course, extensive literature on this problem, but the view which seems most adequate to the writer is that Paul's relationship to God was not one of "immediate" knowledge but a relationship mediated to him by Jesus Christ. In this relationship Paul felt a close identification with Christ, and he sought to live and preach the way of life which he found in Christ; but this is an identification with the attitudes and the purposes and activities of Christ, not with a contemplative way of life. Because of what he had received from Christ he felt a close sense of communion and fellowship with God. He felt this from day to day and expressed it in prayer, but it is the fellowship of a "son" with his Heavenly Father, not of a "mystic" with "The Infinite." Paul's own words in Galatians 2:20 describe, however, some of the paradoxical characteristics of his relationship with God in Christ. He felt a kind of "union" of identification with Christ, but he knew he continued to be Paul who must live this life by faith. He wrote,

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[1] See Rufus Jones, Studies in Mystical Religion (London: MacMillan and Company, Ltd., 1923), p. xv. Evelyn Underhill, The Mystics of the Church (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1926), pp. 9-20.

[2] J. Ernest Rattenbury, The Religious Experience of St. Paul (Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1931), p. 125.

[3] James S. Stewart, A Man in Christ (London: Hodder and Stoughton, Ltd., 1938), p. 231.

[4] Pfister, op. cit., pp. 231, 232.

> "I have been crucified with Christ; it is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me; and the life I now live in the flesh I live by faith in the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me."

Stewart Means has an interesting discussion of faith as a personal relationship in the writings of St. Paul. He stresses both the "sonship" and the "discipleship" aspects of this relationship. He sees in "sonship" the acceptance not only of man's intended relationship to God but also the acceptance of a profound identification with Christ:

> Sonship is not merely theoretical and titular, but it is the expression in man's spiritual character and moral

> life of the characteristics and essential qualities of Christ's life.[1]

Thus, St. Paul, in his identification with Christ, lived and taught the relationship of "sonship" to God. Means also notes what has been mentioned above, that faith for Paul involved a growth in fellowship and communion with God and a "consequent increase and growth in all the most spiritual elements of character."[2] Beyond this, however, Means asserts that for Paul faith meant obedience:

> It is the surrender of the whole personality to the molding power of God to whom the soul has submitted itself in perfect trust, which constitutes that essential obedience which is the obedience of faith and the result of faith.[3]

The Fourth Gospel.--In the Fourth Gospel also is to be found a faith relationship with God in Jesus Christ which is deeply personal. The intellectual and cultural background of the Johannine writings causes differences in language and emphasis, and we shall have more to say about these when we discuss the intellectual emphasis in the meaning of faith; but we note here that "believing" and "knowing" in the Fourth Godpel find meaning in the context of a total personal relationship to God in Christ. As Means has written, commenting on this Gospel:

> The existence of Jesus as an object of adoration and love obviously made possible for the human soul a relation which had never existed before. It also implied an ex-

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[1] Means, op. cit., p. 64.

[2] Ibid., p. 60.

[3] Ibid., p. 62.

> perience of a spiritual character so wonderful and so vital that old terms might be used, but they could not adequately express this new condition, or state the psychological changes with accuracy and precision. This knowing or believing has reference to a Person and therefore cannot be merely an act of the mind, an historical apprehension, but must involve, as the object itself does, the whole realm of personality.[1]

Dean Inge also gives a broad meaning to the term "believing" in the Fourth Gospel, suggesting that it means both "intellectual conviction" and "moral self surrender."[2]

The question of a "mystical" character of the relationship with Christ arises in relation to the Fourth Gospel as it did with Paul,[3] but it will be more meaningful to discuss this question in the next section in relation to the intellectual emphasis of this Gospel. One important limitation on the meaning of faith in the Johannine writings needs to be mentioned here, however. In these writings the symbol "love" tends to include most of the dynamic aspects of the personal relationships to God, Christ, and "the brethren." There is no clear-cut distinction between the place of faith and love in these relationships, but the two are separated from each other more definitely than in the writings of Paul and an emphasis was established which tended to result in a weakening of the meaning of faith in much of later western thought. We shall have occasion to return to his problem elsewhere.

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[1] Means, op. cit., p. 75.

[2] Inge, op. cit., p. 23.

[3] see Hatch, op. cit., p. 23.

From New Testament Times to the Reformation.--Elsewhere in the New Testament we also see evidence of a faith relationship with God through Christ which involves something more than a simple attitude of trust or an act of intellectual belief.[1] In later New Testament writings the "discipleship" emphasis, as we have defined it, tends to come to the fore, and the "sonship" aspect of the relationship tends to lose some of the importance it had for Jesus and Paul.

As we move out from the New Testament into the stream of western Christian thought, the intellectual and cultural concerns which had begun to manifest themselves in the Fourth Gospel continue to exert a strong influence on the thinking about the nature of faith. Consequently, we shall deal with the major emphases in Graeco-Roman and Scholastic thought about faith in other sections which are relevant to those emphases. Before we move on to the intellectual emphasis in the meaning of faith, however, we want to look briefly at some Reformation and contemporary thinking about the relationship of the total self with God.

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[1] Commenting on Faith in the New Testament, G. G. Findlay writes, that faith "is a spiritual apprehension joined with personal affiance; the recognition of truth in and the plighting of troth with the unseen." loc. cit.

On Hebrews, Hatch says, "Faith is not mere belief in Jahveh's promises, or even trust in him. It is rather assurance concerning the fulfillment of his promises, which is based ultimately on his character...Faith, however, has other meanings in the Epistle to the Hebrews besides the one which has been discussed above. Faith is the word for the hearer's response to what he has heard. He believes the message, accepts it, and acts upon it." op. cit., pp. 14, 17.

On I Peter, Hatch concludes, "...faith is not merely belief or conviction. It is primarily trust in a person, and it includes self-surrender." Ibid., p. 28.

The view which has been suggested here is that a personal response to God's revelation of Himself in Jesus Christ necessarily involves some kind of total involvement of the self in a "faith relationship." This we hold to be true even though this involvement is not recognized in the concept of faith of a particular historical expression of the meaning of faith. Through all the centuries, Christianity as a way of life has included some elements both of "sonship" and "discipleship." These have been variously interpreted in differing cultural atmospheres, but personal commitment of some kind to Christ and an identification with some aspect of his life and ministry is to be seen in Christian life in every period.

Martin Luther and John Calvin.--When we look at the thinking of the Reformation, particularly the thought of Martin Luther, we see the use of the symbol "faith" to include a deep sense of identification with Christ. Roland Bainton, in his study of Luther's life suggests his view of the experience by which Luther was able to come to a sense of personal identification with Christ. He pictures Luther preparing for his first lectures on the Psalms during that crucial period of his life when he was searching desperately for a Saviour. Meditating upon the 22nd Psalm, Luther found the words--"My God, my God, why has thou forsaken me?"--to be particularly meaningful to him. Often he had had a feeling of being forsaken by God and he knew the awful experience these words could mean. But these had been the words of Jesus on the Cross. Could Jesus, too, have known this experience? Could Jesus have so identified himself with the suffering of men that he, too, could feel forsaken by God? Bainton writes:

> Why should Christ have known such desperations?...Christ was not weak; Christ was not impure; Christ was not impious (as Luther felt himself to be). The only answer must be that Christ took to himself the iniquity of us all. He who was without sin for our sakes became sin and so identified himself with us as to participate in our alienation.[1]

Through some such experience Luther found that he came, through faith, to an understanding of Christ's act of atonement for him and a profound sense of personal identification with Christ. Luther wrote:

> Faith...unites the soul with Christ as a bride is united with her bridegroom. And by this mystery, as the Apostle teaches, Christ and the soul become one flesh. And if they are one flesh and there is between them a true marriage..., it follows that all they have they have in common, the good as well as the evil, so that the believing soul can boast of and glory in whatever Christ has as if it were its own, and whatever the soul has Christ claims as His own.[2]

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[1] Roland Bainton, Here I Stand (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury, c. 1950), p. 62.

[2] "A Treatise on Christian Liberty," Works of Martin Luther, Vol., II, p. 320.

And again:

> For I am a sinner; yet am I drawn in His righteousness, which is given me. I am unclean; but His holiness is my sanctification...I am an ignorant fool; but His wisdom carries me forward. I have deserved condemnation; but I am set free by His redemption.[1]

Means summarizes this aspect of Luther's faith-relationship:

> It is not the subjective faith of the individual which makes righteous before God, but the appropriation and identification of the soul with Christ, to whom we are united, and who becomes the living energy of our lives. Faith is thus not an idle quality or intellectual apprehension, but a living force and power working in the life and for the life, in real fact, Christ himself.[2]

In Luther we see, then an identification with Christ which is in many ways similar to that seen in St. Paul yet it is significantly different because the personalities are different and the situations in which the personalities are involved are different. This identification is important, as Means suggests, as part of the dynamic power of Christian life, but the differences in the kinds of identification which are made are also of great importance. Calvin, for example, also finds a basis for identification with Christ, but the essence of this identification seems to be "voluntary obedience to the will of God." It was "the whole course of his obedience," particularly "his voluntary submission," which accomplished the redemptive work of Christ and it is "voluntary obedience to the will of God" which characterizes the life of the Christian.[1] It is interesting to note how Luther and Calvin emphasize two different aspects of sonship. Luther writes:

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[1] "The Fourteen of Consolation," Works of Martin Luther, Vol.,I, p. 168.

[2] Means, op. cit., p. 273.

> A Christian, if he but believe it, may boast of the merits of Christ and all His blessings, even as if he had won them all himself. So truly are they his own that he may even dare to look boldly forward to the judgment of God, unbearable though it be. So great a thing is faith, such blessings does it bring us, such glorious sons of God does it make us. For we cannot be sons without inheriting our Father's goods.[2]

And Calvin:

> We have said that the end of regeneration is, that the life of believers may exhibit a symmetry and agreement between the righteousness of God and their obedience; and that thus they may confirm the adoption by which they are accepted as his children.[3]

Of course, both men include other aspects of sonship in their thinking, but the differences of emphasis noted in these passages seem significant.

Few thinkers would as openly include identification with Christ under the meaning of faith as Luther has done. Perhaps his use of the term makes it so broad it ceases to have clear and consistent meaning in his thought. The role of identification in the faith-relationship, however, is an important problem to which considerable attention will be devoted in the psychological section of this study. Further study of the nature and meaning of identification with Christ in the thought and experience of various writers in the Christian tradition would be of interest, but here we shall note this simply as one of the significant aspects of the response of the total self to God in Christ.

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[1] *Institutes* ii.6.1 and iii. 19.4

[2] "The Fourteen of Consolation," *Works of Martin Luther*, Vol. I, p. 169.

[3] *Institutes* iii. 6.1.

Three Later Writers.--Other important aspects of the total faith relationship can be seen in the writings of a few more recent theologians. Briefly, we shall characterize three types of relationships to God in Christ: (1) Faith as the acceptance of a "saving" relationship, (2) Faith as ethical obedience, and (3) Faith as acceptance of "sonship."

G. G. Findlay has described faith simply as "faith is the hand reached out to accept God's gift of mercy proffered from the Cross of Christ."[1] John Wesley's concept of faith is a good example:

> Christian faith is, then, not only an assent to the whole gospel of Christ, but also a full reliance on the blood of Christ; a trust in the merits of his life, death, and resurrection; a recumbency upon him as our atonement and our life, as given for us, and living in us; and in consequence thereof, a closing with him, and a cleaving to him, as our "wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption," or in one word, our salvation.[2]

Quite a different kind of faith-relationship has been seen in the response of so-called "liberal" Christianity to Jesus Christ. There have been many exponents of this view of Christianity in the last century. The symbol "faith" as we have been using it here has little meaning for many of them because they have placed a strong confidence in human efforts to follow the teachings of Christ. Albert Schweitzer is by no means typical in thought or experience but he does share some of the emphases of "liberal" thought. For him, the faith-response to Jesus Christ is characterized by obedience to His ethical will, but a deep personal love and respect for Jesus underlies this obedience. Schweitzer's studies of the world-view of the New Testament, particularly the eschatology of Jesus and Paul, did much to undermine the picture of Jesus as the founder of a Kingdom which was to be realized in this world (as had been taught by some of Schweitzer's predecessors). Schweitzer, himself, however, found in the person of Jesus the supreme authority of his life. He wrote:

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[1] Findlay, op. cit., p. 257.

[2] quoted in William R. Cannon, The Theology of John Wesley, (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, c1946), p. 79.

> Anyone who ventures to look the historical Jesus straight in the face and to listen for what He may have to teach him in His powerful sayings, soon ceases to ask what this strange-seeming Jesus can still be to him. He learns to know Him as One who claims authority over him.
>
> The true understanding of Jesus is the understanding of will acting on will. The true relation to Him is to be taken possession of by Him. Christlike piety of any and every sort is valuable only so far as it means the surrender of our will to His.[1]

In his Christianity and the Religions of the World, Schweitzer describes an "ethical mysticism" which seems to mean a kind of identification of the self with the ethical will of God as it is revealed in Christ and in the ethical nature of the self.[2]

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[1] Albert Schweitzer, Out of My Life and Thought (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1933), p. 71.

[2] (New York: Henry Holt and Co., c 1939) pp. 71-80 et. passim; see also Indian Thought and Its Development (New York: Henry Holt and Co., c 1936), pp. 258-88.

Underlying his "ethical mysticism" or "Christ mysticism" in the thought of Schweitzer are identifications with the eschatological renunciation of the world and the affirmation of individual existence which he finds in the thought of Jesus and Paul.[1]

Moving out of the contemporary stream of liberal thought and into the thinking of one of the leaders in the rediscovery of Reformation theology, we find in Emil Brunner a view of faith which might be called "acceptance of sonship." In The Divine Imperative, Brunner says:

> Faith consists in the fact that henceforth man knows that his life, his very self, is a gift from God, not a life which is straining after God. This complete reversal of the direction of man's life, the fact that this re-direction or con-version takes place constitutes the New Birth, the Divine establishment of the 'new man.' But the fact that this new birth takes place as conversion, as self-knowledge and redirection of the Self, is the Divine hall-mark of this event, which distinguishes it from a magical process. This is what faith means: to know that one is thus "born again," to accept life as a gift and righteousness as something outside oneself. The new life is life in the Divine indicative (mood), instead of in the imperative, in dependence upon God, not in search for God.[2]

Brunner stresses many facets of this dependence upon God but especially the dependence of faith upon revelation, upon the Word of God which comes to us in Jesus Christ and makes possible the "new birth."[1]

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[1] see The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle (New York: Henry Holt and Co., c 1931); Out of My Life and Thought, pp. 267, 268, and Indian Thought and Its Development, pp. 179, 180, et. passim.

[2] Emil Brunner, The Divine Imperative, trans. Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, c 1947), p. 77.

Summary.--We have noted these last three writers to include aspects of the relationship of the self to God in faith which were not sharply focussed in the thought of the New Testament or the Reformation. We pause now to look back at some of the general characteristics of faith as a "personal relationship."

Trust in God who is revealed to have personal attributes makes possible some kind of "faith relationship" with God which involves, in various ways, the total personality. The first important characteristic of this "faith relationship" is then, that it involves the total person--it is personal. As a "total" response, however, it varies widely from individual to individual with the nature of the involvement. We suggest that the variations fall somewhere along a continuum, "sonship-discipleship," ranging roughly from the "freedom-in-love" of Jesus to the strong emphasis on dutiful obedience in some elements of Calvinism and liberal Christianity (to mention only two groups in which this is to be seen).

There are a few more specific characteristics of faith as a personal relationship which have been noted. These, too, vary from individual to individual, as to the degree of "sonship-discipleship" involved, but they can be generalized as follows:

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[1] see especially The Mediator, trans. Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, c1947), pp. 299-302. In his Earl lectures on "Faith, Hope, and Love" Brunner stresses that faith is the openness of the heart for God's love. See Faith, Hope, and Love (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, c1956), p. 75.

1. "self-commitment" or "self surrender," involving various degrees of love-duty relationships;
2. "identification" with God through Christ--This is a complex phenomenon which needs to be studied carefully from a psychological point of view. In general we would say the greater the acceptance of "sonship" the deeper the level of identification;
3. "communion," involving varying levels of person communication in the relationship with God--Such psychological concepts as "verbal catharsis" and "support" are involved here;
4. "dependence" as suggested by Brunner but having many meanings, most of which must be dealt with in psychological terms. "Dependence" is especially important in relation to "sonship."

No attempt is made here to give definitions for these characteristics beyond those which have been included in the material of this chapter. Psychological correlations are important, as has been noted, and will add further meaning.

The Intellectual Emphasis in the Meaning of Faith

For many reasons the total personal nature of the faith relationship has often been overshadowed by emphases on particular aspects of that relationship. The intellectual aspect, for example, begins to take precedence even in parts of the New Testament. This precedence was perhaps the inevitable result of fading memories of first-hand relationships with Jesus and the tendency of any movement to stress the verbal aspects of experience which can be most easily formulated and communicated and which tend to become substitutes for the more dynamic aspects of experience. We look now at some of the other reasons for the intellectual and content emphasis in Christian thinking about faith, tracing a few of the important developments from New Testament times to the present day.

Hellenistic Influences-The Fourth Gospel.--Moving away from the land of Old Testament piety and out into the world in which Greek thought predominated, Christianity of necessity assumed a more intellectual character and faith became increasingly a matter of "knowing" and "believing." Plato and his followers had long struggled with the problems of the nature of knowledge and the relationships of knowledge and virtue. The mystery religions had contributed their own special kinds of "knowledge" and their rites and disciplines purporting to give the believer "union" with his god. These and other influences had contributed to a general cultural atmosphere, with important local variations, in which knowlege was accepted as the key to religion. Christianity, thus, had to assume the trappings of knowledge if it was to win converts in this kind of a world. The Johannine writings in the New Testament reflect this necessity. Fosdick suggests the process:

> The Gospel of John ...reflects the kind of experience doubtless familiar in a Hellenistic city such as Ephesus, as converts were won to Christianity. First, they were attracted to Christ; going deeper in acquaintance with his life and ministry, they found in him the satisfaction of their religious needs; through this experience they progressed in knowledge of him until at last they believed in him as the Son of God. That is to say, in

> John's Gospel faith is not so much the beginning as it is the end of the process of conversion.[1]

And if men were to be attracted to Christ, they must be able to see in him not only the Messiah of the Jewish Scriptures but also the divine Wisdom of the universe. Thus, Jesus is presented in the opening words of the Gospel as the Logos, both the Word of Revelation and the Reason of Philosophy. And throughout the Gospel He is Light, Truth, Life and his followers receive the Light, the Truth, and the Life.[2] These and other categories were meaningful for the intellectual world in which they were written. They present profound understandings of the significance of Jesus born of deep religious experience which the writer sought to communicate to others. The approach to the reader is intellectual, but not the kind of superficial intellectualization which is so often found in our own day. It presents knowledge but the kind of knowledge which can be called "uniting" or "self-transforming" knowledge. It involves deep personal commitments. If the Johannine writer speaks of knowing the truth which shall make men free, he prefaces this with "If you continue in my word, you are my disciples, and you will know the truth..."[3] When he writes that "whoever believes in him should not perish but have eternal life," he prefaces it with a statement of the greatest gift of love the world has ever known, "For God so loved the world that He gave his only Son..."[1] Such a gift of love cannot but call for a deep personal response. Similarly, the knowledge which is described as "eternal life" is the knowledge of those who belong to Christ. In the "high priestly" prayer of Jesus, we find these words:

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[1] Harry Emerson Fosdick, A Guide to Understanding the Bible (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, c1938), p. 234.

[2] see Edgar J. Goodspeed, Introduction to the New Testament (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, c1937), Chap. xix.

[3] John 8:31.

> Father, the hour has come; glorify thy Son that the Son may glorify thee, since thou hast given him power over all flesh, to give eternal life to all whom thou has given him. And this is eternal life, that they know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent.[2]

Thus the "knowing" or "believing" which the Fourth Gospel stresses is intellectual in its appeal and some of its categories of thought, but it is far more than intellectual in its total context. Its context is that of a deep personal relationship to God in Christ, a relationship that the author often calls "love." The respective roles of "faith" and "love" will be discussed later, as will other aspects of the Johannine view of faith.

The Johannine approach to the Gospel provided an answer to a need which had to be met if Christianity was to be understood by men who thought in Hellenic terms. This approach became more and more dominant in the Church as new leaders in Christian thought emerged in Antioch, Ephesus, Alexandria, Rome and other centers of Graeco-Roman culture. Dr. Goodspeed suggests that "the Gospel of John set the new religion upon the rails of thought and theology upon which it was to run for a thousand years."[1] The direction of Christian thought for many centuries was to be determined by the questions underlying the Greek and Roman approach to existence--questions in regard to the nature, meaning, and value of human life and the universe which either had not been asked or had not been made explicit in Hebraic thought. These underlying questions and Greek definitions of their basic terms were to exert an influence upon Christian thought which remains until the present day. This Hellenization of Christianity was a necessary development productive of many significant movements, but also fraught with many unfortunate consequences. One of these was the loss of much of the Biblical meaning of "faith."

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[1] John 3:16.

[2] John 17:2,3.

Other books of the New Testament.--In addition to the Johannine writings, other books, of the New Testament show the effects of the Hellenization of Christianity. This Hellenization was not the only force at work, however, to undermine the meaning and significance of faith. Some of the books of the New Testament show the effects of the inevitable loss of meaning in second, third, or fourth generation Christians who have not shared deeply in some of the experiences underlying the faith of the Synoptic Gospels and Paul's letters. In James, Jude, and the Pastoral Epistles for example faith includes acceptance of Jesus as the Messiah and a more or less formal body of doctrine.[2] Some of these writings also show the necessity which soon confronted the Church of defining an "orthodox" body of belief as it moved out into the world and found its central experiences and traditions subject to increasingly varied interpretations. A growing emphasis on the content of Christian faith was inevitable, particularly in the written products of the early Church; but this concern helped, again, to cause the experiential meanings of faith to be overshadowed.

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[1] Goodspeed, op. cit., p. 301

[2] see Means, op. cit., pp 51 ff. and Hatch, op. cit., pp. 28ff. for discussion.

Early in the history of the church the conflict between philosophy and religion manifested itself, which in various forms is much alive today. St. Paul issued the challenge;

> "Has not God made foolish the wisdom of the world? For since in the wisdom of God, the world did not know God through wisdom, it pleased God through the folly of what we preach to save those who believe."[1]

Such statements, apart from the context of Paul's thought, could easily be interpreted to mean that the preaching and doctrine of the Church alone was to be accepted, all prior religion and all attempts at human wisdom were to be rejected. Such interpretations, plus the tendency toward rigid orthodoxy which is often seen in struggling young movements, led to a spirit of "do not inquire, only believe." On the other hand more philosophically oriented Christians faced the necessity of achieving some kind of reconciliation between their philosophy and their acquired Christian beliefs. An inadequately digested Christianity sometimes became an adjunct of a secular philosophy. I Timothy 6:20, 21 reflects this conflict between

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[1] I Corinthians 1:20-21.

"bare faith" and "false knowledge;" "O Timothy guard what has been entrusted to you. Avoid the godless chatter and contradictions of what is falsely called knowledge, for by professing it some have missed the mark as regards the faith."[1]

Both extremes are, of course, untenable over a long period of time, and the Church found thinkers who could hold the truths of Christianity and make use of the contributions of secular thought without sacrificing the paramount values of their religion.

Clement of Alexandria.--One such writer was Clement of Alexandria (lived 153-217). He is of interest to us because of his study of the meaning of faith.[2] His two great concerns seem to be "truth" and "piety," and in Christianity both are united. Faith is "the assent of piety" to the truth of Christianity, especially the Truth which is in the Word of God, Jesus Christ. The importance of faith is seen in this passage from his "Exhortation to the Heathen:"

> Set thyself earnestly to find Christ. "For I am," He says, "the door," which we who desire to understand God must discover, that He may throw heaven's gates wide open to us. For the gates of the Word being intellectual, are opened by the key of faith. No one knows God but the Son, and he to whom the Son shall reveal Him.[3]

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[1] see Inge, op. cit., p. 21 for discussion.

[2] Clement of Alexandria Stromata ii.2-4, The Ante-Nicene Fathers, ed. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson (Buffalo: The Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1885), Vol. II.

[3] Exhortation to the Heathen I.

His discussion of the meaning of faith is somewhat obscure and it is difficult to know the meaning of some of the words he uses, but his intellectual emphasis is clear:

> But faith, which the Greeks disparage, deeming it futile and barbarous, is a voluntary preconception (or anticipation), the assent of piety--'the subject of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen,' according to the divine apostle...Others have defined faith to be a uniting assent to an unseen object, as certainly the proof of an unknown thing is an evident assent. If then it be choice, being desirous of something, the desire is in this instance intellectual. And since choice is the beginning of action, faith is discovered to be the beginning of action being the foundation of rational choice in the case of any one who exhibits to himself the previous demonstration through faith. Voluntarily to follow what is useful, is the first principle of understanding. Unswerving choice, then, gives considerable momentum in the direction of knowledge. The exercise of faith directly becomes knowledge, reposing on a sure foundation.[1]

Faith is not only the foundation of knowledge, faith is also the criterion of knowledge and, as such, its superior.[2]

But such discussion of the meaning of faith and its relationship to knowledge seems remote from the more dynamic conceptions of faith to be found in the New Testament. It does provide a sample, however, of the kind of thinking about faith which was to prevail in the Western Church until the Reformation. For the concern of Clement was to continue to be a dominant concern of theologians for hundreds of years. His "Stromata" were written as a "miscellaneous collection of speculative (gnostic) notes bearing upon the true philosophy,"[3] and they proposed to furnish materials for construction of a true philosophy or "gnosis" on the basis of faith. Such materials could be taken both from the contributions of the Bible and of philosophy. But it is important to note that, for Clement as for many of his predecessors and successors, such a philosophy is not an end in itself but is a means to "Christian piety," and such "piety" involved many of the aspects of faith. The definitions of faith differ, however, because different aspects of the role of faith in Christian life are stressed. To Clement, as to the writer of the Johannine works, the role of faith in coming to the Truth was of greatest interest.

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[1] Stromata ii. 2.

[2] Stromata ii. 4.

[3] Eusebius and Photius according to the "Introduction" in op. cit.

Augustine.--Some 200 years later we find St. Augustine viewing faith in a manner reminiscent of Clement of Alexandria. In fact these words might easily have been taken from Clement:

> No one indeed believes anything, unless he has first thought that it is to be believed...everything which one believes should be believed after thought has led the way; although belief itself is nothing other than to think with assent.[1]

In many ways St. Augustine represents the culmination of the thought of the Western Church and the Roman world prior to the fall of Rome. In him the philosophic and quasi-religious quests for "wisdom" and "happiness" found extensive expression but were more and more subjected to Christian concepts after his conversion experience (or experiences). In his nineteenth year Cicero's Hortensius inspired him with a zeal for wisdom, but his search took him through various schools of thought before he found satisfaction in Christian answers to the questions that neo-Platonism (a la Plotinus) had helped to ask about truth and man's chief good. With such a background it is not strange that the role of faith in his thought was secondary to wisdom. In his experience he had come to a kind of certainty without Christian faith--the certainty of "unchangeable" principles of judgment in mathematics, ethics, esthetics, etc.,[1] the certainty of his own inner consciousness,[2] and the certainty of The Unchangeable or Being Itself.[3] Apart from Christ, however, he was unable to "see" or to "cleave" to God who is The Unchanging.[4] In Christ he found the revelation which restored the wisdom which had been obscured by the effects of sin.[5] In Christ he found the power to overcome his own moral weaknesses which had prevented him from accepting the Christian life, as he understood it.[6] The nature of these experiences have been the subject of much debate, but Augustine concluded that through his experiences of Christ he received that gift of faith which made both knowledge and happiness possible. In his writings he variously described the progress of the soul from faith to wisdom or the "vision of God." In one of his most extensive discussions of faith, he summarizes his point of view:

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[1] Augustine De praed. sanct. ii.5.

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[1] *De lib. arb*. ii. 10.23 and 16.41; *De doct. christ*. ii. 35.53, 36.54, and 38.56; *Contra Acad.* iii. 10.23 and 11.25.

[2] *De Trin.* x.10.13

[3] *Confessions* vii. 17.23

[4] *Confessions* vii.17 and 18

[5] *De doct*. christ.i.11.11

[6] *Confessions* vii.12.29.

> When the mind has been imbued with the first elements of that faith which worketh by love, it endeavors by purity of life to attain unto sight, where the pure and perfect in heart know that unspeakable beauty, the full vision of which is supreme happiness. Here surely is an answer to your question as to what is the starting point and what the goal: we begin in faith and are made perfect by sight. This also is the sum of the whole body of doctrine.[1]

The act of faith, itself, as we have seen, Augustine defined as "to think with assent" or

> For what is believing but consenting to the truth of what is said? And this consent is certainly voluntary.[2]

This assenting or consenting is, according to Augustine, an act of the will. Analysis of the meaning of this act of will in relation to the whole process of knowing involves psychological questions about the nature of thought which are extremely difficult to answer. Philosophy and early experimental psychology have made serious attempts to analyze the "elements" of consciousness. Augustine's view of faith has been interpreted in terms of such "elements,"[3] for our purposes, however, it is enough to note that faith in his thought is more than a superficial rational acceptance of an idea. It is an act by which, as it were, a man whose "vision" has been almost entirely obscured accepts the truth which makes possible the restoration of his "sight." A careful study of St. Augustine's theory of knowledge discloses that he believes God to be ever present to the mind as that "divine illumination" which is responsible for unchanging principles of judgment and, particularly, as "That Unchangeable which, unless it had in some way known, it had no sure ground to prefer it to the changeable."[1] The effects of sin make it impossible to see God without the aid of revelation, but even in his sinful state man has a "glimmer" of faith because of the continuous activity of God within his mind. When a man accepts the wisdom of God revealed in Christ, he is, thus, giving consent to the restoration (or at least the beginning of the restoration) of that which was originally his in God's purposes. This restoration has many other aspects, of course. In this interpretation the conscious act of faith is important because of the state of being which it makes possible--or as it would be more Augustinian to say, which God makes possible through faith--and the act of faith needs to be seen in relationship to this state of being. The more dynamic aspects of this state of being are discussed by St. Augustine under the category of "love" rather than "faith," although there are passages in which he does speak of faith as a dynamic relationship to God in Christ.[2]

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[1] Enchiridion v.

[2] De Spirit et litt. xxi. 54.

[3] see for example W. Windelband, A History of Philosophy, trans. James Tufts (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1893), p. 282.

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[1] Confessions vii.17.23.

[2] Let what follows admonish us: "Verily, verily, I say unto you, he that believeth on me hath eternal life." He willed to reveal Himself, what He was: He might have said in brief, He that believeth on me hath me. For Christ is Himself true God and eternal life. Therefore, he that believeth on me, saith He, goeth into me; and he that goeth into me, hath me. In Joan. Evang. xxvi.10.

The emphasis which we have seen beginning in the Johannine writings and continuing in the thought of men such as Clement of Alexandria and St. Augustine was to remain dominant in much of Christian thought until the Reformation. It continues to be dominant in some places today.

Thomas Aquinas.--Thomas Aquinas' formulation is very much the same as those we have been discussing,

> Now the act of believing is an act of the intellect assenting to divine truth at the consent of the will moved by the grace of God, so that it is subject to free choice in relation to God.[1]

A deeper type of relationship or state of being, however, is suggested in his interpretation of Hebrews 11:1. He writes that faith is a "habit of mind" whereby eternal life is begun in us, making the intellect assent to what is non-apparent.[2] We do not propose to carry further the study of the meaning of faith to Aquinas or other medieval theologians. The emphasis seems clear; however, the criticisms of Means do not seem wholly justified.

> The questions as to the meaning and value of Faith as presented by St. Thomas carries us into the very heart of medieval theology and to the conception of the Gospel which prevailed in that period...It took the legal view that faith is primarily the acceptance of religious truth on the authority of either the Church or revelation. It was, fundamentally and psychologically, intellectual in its essence and meaning...With respect of faith neither Augustine nor St. Thomas departed from the accepted standard of interpretation of this fundamental subject. It had passed over to them from an earlier period, during which the psychological character

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[1] Summa Theologica, "The Interior Act of Faith,"Part II-II Ques. 2, art. 9.

[2] Ibid., Ques. 4, art. 1

> of faith as an inward state or relation of the soul with God was changed to an intellectual acceptance of the theological formulas.[1]

Means comment on the change in the definition of faith seems accurate, but he neglects to note that the definition changed because the context of the definition changed. In Paul's letters and some of the other New Testament writings, faith was defined as an answer to the question, "How can I experience a redemptive relationship with God?" In the Johannine writings and the Graeco-Roman apologists, however, faith was defined as an answer to the question, "How can I know what is true and/or what is good?" which became redefined in Christian experience as the question, "How can I know God?" This change in context necessarily means a change in the meaning and value of faith, but it does not necessarily mean a change in the basic quality of the personal relationship to God; at least it is our view that it did not in the writers we have discussed. More or less significant changes, however, inevitably did occur as the relationship of the individual Christian to the authority of the Church created problems which complicated the relationship to God. Most theologians in the Roman tradition have been affected by this struggle, as have most Protestant theologians by the problem of their relationship to the Bible (as well as the Church).

Contemporary Concepts of "Belief" and "Faith".--It can be seen that increasingly the intellectual approach to Christianity tended to make "faith" synonymous with "belief" or "believing." Although it is doubtful whether an exact equation has been made, there has been a tendency to use the two terms interchangeably in certain contexts. This is unfortunate because the synonymity has long been part of popular thinking about faith, at least in English speaking countries. The meaning of faith as "belief" has remained much the same from the time of Clement to our own day. Pratt in his *Psychology of Religious Belief* defines belief as "the mental attitude of assent to the reality of a given object."[1] Webster's Dictionary suggests that faith and belief differ chiefly in that "belief, as a rule, suggests little more than intellectual assent; faith implies also trust or confidence."[2] In his dissertation on "Faith-Consciousness," William Costin also includes the additional dimension of trust:

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[1] Means, op. cit., pp. 222, 223.

> Faith as act is that condition in which mental objects possess the interest and significance that make them worthy of acknowledgment, consideration, and trust.[3]

More complex views of the cognitive aspects of the faith relationship are to be found in some of the contemporary statements of Christian theology. Men like Barth, Brunner, and Aulen have stressed the divine initiative which makes faith possible and provides the content of faith. Aulen writes:

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[1] James P. Pratt, *The Psychology of Religious Belief*, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1907), p. 32.

[2] *Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language* (Springfield, Mass: C & G Merrian Co.) 2d ed. 1947, p. 248.

[3] William W. Costin, *Introduction to the Genetic Treatment of the Faith-Consciousness in the Individual* (Baltimore: William Wilkins Co., 1909), p. 7.

> The content of Christian faith is, in principle, something fixed and definite. It is not a question of just any vague and indefinite 'faith' whatever, for God is not the great Unknown about whom nothing really positive can be affirmed. God is not only hidden, but is at the same time the God who has disclosed himself in the past and continues to make himself known. It is that divine will given in revelation and qualitatively determined by the work of Christ which faith embraces, or rather which embraces and subdues man and thereby creates faith and establishes the relationship to God...Faith cannot be isolated from this revelation so that it would have its own existence apart from divine revelation. Faith is nothing in itself. It is what it is by reason of that divine revelation which subdues man.[1]

Brunner has emphasized the "emptiness" or "openness" of faith before the divine initiative,[2] and Barth has contended that the "knowing" of faith is a result of the divine initiative:

> The knowing of faith is higher than all reason, surpasses all thinking, which we can follow only in the capitulation of our reason. The antithesis of heart and head, the emphasis on the fiducial character of faith, may indicate the nature of the knowing...The superrational (Das Irrationale) in man in his relative antithesis to the rational is a helpful reminder of the absolute antithesis, that, as over against revelation it is only a question to accept God, whom we cannot comprehend, after that we have been gripped by God...Not as if the super-rational were the seat of immanence in man, not as if the heart were less in need of conversion than the head, though it be doubtless true that in the begripping the heart is somewhat quicker than the head.[3]

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[1] Gustaf Aulen, The Faith of the Christian Church, trans. E. H. Wahlstrom and G. E. Arden (Philadelphia: The Muhlenberg Press, c1948), p. 73.

[2] "Faith is nothing in itself but the openness of our heart for God's love." Faith, Hope, and Love, p. 75.

[3] Quoted from Die Christliche Dogmatik, im Entwurf, I, pp. 330-332; quoted by Alvin S. Zerbe in The Karl Barth Theology or The New Transcendentalism (Cleveland: Central Publishing House, c1930), p. 158.

The knowledge of God is a continuing problem in our day, and these writers, among others, have pointed to the objective, transcendent truth of God which can be known by sinful men only as God reveals Himself to them. This revelation involves much more than knowledge, but it includes knowledge, even though it is knowledge which can never be fully captured in immanent terms. But cognitive content must be present in revelation for a valid distinction between God and no-God to be made. There are many problems involved in the knowledge of God which cannot be discussed here, but we point to a few--the relations of "immediate" knowledge of God who is immediately present and "mediated" knowledge through Jesus Christ and the Church; the relations of personal and corporate, present and historical reception of revelation; the relations of knowledge of God "inside" and "outside" the community of faith; the relation of revelation to any particular statement of the content of revelation.

Faith as "Feeling" or "Intuition"

Throughout the history of man's various approaches to God, the importance of direct or immediate experience of the divine has been stressed many times in many different ways. As an emphasis on personal experience as the sine qua non of religious understanding, this concern has again and again arisen as a corrective to religious life which has become aridly intellectual, moribundly organizational, or which in some other way has become removed from serious participation in the experiences which give meaning to religious symbols. "Mystical," "pietistic" or other movements which have stimulated anew the personal search for a relationship with God have often revitalized Christian groups as well as non-Christian. The extreme emphasis on "feeling" or "intuition" or "immediacy" which has characterized some of these movements, however, has sometimes resulted in a distortion of the nature of the faith relationship and a loss of important elements of that relationship which are the function of other elements of the personality or other types of experience. Like the extreme emphasis on the intellectual aspect of faith, the extreme emphasis on non-rational experience has tended to obscure the total nature of the personal involvement in faith.

Some rather strange "bed-fellows" can be included in this portion of our discussion of the nature of faith. We cannot be adequately comprehensive but we shall begin with a brief consideration of the problem of the relation of "mysticism" to faith and move into some of the modern attempts to arrive at empirical concepts of the nature of religious life which have stressed the "feeling" aspect. There is much that is antithetical between the "mystical" and the "empirical" approaches to man's relationship to God but there are also some notable similarities which justify our grouping them together.

1. Mysticism and faith

This topic was briefly noted in previous discussions of the nature of faith in the experience of Paul and the

Johannine author, but we shall deal with it in more detail at this point. The relationship of "mysticism" to faith has long been a subject of controversy in the Christian Church, and the controversy is very much alive today. Part of the conflict, however, is semantic. Much depends upon the definitions of "mysticism" and "faith" which are being used and the scope of these definitions. For our purpose we shall use the definition of "mysticism" suggested by Rufus Jones:

> ...the type of religion which puts the emphasis on immediate awareness of relation with God, on direct and intimate consciousness of the Divine Presence.[1]

The "mystical" emphasis is by no means limited to the Christian tradition and the theories and methods of realization of direct experience of God vary somewhat from culture to culture, and within cultures as historical conditions change. Students of mysticism, however, are able to see certain common characteristics. The goal of mysticism is an experience of "union with God." Its general quality is an experience of being "grasped by" or "united with" a power transcending the self. The characteristics of the mystical state have been described by William James as (1) ineffability, (2) noetic quality, (3) transciency, and (4) passivity.[2] The nature of the experience is difficult to describe and mystics must use various types of symbolic language to attempt to communicate something of the experience. The knowledge which is said to be given in the experience is necessarily private and personal; but the mystics tend to give both to the experience and to the knowledge ultimate significance in their lives and thought. Associated with the emphasis on mystical union as the goal of religious life, mysticism usually contains a system of discipline or a "way of life" which is purported to prepare the practitioner for the experience of "union." Studies of mysticism often suggest three general stages or levels of development in this discipline.[1]

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[1] Jones, op. cit., p. xv.; compare Evelyn Underhill's definition, "the direct intuition or experience of God," in op. cit., p. 9.

[2] William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (New York, Longmans, Green and Company, 1925), pp. 380ff.

The extent of mysticism in the Christian tradition varies with the definition of mysticism and the interpretation of individual writings and experiences. Jesus himself is often considered the supreme mystic and Paul and the Johannine writer are usually included. The list of Rufus Jones also includes such names as Augustine, Tertullian, Montanus, "Dionysius the Areopagite," St. Francis, St. Catherine of Siena, John Scotus Erigena, Meister Eckhart, John Tauler, Henry Suso, Jan Ruysbroek, Gerard Groote, Jacob Boehme. Such groups as the Waldensians, the spiritual Franciscans, the Friends of God, the Brethren of the Common Life, the Lollards, the Anabaptists, and the Quakers are also included by Jones in his study as examples of the corporate expression of the mystical religious life.[2]

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[1] Purgation, illumination, and union or contemplation--see Underhill, op. cit., pp. 20-27.

[2] Jones, op. cit., passim.

The primary issues in the relationship of mysticism to faith have to do with the significance of the mystical experience and the value of the mystical discipline or "way." The kind of faith which we have been studying tends both in its interpersonal and intellectual emphases to stress that ultimate truth and ultimate value can be found only in God through Christ. The truth and value of any particular personal or corporate experience can be finally determined only by subjecting them to the criterion given by God in His Self-revelation in Jesus Christ. Pragmatic values can be determined in other ways but Christian values of given experiences can be determined only in the light of the Revelation which gives a criterion of what is and what is not God, which makes possible a distinction between God and false gods and between the divine and the demonic in human experience. This view runs into serious difficulties when attempts are made to give definitive statement to the nature of the criterion which is given in God's revelation of Himself in Jesus Christ, but it does hold up a "norm" which can be given at least a working definition to apply to the problem of the Christian value of specific individual or corporate experiences. The individual "mystic" or a group claiming direct experience of God and using that experience, consciously or unconsciously, as a definitive norm for determining the significance of other experiences of God would, then, be in direct conflict with this classical claim of Christian faith. Such trust placed in human experience would be contrary to the radical claims of Christian faith that trust is to be placed only in God as He reveals Himself in Christ. Or to do as some mystics have done and recognize the necessity of a revelation in Christ along with revelations in other great "mystics" of history[1] is to deny the claim of Christian faith to possess the unique revelation of God.

A second issue has to do with the religious status of mystical discipline. At least two problems are involved--the nature of God's revelation to man and the nature of man in his sinful state of existence. The initiative of revelation is with God, both in the thought of the mystics and of the writers we have noted in previous sections, but there is a difference in emphasis. Where we find a strong emphasis on God's grace and man's sin, we usually find an emphasis on the "downward way" from God to man. This is especially true in the thought of the Reformers who strongly stressed the totality of the effects of sin upon human personality.[2] Like Paul, the Reformers stressed the inability of man to achieve any kind of righteousness by his own efforts because of the nature of his sinful state. Thus their thought is opposed to any system which proposes to help man to rise by his own efforts to a condition in which he can be worthy of "union with God" or any other kind of divine gift. Man cannot be justified by any efforts of his own, but by his humble acceptance in faith of the divine gift of mercy in Jesus Christ. Mysticism in the Christian tradition tends, on the other hand, to be grounded in neo-Platonic soil. It proceeds on assumptions which separate, in man's nature, the rational soul from the "animal" body. It tends to glorify the mind or consciousness as capable of growth to the point of union with the Infinite through disciplines which "detach" the mind from the body and the world of the senses. It thus poses an "upward way" which is strongly rationalistic even though its final stages are described as non-rational or suprarational. This "upward way" does not necessarily guarantee the "beatific vision" but, for the mystic, it tends to be necessary for growth in the divine-human relationship and there is a strong emphasis on human effort.

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[1] see, for example, various writings of Rufus Jones and Gerald Heard.

[2] See discussion by Anders Nygren in Agape and Eros (London: Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge 1941), Vol. I., *passim*.

Emil Brunner, Reinhold Niebuhr, Anders Nygren, Karl Barth, and others in the so-called "neo-orthodox" school of thought, reviving the emphases of the Reformation, have attempted to draw sharp distinctions between the mystical way to God and the "Biblical" way of faith or "divine-human encounter." Much more could be written about these distinctions but, as Paul Tillich has suggested, some of them have been too rigidly drawn. He describes "absolute faith," which he argues transcends both the mystical and personal encounter types of experience. His view of faith, which we shall discuss more fully in the next section, is closely tied to his ontological approach to theology, but one of the important points he makes is that any meaningful experience of the divine involves participation in the power of the divine, and to this extent there is a "mystical" or "ecstatic" element in every significant divine-human encounter. Too rigid an emphasis on faith as the confidence of the solitary individual before God tends to deny this element of participation and, at times, to suppress it and to force it to seek other channels.[1]

The conflict between mysticism and faith, however, cannot be minimized in the quest for personal certainty about the reality of God. The mystic who has experienced immediate awareness of the "presence of God" is convinced of the reality of that experience. "John Christian" who has experienced the "love of God shed abroad in his heart" through faith in Jesus Christ is also convinced of the reality of the God who has made that experience possible. The conflict cannot, as we have suggested, be finally resolved on pragmatic grounds but in terms of a criterion of the nature of God and ultimate value. Both the mystic and "John Christian" may, however, have come to their experiences through a personal relationship with the Christ of the New Testament and both may have some common elements in their experiences. Their views of Christ will tend to differ because of the different assumptions from which they approach him.[2] Their views of the

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[1] Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), pp. 157-163.

[2] see Rufus Jones, op. cit., p. xxxv. for an example of the approach of a mystic to Christ.

Christian life will also be different because of differences in their assumptions about Christ and the nature of human life. These differences vary, of course, with cultures and periods of history but the basic conflicts are continuous.

2. Empirical Studies and the Religion of Feeling

Mysticism has made important contributions to the stream of religious life because of the efforts of mystics of various kinds to participate in experiences which tap the dynamic springs of life beyond consciousness. Various students of religion as a phenomenon have observed the significance of these and other subjective experiences of a religious nature and have concluded that the "feeling" or "non-rational" elements of these experiences were of primary value in relation to the other elements of these experiences. Such an emphasis was particularly common during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when the study of the nature and elements of consciousness was popular in philosophy and psychology.

Schleiermacher.--The first name that we mention in this connection is that of Friedrich Schleiermacher. He emphasized the element of "feeling" in his early studies of the nature of religion. In his On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers (1799) he wrote:

> The contemplation of the pious is the immediate consciousness of the universal existence of all finite things in and through the Infinite, and of all temporal things in and through the Eternal. Religion is to have and to know life only in immediate feeling as existing in the infinite and eternal. Where this is found, religion is satisfied; where it hides itself, she is in anguish and disquietude. Religion is not knowledge or

> science, either of the world or of God. The pious man, as pious, knows nothing about ethical science. It is the same with action itself. While morality always appears as manipulating, as self-controlling, piety appears as a surrender, a submission to be moved by the Whole that stands over against man. The pious man may not know at all, but he cannot know falsely. His nature is reality which knows reality. True religion is a sense and taste of the Infinite. If a man is not one with the Eternal, in the unity of intuition and feeling which is immediate, he remains forever apart.[1]

What Schleiermacher means by "feeling" here is primarily an immediate consciousness of God and is closely kin to mysticism. The God of these "Speeches" is, however, more reminiscent of Spinoza's pantheism than of the God of the New Testament.

In one of his later works Schleiermacher redefined the basic element of religion as "consciousness of being absolutely dependent, or, which is the same thing, of being in relation with God."[2] This has a more nearly Christian sound to it, but there are some important limitations which make it difficult to relate this concept to earlier Christian thought. By Schleiermacher's time the quest for certainty in religion had been rendered much more complex by Immanual Kant's "Critiques" of various forms of reason. The possibility of certainty about objective reality had been seriously questioned. Schleiermacher's approach to religious certainty was to limit the data for theology to the contents of "the religious consciousness;" that is, religious knowledge is to be found in the data of subjective experience in contemporary religion, which, however, must be checked against the Evangelical confessional documents and the New Testament Scriptures.[1] The methods of theology, as a result of this view, must be limited primarily to various types of individual introspection, including attempts through introspection to understand the "collective consciousness" of the Christian community. Thus faith as a "feeling" or "consciousness" of being "absolutely dependent upon God" is not so much a response to a personal confrontation with God in Jesus Christ as a response to the participation of a particular individual in a particular religious community. Also, as Brunner notes, Schleiermacher's response is more a feeling of causal determination than the admission of a personal relationship.[2] Schleiermacher says:

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[1] quoted in Inge, op. cit., pp. 58, 59.

[2] Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, trans. H. R. Mackintosh and J. S. Stewart (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1928), part 4, p. 12.

> The divine causality, as affirmed in our feeling of absolute dependence, is completely presented in the totality of finite being, and consequently everything for which there is a causality in God happens and becomes real.[3]

Thus, the relationship of the personality to God is to be considered primarily under the category of causality.

Schleiermacher's view of faith as "feeling" is actually more intellectual than emotional in its emphasis, but it does stress the importance of "immediate consciousness" or "intuition" and the subjective faith experience of the individual; however, the more "mystical" emphasis of his early writings gives way in his later works to that experience which is possible for the individual because of what has been mediated to him by the Christian community.

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[1] Ibid., parts 19, 27, 29.

[2] Brunner, The Mediator, p. 299.

[3] Schleiermacher, op. cit., part 54, p. 211.

Some "Psychologies" of Religion.--In America some of the early students of the psychology of religious experience called attention to the importance of the feeling or non-rational aspects of that experience. William James in his Varieties of Religious Experience stressed the importance of the feeling of a "presence" which is reported in many of the written reports of religious experience. He wrote as a conclusion:

> It is as if there were in the human consciousness a sense of reality, a feeling of objective presence, a perception of what we may call 'something there'....[1]

He held that it is impossible to base all of the beliefs necessary for life upon factual evidence and rational choice and that some of the basic decisions about life as it must be lived are made on non-rational grounds. He pointed to the "subconscious" sources of such decisions:

> Your whole subconscious life, your impulses, your faith, your needs, your divinations, have prepared the premises of which your consciousness may feel the weight of the result...[2]

Such decisions "feel" true even though their truth cannot be established on objective data, and there are inevitably individual variations because of the differences in individual impulses, needs, etc. In his essay on "The Will to Believe" James advanced the hypothesis:

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[1] James, op. cit., p. 28.

[2] Ibid., p. 73.

> Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds; for to say, under such circumstances, 'Do not decide, but leave the question open,' is itself a passional decision, --just like deciding yes or no, --and is attended with the same risk of losing the truth.[1]

The emphasis of James in pointing to the unconscious sources of religious faith seems to fall within the limits of psychology in describing the "elements" of religious experience. Some of James followers, however, tended to go beyond these limits to develop this point of view into a philosophy of religion. Notable is the statement of the "religion of feeling" expressed by James B. Pratt in his The Psychology of Belief. In one place he writes:

> The belief in God of the Religion of Feeling is...a vital rather than a theoretical matter, and, like breathing, is an outcome of the needs and demands of the organism, not of the reason. It has its roots deep in the field of vital feeling; its roots go deeper than most of our practical beliefs. It is an attitude toward the universe, our reaction to the stimulus of the whole cosmos. This reflex is determined by no momentary reasoning of the individual. The whole line of his heredity, the whole of his conscious and subconscious personality is involved in it. It is not so much the individual that thinks; the race thinks in him. I might better say the race feels and wells in him. It is the feeling background that determines his belief and this might be described as the reason experiencing the race become organic.[2]

In his book Pratt sets forth this view of the nature of faith as the result of his "empirical" studies and argues for it as the religion of modern man freed from the biases of the past. His words are suggestive of some of the ideas of C. G. Jung, particularly the "collective unconscious." Jung is also much interested in the nature of religious experience and particularly the unconscious sources of religious symbolism. He also tends to flirt with the deification of the human psyche but does not go as far as Pratt in his rejection of classical religious symbols.[1]

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[1] William James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1923) p. 11.

[2] Pratt, op. cit., pp. 293, 294.

Other names appear in the list of American psychologists urging the primacy of feeling in religious experience, but the examples cited may be enough to illustrate the emphasis. Edward S. Ames summarizes and criticizes some of the points of view in his Psychology of Religious Experience,[2] and then states his own theory which follows closely the "James-Lange theory," describing emotions as the feelings accompanying different types of action. Much of his discussion, as well as those of Pratt, Starbuck, and others on the role of feeling in religious experience is now rather outdated in psychology as new concepts and methods have been developed to meet the operational requirements of scientific psychology. An interesting example of the extreme development in the use of introspection and verbal reports to analyze the nature of the religious consciousness can be seen in W. W. Costin's dissertation, Introduction to the Genetic Treatment of the Faith-Consciousness in the Individual.[1]

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[1] See Modern Man in Search of a Soul, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1939) especially chapters X and XI; and Psychology and Religion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938).

[2] (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, c1910), chap. XVII.

The use of the empirical approach to religious experience continues in various ways, and writers continue to make use of psychological data as well as data from the comparative study of religions, anthropology, etc. to attempt to establish an empirical view of religion. The writings of Gerald Heard constitute a significant example of a man widely read in various fields using such a variety of data to attempt to establish his view. Starting from assumptions about the nature and significance of consciousness, Heard makes use of evolutionary and psychological theories as well as observations on the history of religious thought and experience to support his interpretation of "The Eternal Gospel." Heard's writings draw heavily from mystical literature, Christian and non-Christian, and his emphasis on the feeling or intuitive aspects of religious experience bear much resemblance to the "mystical way."[2] There are, of course, other writers engaged in tasks similar to Heard's who have roughly similar emphases although showing individual differences.

Summary and Evaluation.--The material presented in this section has been included to indicate the nature of varying emphases of the non-rational "feeling" or "intuitive" aspects of the faith experience. The emphasis is important even though some conflicts have been noted with the views of the faith response included in other sections of this dissertation.

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[1] See footnote [2] p. 69.

[2] See, for example, The Eternal Gospel (New York: Harper and Brothers, c1946).

The task of the Christian has been described by the writer of the Fourth Gospel as the worship of God both "in spirit and truth."[1] A vital faith response must include both. There can be no "spirit" in faith without the power which comes from the unconscious aspects of personality, but power must find channels consistent with a criterion of truth and value if it is not to be disruptive of the unity of personality in the faith response. The problem of maintaining a harmony of "spirit" and "truth" is one with which the Christian Church and all religious groups have struggled and will continue to struggle throughout their earthly existence. Ideal resolutions of the conflict can perhaps be formulated in thought (and the ideal resolution has been incarnated in Jesus Christ), but in practice the conflict continues and the task of achieving some kind of balance is always before us. The dangers of some of the emphases on feeling in religious experience have been seen as uncritical exaggeration of the role of "spirit." At times, however, such an emphasis has been necessary to offset a sterile exaggeration of dogma or other approaches to truth which had lost their experiential meaning. For anyone who proposes to make an empirical approach to religious experience, psychological or otherwise, a warning needs to be stated again and again that study of experience cannot stand alone, except for academic purposes. For religious purposes it must be joined to a study of "truth." Both empirical study and theology have their necessary functions.

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[1] John 4:23,24.

The role of feeling in the experience of faith needs to be seen in the same context as the role of intellectual activity. Both "roles" are actually abstractions from the functioning of an organism which responds as a totality even though it may be a totality divided against itself. The faith response is a total response involving the whole personality in its relationships to its total environment. The feeling, or more broadly, the non-rational, aspects of this response are important for their dynamic power and their strong, although often unconscious, influences upon conscious thought and action, but they need to be seen in the total context. This context and the interrelationships of the various aspects will be discussed at some length in the second part of this paper.

Faith as Acceptance of a "State of Being"

In the New Testament there are suggestions of faith as something more encompassing than any of the categories yet discussed. Some of our theologians have attempted to include the important contributions of each of the emphases thus far discussed and this "more" of the New Testament by describing faith as a "state of being."

The discussion of faith as a personal relationship with God has already implied a "state of being"--i.e., a "state of being in relationship with God" involving the total personality. The New Testament in various ways suggests that there is a qualitative difference between the Christian "state of being in relationship with God" and the prior state, which might be called "a state of being separated from God." The symbols "new birth," "new life," "redemption," and especially "atonement" (at-onement) imply a qualitative change in the state of being of the personality arising out of a qualitative change in its relationship with God. The Biblical emphasis on "a change of heart" is a symbolic way of expressing this qualitative change in the total state of man's being.

Paul.--In the writings of Paul the state of being separated from God is described as "sin" (or being "under law") and the state of being related to God is described as "faith," (or being "under grace"). A correlation "sin-faith" (or "law-grace") can be formulated with special reference to Romans 14:23, upon which we shall comment later. In brief, Paul's view seems to be that he who is in Christ is a "new creature"[1] by the grace of God. Faith is man's response to grace. Living under grace is living in faith, having "died" to sin.[2] This correlation of faith-sin is an ambiguous one, however, because faith and sin are viewed by Paul as both "states of being" and individual acts. This gives rise to much inconsistency in his understanding of both terms and has caused inestimable confusion in Christian thought and preaching. In Romans 1:18-32 however, Paul sketches what might be called the "classical" Christian doctrine of sin, in which he contends that it is man's separation from God which is the root of the various disharmonies within personality and in interpersonal relationships. Individual acts of sin proceed from the basic disharmony between man and God. Not being a systematic thinker, Paul does not carry out this view consistently in his writings, but this seems to be his fundamental point of view in his mature thought as represented by the Epistle to the Romans.[1] Similarly Paul's view of faith, although not explicitly defined, may be interpreted as including both individual acts and attitudes of faith and the new quality of relationship with God which the Christian has in Christ, from which these acts and attitudes proceed. Thus Romans 14:23, although it has to do with a question of whether to eat or not to eat certain things, may be interpreted to mean that such concrete decisions are to be made in the light of the Christian's total relationship to God and, as such, they are "acts of faith." There is, of course, the original "act of faith" whereby the non-Christian accepts a new relationship with God through Jesus Christ.[2]

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[1] II Corinthians 5:17.

[2] See Romans 6:5-11 for a Pauline description in rather symbolic terms of the change from a sinful state to a state of new life in relationship to God in Christ.

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[1] The writer has made a detailed study of Paul's concept of sin and its development in Christian thought in his B.D. thesis, "The Relation of Pride and Sensuality in the Christian Concept of Sin," Union Theological Seminary, 1946.

[2] Such an act is implied in the missionary speeches attributed to Paul in the Book of Acts, see Acts 13:38,39 for example.

Thus, it is our view that it is possible in the writings of Paul to find evidence of a view of faith, at least in its rudimentary form, which permits the harmonizing of various views of faith into one dialectical concept--an act of acceptance of Jesus as the Christ which brings the believer into a new state of being in relationship with God, which state of being is continuously manifested in every discrete attitude, decision, and action. Such a "state of being" may also be manifested in occasional ecstatic experiences or "mystical states," but the writings of Paul have abundant warnings against trusting or taking pride in such experiences.[1] But we shall have more to say shortly about the dialectical view of faith sketched here.

The Fourth Gospel.--The Fourth Gospel in its emphasis upon "eternal life" has abundant references to a new "state of being" in Christ. Often "eternal life" is interpreted as being the reward of the believer after death, but, more accurately, the Fourth Gospel describes it as a qualitative change in existence concomitant with the act of believing or knowing God in Christ: "And this is eternal life, that they know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent."[2] "He who believes in the Son has eternal life; he who does not obey the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God rests upon him."[3] "Truly, truly I say to you, he who hears my words and believes him who sent me, has eternal life; he does not come into judgment, but has passed from death to life."[1] There are passages, of course, in which a future tense appears,[2] but, as Fosdick points out, a trusting future hope is implicit in a profound present experience of divine friendship:

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[1] Although he himself succumbs to the temptation in II Corinthians 12:1-13. See I Corinthians 12, 13, 14 on the subject of various religious experiences.

[2] John 17:3

[3] John 3:36

> Let the interior fellowship of a soul with God be once conceived in terms of mutual care, so that the soul adores and trusts the Most High, the Most High values and supports the soul, and the corollary is bound to be drawn that such a relationship predicts its own continuance. Such divine friendship is, to use Johannine language, 'eternal life'...[3]

Concerning this present experience, Fosdick says:

> The great hope of this Gospel is not any kind of reign on earth but "eternal life," and even this, far from being a post-mortem goal, is a present, interior possession of the soul...[4]

The postponement of "eternal life" to the "future life" is an interesting example of the attempts of finite minds to conceive the eternal in temporal and finite categories. For our present purposes, however, it is sufficient to understand "eternal life" as a quality of existence, a "state of being" which characterizes the Christian's relationship with God in Christ. In the Fourth Gospel it is again necessary to note the dialectic of faith which we saw in Paul--an act of faith ("believing" or "knowing") which is the entrance into a "state of faith" called "eternal life" which is manifested in continuous acts of "believing" or "knowing."

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[1] John 5:24 [2] 3:16, 6:40, 11:25,26, etc.

[3] Fosdick, op.cit. p. 291. [4] Ibid., p. 289.

Hebrews.—A provocative concept of faith as a "state of being" is to be found in another New Testament writing, the Epistle to the Hebrews. The classic definition of faith in Hebrews 11:1 has previously been described as a "trusting hope," but a more extensive meaning seems to be implied. The interpretation of this epistle is a difficult problem, but we shall follow here a stimulating discussion to be found in the first chapter of Lewis Sherill's The Struggle of the Soul.[1]

This author views the Epistle as a treatise on faith and unbelief, as the two extremes of possible reactions to times of crisis or confrontation. Those who "shrink back" and are disobedient to the opportunity to be found in the confrontation do so because of "unbelief."[2] Those who are able to take possession of the values to be found in the confrontation, however, are those of "faith."[3] The consequence of "shrinking back" is "perdition," that of "faith" is "salvation." "Faith" is defined as "the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen."[4] The preceeding chapters of the epistle have sketched a view of two orders of existence, the temporal or "earthly" and the eternal or "heavenly." The meaning of the writer's view of faith is to be understood in terms of his concept of these two orders and their relationship in experience. In the eternal order are to be found the "archetypes" of reality, particularly "God Himself," "remission of sins," and "eternal life." These "archetypes" can be known in earthly existence either through some earthly clue to the nature of the "archetype" or through the "archetype" itself being found in earthly existence either in its own "substance" or in an exact reproduction or "image." There are five modes in which eternal reality can be revealed to man and known by man:

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[1] (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1951)

[2] Hebrews 3:18, 19 and 10:38.

[3] Hebrews 10:37-39.

[4] 11:1, American Standard Version.

1. The figure (parabole); a likeness, drawn from another realm.
2. The shadow (skia); a reflection cast by the thing itself.
3. The pattern (hypodeigma); copy, a specimen of a species.
4. The image (character); an exact reproduction.
5. The substance (hypostasis); the archetype itself; i.e., the eternal reality itself going forth in to the temporal order.[1]

The Old Testament gave man the pattern, the shadow, or the figure of the significant "archetypes," but the New Testament gave man either the "image," Jesus Christ, or else the very "substance" itself. The sacrifice of himself which Jesus made is the "substance" of eternal redemption. The believer possesses the "substance" of redemption through faith: Sherill redefined 11:1

> Faith is the actual substance of eternal life, enjoyed here and now within the temporal order of history giving pragmatic evidence of things as yet not seen by mortal eyes.[2]

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[1] Sherrill, op. cit., p. 18.

[2] Ibid., p. 18.

Sherrill comments further upon the meaning of this concept

> ...Faith is, so to say, the organ or instrument by which man, while still living in time and enmeshed still in nature and in history, may yet pass really and actually into the eternal order of existence. He has the substance, that is, the actuality of the things hoped for, and has them now, in danger, in suffering, in defeat or in victory, in the years of long-delayed fruition as truly as in the hours of ecstatic fulfillment. His is the life of the pilgrim who, while seeking the better country, has already begun to find it and live within it.[1]

Although Sherrill does not say, we might add the comment that the "heroes of faith" of chapter 11 possessed the "form" of faith but not its "substance" in their earthly existence. The "substance" being available only through Jesus Christ.[2] The Old Testament heroes made their "pilgrimage" with the help of a trusting hope, but the Christian has at least a partial enjoyment of the fruition of that hope in the quality of his relationship with God (and the resultant relationship with his fellow men) through Christ. To use a different figure, although anticipating a more complete "homecoming," the Christian knows something of the quality of "home" through his "at-homeness" with God and his fellow men.

In the New Testament, then, or at least in the writings surveyed, "faith" emerges as a complex symbol which can only partially be described as an "act." The response of faith to the redemptive activity of God in Jesus Christ means a continuous participation in that activity with all that is implied therein in terms of relationship with the Redeemer, the "redeemed," and the "lost." It is a symbol of a relationship or set of relationships which points beyond itself to a greater reality but which also participates in the reality it symbolizes. As such its meaning must be interpreted on "two levels," the level of reality which transcends anything which can be known in temporal experience and the level of reality which can be experienced here and now. These are not two separate and distinct "levels," something of the quality of the eternal can be experienced in time, and the Eternal has come into time in Jesus Christ, but the two levels remain two and cannot be completely reduced to one.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 18, 19. [2] An interpretation of 11:39,40.

Faith as a "state of being" includes the acceptance and continuous affirmation of personality both as created and redeemed and the inter-personal relationships implicit therein. To give faith such a broad meaning relates it to all of the Biblical symbols of creation and redemption, the "fall," sin, grace, etc. A discussion of this theological context is needed to clarify these relationships. Such a discussion will be given briefly in the next chapter.

Later Developments.--The definition of faith in Hebrews 11:1 became the generally accepted definition in Western Christendom, but, as we have noted previously, the theologians of the western Church were for many centuries concerned with questions which led them to emphasize the intellectual aspects of that definition. The "state of being" of the redeemed personality continued to be important, of course, but in other contexts.

St. Augustine's views of the nature of man's being have been particulaly important in the development of western thought. His theories, as we have said, were much concerned with the love relationships of personality. He had a broad and deep understanding of the nature of love and stressed the importance of divine love as the power which makes possible human righteousness.[1] In the City of God, as well as other writings, Augustine set forth a view of nature of the ideal potentiality of personality as a meaningful "order of loves" corresponding to the "order of being."

The various developments of Augustine's views are beyond the scope of this study, but one development is of particular importance for the meaning of faith. Augustine's views of grace show some ambiguity because of the underlying conflict in his thought between a dynamic understanding of love and a rather static Platonic view of "being." It is not clear in his writings whether grace is to be described as a dynamic power or as a "substance." As the writer reads and interprets St. Augustine, grace is understood as the dynamic power of the love relationship between God and man, both as intended in creation and as restored by redemption. It is possible, however, to interpret grace as a "gift of being" and this has tended to be the view of Scholastic and Thomistic theology. The Scholastics interpreted grace as a supernatural gift which was part of the nature of man in his brief sojourn in "paradise" and which was lost when he "fell."[1] The issues involved in the interpretation of grace are more complex than has been indicated, but a more complete discussion is not possible here. The Scholastic interpretation of St. Augustine however, gave great importance to the Church and its sacraments as the means for the restoration of the lost gift and, thus, played an important part in the development of the ecclesistical system which dominated the religious life of the Middle Ages. In practice, faith was almost equated with acceptance of the authority and "supernatural" gifts mediated by the Church.

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[1] There is some disagreement about the relative values of the divine "agape" and human "eros" in Augustine's view of love. Nygren's Agape and Eros is a detailed study of this relationship. In his own studies, however, the writer disagrees with Nygren's view and holds that Augustine rather consistently emphasized the primacy of divine grace.

The abuses of the Church's methods of mediating "grace" to the people ledto the precipitating causes of the Protestant Reformation. There were, of course, more fundamental causes than the "indulgence system" but the problem of the "means of grace" was an important one in the early conflict between the Reformers and the established Church. Protestant thought turned once more to the direct love relationship which is possible between man and God through faith in the reconciliation effected in Jesus Christ. They rejected the donum superadditum of the Scholastics and emphasized the love relationship as the source of all human righteousness.

The concerns of the Reformers, however, caused their emphasis to be one sided. As Tillich has described their views, the stress is on faith as confidence in God. This is a radical confidence in God and God alone:

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[1] See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Part I, Question 95, article 1 for a classical statement of this view.

> The Reformation pronounces...one can become confident about one's existence only after ceasing to base one's confidence on oneself...the courage of confidence is in no way based on anything finite, not even on the Church. It is based on God and solely on God, who is experienced in a unique and personal encounter.[1]

A study of the lives of Luther and Calvin indicates some of the reasons for the one-sided emphasis. They lived in an age of anxiety marked by strong fears of judgment and punishment. They, like many other people in that day, struggled with personal feelings of guilt and fear related to the anxieties of their period. Luther and Calvin fought these feelings in quite different ways, but both of them made effective use of the assurance of divine favor which came to them through faith and which gave them a powerful weapon against feelings of guilt and fears of rejection and punishment. Their anxieties were never completely overcome, however, and they needed to cling strongly to their confidence in God's benevolent attitudes to keep these anxieties in check. The nature of the anxieties, moreover, caused them to be severely rejecting toward various aspects of their personalities which had caused them great conflict before they experienced faith. Roughly similar phenomenon can be seen at work in the leaders of the Wesleyan revival and some of the other religious movements which have given an extreme emphasis to faith as assurance of divine favor. One of the unfortunate results of such a strong subjective emphasis on a certain kind of perception of God is that as the meaningful experiences connected with that perception fade into memory there is an increasing emphasis on the intellectual or dogmatic aspects of that perception. Thus, the understanding of faith in Luther and Calvin which originally seems to have been quite dynamic tended to become less and less dynamic and more and more dogmatic in their followers. The Wesleyan movement, however, avoided some of this by a continuous emphasis on the importance of personal experience and a lack of concern about dogma. Rigidity has tended in that movement to be connected with various emphases on "holiness" of life.

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[1] Tillich, op. cit., p. 163.

Kierkegaard.--Personal and cultural exigencies make it difficult for the theologians of any given period of history to formulate a well-rounded view of faith as a "state of being." A significant framework for such a view has been suggested however, by that strange and stimulating thinker of nineteenth century Denmark, Søren Kierkegaard. The thought of this man is difficult to interpret and his language is sometimes obscure, but his concept of faith presents a profound view of faith as self-affirmation before God. In his Sickness Unto Death he defines faith in these words:

> By relating itself to its own self and by willing to be itself, the self is grounded transparently in the Power which constituted it.[1]

The interpretation of this definition is no simple task. The thought of Kierkegaard is most complex. In the Sickness Unto

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[1] The Sickness Unto Death, trans. Walter Lowrie. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), p. 216.

Death the definition of faith is closely tied to his concepts of the self and sin. The self is a "relation which relates itself to its own self."[1] The self is a synthesis of "dialectical elements"--body and soul, finite limitations and infinite possibilities, time and eternity, the particular and the universal, etc.; but it is a synthesis which can transcend its own unity and reflect upon it and see the possibilities and limitations implied in it. The spirit as the synthesis is "a relation which relates itself to itself"--it is the self. Sin is despair, either of not being oneself or of being oneself, before God. Sin is a "state of being" in "disrelationship" to the Power which constituted the self. Sin is manifested in continuous acts of the "will" which bring into actuality the possibilities of the self but only partially and in distortion of the true relationship of its dialectical elements. Sin is despair because it is the inability wholly to live or wholly to die in the light of what one is and what one might be before God. Despair, for the Christian, is sin because in Christ he has seen his true measure. He sees the possibility of living before God or living as "grounded transparently in the Power which constituted the self;" he knows that he has not attained this possibility and cannot attain it. He sees that he has fallen short because in his "defiant will" he has sought to be himself by relating himself to himself as his own measure. Faith consists then in seeking to be himself by relating himself to God in Christ, his true measure. In so doing he relates himself to himself as he truly is and is grounded "transparently" in God. Faith is a "state of being" in relationship with God and is manifested ideally in acts of will by which the self freely becomes itself as it is before God.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

The dialectical nature both of sin and faith is, thus, noted by Kierkegaard. Both have to do basically with the relationship of the personality to God. This relationship is continuously being affirmed or denied. The end states of both describe the extremes of this relationship, complete despair of being oneself before God or complete self-realization before God. The end states are not to be found in this life, apart from the "devil" and Christ. Ordinary mortals fall somewhere in between. Affirmation and denial of man's true being is an ambiguous experience because of the effects of anxiety or "dread" upon personality. Kierkegaard discusses the effects of "dread" in some detail in his book on The Concept of Dread[1] and then, in The Sickness Unto Death describes the various forms of "despair" which are the result of "dread." This relationship of anxiety to faith is an extremely important one which must be discussed in some detail later.

Anxiety, sin, faith--these are key concepts with which we are concerned. Each involves the total personality. Each is at once a particular experience and a condition of man's being. Various modern theologians have followed Kierkegaard's lead in relating anxiety to faith in the totality of man's existence.

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[1] trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944).

Tillich.--For our purposes, one of the most important of these theologians is Paul Tillich. Tillich defines faith as "the reception of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ." As such it involves a self-transcending unity of the theoretical, practical, and emotional aspects of personality. This unity of the self is possible only through reunion with God and with all beings. The ecstatic quality of faith makes this unity possible. Faith is "the state of being grasped by the divine Spirit, or the state of self transcendence in theoretical, practical, and emotional respect."[1]

The following material from one of Tillich's sermons illustrates something of what he means by a "state of being grasped":

> ...faith means being grasped by a power that is greater than we are, a power that shakes us and turns us, and transforms us and heals us. Surrender to this power is faith. The people whom Jesus could heal and can heal are those who did and do this self-surrender to the healing power in Him. They surrendered their persons, split, contradicting themselves, disgusted and despairing about themselves, hateful of themselves and therefore hostile towards everybody else; afraid of life, burdened with guilt feelings, accusing and excusing themselves, fleeing from others into loneliness, fleeing from themselves to others, trying finally to escape from the threats of existence into the painful and deceptive safety of mental and bodily disease. As such beings they surrendered to Jesus and this surrender is what we call faith...We belong to these people, if we are grasped by the new reality which has appeared in Him. We have His healing power ourselves.[2]

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[1] Unpublished syllabus for the private use of students, Systematic Theology, Part IV, p. 18.

[2] "On Healing," in The New Being (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), pp. 38, 39.

In his discussions of faith it seems that for Tillich, there may be one or more particularly "ecstatic" experiences of being grasped by "the divine Spirit" in the early stages of faith and there may be particular times which are relatively more "ecstatic" than other periods during the later stages of faith; but Tillich's major emphasis is on a continuing quality of life in which the "power of being" is manifested in personal self-affirmation in the face of the anxieties of existence. This is the impression given by his concept of "absolute faith" in The Courage To Be. In that work he defines faith as "the state of being grasped by the power of being-itself."[1] He does not explicitly identify the "power of being" with the "divine spirit," although such an identification seems implied in the larger framework of his thought. There is a suggestion in this book as well as other of Tillich's writings that "absolute faith" transcends all symbols. In The Courage To Be he is especially concerned with a faith which can overcome the anxiety of doubt and meaningless which he feels is characteristic of our present age. Radical doubt undercuts the meaning of all religious symbols and all concrete content of faith, he argues, and brings the doubter to the point at which the only foundation left for faith is that which makes doubt possible, the power of being itself. Thus, Tillich, comes to the formula which St. Augustine suggested long ago, "dubito ergo sum."[2] "Absolute faith" then, affirms life inspite of radical doubt by affirming that in the very act of doubting the "power of being" is manifest. Affirming the power of being, faith then gives rise to courage which affirms the various aspects of the being of the self "in spite of" the anxieties of existence which work against such affirmation. Although "absolute faith" is undefinable, since everything defined is dissolved by doubt and meaningless, Tillich does give an analysis of its elements:

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[1] The Courage to Be, p. 172.

[2] See Augustine De lib. arb. x: 10.13 for statement and discussion.

> An analysis of the nature of absolute faith reveals the following elements in it. The first is the experience of the power of being which is present even in face of the most radical manifestation of nonbeing. If one says that in this experience vitality resists despair one must add that vitality in man is proportional to intentionality. The vitality that can stand the abyss of meaninglessness is aware of a hidden meaning within the destruction of meaning. The second element in absolute faith is the dependence of the experience of nonbeing on the experience of being and the dependence of the experience of meaninglessness on the experience of meaning. Even in the state of despair one has enough being to make despair possible. There is a third element in absolute faith, the acceptance of being accepted. Of course, in the state of despair there is nobody and nothing that accepts. But there is the power of acceptance itself which is experienced. Meaninglessness, as long as it is experienced, includes an experience of the "power of acceptance." To accept this power of acceptance consciously is the religious answer of absolute faith, of a faith which has been deprived by doubt of any concrete content, which nevertheless is faith and the source of the most paradoxical manifestation of the courage to be.[1]

There is much that is stimulating to thought in this concept of faith suggested by Tillich, but such an "absolute faith" is without criterion except the nature of being itself, which is indefinable. Theology must include a symbol which can serve in some definable way to give a criterion which differentiates between God and idols. Tillich suggests the answer in the last chapter of The Courage To Be and in various sections of his "Systematic Theology." The answer is found in an "absolute paradox." In Tillich's view there is the God above the God of the religions--indefinable, indescribable, transcending all concrete content and all symbols; but this God is also the God of the Church, "the Church under the Cross which...preaches the Crucified who cried to God who remained his God after the God of confidence had left him in the darkness of doubt and meaninglessness."[1] Thus Tillich holds to the ineffable God of the mystics, the divine ground of being of the ontologist, and also the God revealed in Christ, but the tensions involved in this effort are difficult to hold together and give rise to many problems in relation to his thought.

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[1] The Courage To Be, p. 177.

Tillich's analysis of faith has been developed further and in greater detail in his Dynamics of Faith in which he attempts to describe the structure of the faith experience in all religions. In this work he describes faith as "the state of being ultimately concerned."[2] He emphasizes the unity of the self in the act of faith, and the "ecstatic" and self-transcending experience of "being grasped" by that which concerns one ultimately. He does not attempt to define the content of the truly ultimate, but does point to the Pauline description of the Spirit in the New Testament as "the answer to the question and the fulfillment of the dynamics which drive the history of faith."[1] He also stresses the "Protestant principle." He declares that the most adequate symbol is the one "which expresses not only the ultimate but also its own lack of ultimacy," and affirms that the criterion of ultimacy "contains a Yes--it does not reject any truth of faith in whatever form it may appear in the history of faith--and it contains a No--it does not accept any truth of faith as ultimate except the one that no man possesses it."[2]

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[1] Tillich, op. cit., p. 187.

[2] Paul Tillich, Dynamics of Faith (New York: Harper and Brothers, c1957), p. 1.

Summary.--With this discussion of Tillich's concept of faith we bring to a close this section on "faith as acceptance of a state of being," and this chapter on theological emphases in the meaning of faith. We shall have more to say about all of these emphases in attempting to formulate a working definition of faith in Chapter III. In this last section we have suggested a number of concepts which are important for such a definition. We note especially the dialectic of faith as both "act" and "state of being" and its relationship to the dialectics of anxiety and sin in the totality of human existence. The thought of Kierkegaard has been particularly helpful and will be of interest for much that is to follow. This last section has also touched on the importance of faith as a symbol for certain aspects of a qualitative change in human life which need to be understood in the context of other symbols which have to do with that "eternal" quality of life. Thus our definition must be placed in a context in which other symbols of the relation of God and man, the eternal and the temporal, can contribute to its meaning, and we need to see, at least briefly, the role of faith in relation to the Biblical symbols of creation, "the fall," sin, redemption, eternal life, etc.

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[1] Ibid., p. 71.

[2] Ibid., pp. 97, 98.

CHAPTER III

TOWARD A DEFINITION OF FAITH

Purpose

Our survey of various emphases in theological interpretations of the nature of the faith experience suggests that no simple definition of this complex experience is possible from a theological point of view. Our survey also warns that any attempt at definition inevitably is influenced by the particular needs and biases of the one who does the defining and the cultural situation in which he seeks to communicate meaning. Nevertheless, definitions have their values and can be, in themselves, manifestations of the existence of some kind of faith.

In this study we are primarily concerned with the identification of aspects of the faith response which can be subjected to analysis and interpretation from a psychological point of view, and we shall list some of these as indicated by our theological survey before we attempt a definition; however, a definition can serve as a unifying focus for these isolated "variables"[1] and can present something of the writer's view of their interrelation. We think of a definition, also, as a kind of "springboard" from which we can plunge into theological and psychological concepts which are integrally related to a particular definition. We despair, however, of being able to find language adequate to express the complex meanings of faith in a brief form (at the same time, attempting to recognize that such despair is related to some of the particular anxieties of the writer), and we undertake the task with "fear and trembling."

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[1] This term is used here as a synonym for aspects, elements, etc. and not in its scientific meaning.

Criteria

In our anxiety we have already suggested four criteria which we feel we can but partially fulfill in our attempt to give a definition of faith--simplicity, objectivity, brevity, and adequacy (for the experience we are proposing to define). There are other criteria, however, that we shall attempt to keep in mind which are closely related to our purposes. As was noted at the beginning of Chapter II, a definition is needed which is consistent, within reasonable limits, with the main streams of thought in Western Christianity. It may be more realistic to strive for a definition which, at the least, does not contradict those "main streams of thought." Our definition also needs to be sufficiently comprehensive to include the most significant emphases in the history of western thought--or, at least, not to exclude an important emphasis,--and to be sufficiently analytical to indicate the relative values of these emphases. It should, of course, be internally coherent and it should identify the distinctive characteristics of faith which differentiate it from related concepts such as belief and love. Beyond consistency, comprehensiveness, coherence, etc. we would suggest that a theological definition should also be creative; that is, it should add something creative to what has been said in the past. In Part II of this dissertation we shall be concerned with another criterion--consistency with what is presently known about personality and interpersonal relationships--but we shall leave this criterion for later consideration.

These criteria are stated here for the guidance both of the writer and of the reader, but we shall not attempt to give a full evaluation of our definition in terms of these criteria. It is important, however, as preparation for the task of definition to summarize some of the elements or "variables" of the faith experience which were brought to light in the material of Chapter II. The important concepts which emerged from the fragments included there are the raw material from which we must attempt to construct a comprehensive, consistent, creative, etc. definition. It is difficult to list these "variables" out of context because their meanings vary so widely with the context in which they are stated, but we can try to list them briefly as a summary and guide for our definition:

Trust.--With related terms such as confidence, assurance, and reliance, trust is a fundamental aspect of faith. In the contexts we have noted it often connotes a confidence in the dependability of God as revealed in Jesus Christ which transcends all temporal knowledge and experience, and it holds to the sufficiency of God and God alone for human salvation.

Personal relationship.--Four variables were noted in summarizing this section of Chapter II--commitment, identification, communion, and dependence. All of these are closely related to trust, especially dependence. All of the variables under this heading were viewed in the light of a dialectic of sonship-discipleship which ideally posited one harmonious quality of relationship to God--freedom-in-love--but practically posited a continuum of relationships varying from this ideal at one extreme to relatively complete dutiful servitude (bondage to the law and the idol) at the other extreme. The emphasis of this section was on the personal relationship to God, but the view was implicit that a Christian quality of relationship to God includes a Christian quality of relationships with one's neighbor and oneself.

Intellectual assent.--This widely held view of faith arises out of man's search for knowledge and symbolizes the importance of knowledge for life and the necessity of some kind of human relationship to Truth. Faith must include the acceptance of a criterion of the nature of God and, derived from this, the nature of man and of the relationships between God and man and man and man.

Feeling.--The dynamic quality of faith arises out of those aspects of personality which are at least partially unconscious. The various views of faith as "feeling" bear witness to necessity of some kind of human experience of an on-going relationship to God as Spirit.

Acceptance of a "state of being."--In many ways this concept seems to "wrap up" the major contributions of the other emphases in one package. In addition it is integrally tied to concepts of anxiety and sin as "states of being" which, like faith, are also manifested in discrete attitudes and actions. It finds meaning in the context of these related concepts, but it needs the content of the other views of faith to describe the nature of faith as a "state of being." This view of faith is especially close in meaning to an emphasis on faith as a personal relationship and involves both conscious and unconscious acceptance of the quality of relationships between God andman and God-neighbor-self which are made possible by the redemption wrought in Jesus Christ. Such relationships, of course, include the totality of personality (even though it is a totality divided against itself by the effects of sin), transcending any separation of the self into elements of "intellect," "feeling," "will," etc.

This summary statement may help to draw together our theological "raw material" and to identify some of the major aspects and inter-relationships of this material, but it also shows the difficulty of reducing this material to a brief but comprehensive definition.

Two Definitions

Any definition which can be given here must be viewed in the light of the content which has been summarized above and also in the light of the assumptions which underly its terms.

Some of these assumptions have already been suggested in Chapter II, especially in discussing the relation of anxiety, sin, and faith in the perspective of man's total relationship to God. These assumptions will be discussed more fully in the following portions of this chapter. A definition is no sooner stated than qualification and clarification of its meaning must begin.

For our purposes we are suggesting two definitions of Christian faith. The first of these relies heavily on symbolic language to include the widest possible scope of theological meaning, and the second follows the Kierkegaard-Tillich type of thought to provide a more psychological type of definition:

1. Faith is a personal relationship to a Christlike God characterized by a trusting dependence upon God and manifested in a Christian quality of life.
2. Faith is the acceptance of personal existence before God.

These two statements are given above in the simplest and briefest form which seems possible to the writer. Much more lengthy statements could, and perhaps should, be given: but the symbols[1]

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[1] The "symbols" of our definitions--"Christlike God," "Christian quality of life" and "God" are labels which refer to experiences within the Christian community which are determinative of the meaning and value of existence within that community. For those within the community such experiences include glimpses of the nature of God and of man and of the relationships between them. They include potential criteria by which God can be differentiated from idols, and the divine and the demonic can be differentiated in human existence.

The experiences which are symbolized and the symbols themselves participate in realities which can be only partially expressed in meaningful human terms. They point beyond and abstractions of these brief definitions have within them the content which might be included in longer versions. We proceed now to a brief exposition of the meaning of these definitions and the various terms included within them.

> 1. Faith is a personal relationship to a Christlike God characterized by a trusting dependence upon God and manifested in a Christian quality of life.

The general purpose of this definition is to provide a brief but yet comprehensive statement which can express the "form" of Christian faith in such a way as to include different emphases and points of view which have been presented in the history of Christian thought, but also to include a criterion (one criterion with two aspects) which makes possible the evaluation of the various types of "content" which can be included in the "form." Conceivably any type of personal relationship to God, including mysticism, "person-to-Person-ism," Pelagianism, Augustinianism, or what have you, could be fitted into this definition if the proponents of the particular type of relationship were convinced that they were relating to a "Christlike God" with deep trust and were experiencing, to a

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themselves to dimensions of reality which transcend human categories. The historic experiences of person within the Christian community with the reality called "Christ" provide a common core of meaning for these symbols, but the experiences of each individual and group is, to some extent, unique and each interprets such experiences in different ways. The significance of the symbols consist both in the experiences which can be shared by Christians in temporal existence, even though variously interpreted, and the potentialities of divine-human relationships which these symbols suggest beyond present actualities.

For a significant discussion of religious symbols see Tillich, _Dynamics of Faith_, chap. iii.

demonstrable degree, a "Christian quality of life." The definition, however, assumes that within the Church there is the possibility of some kind of authority by which various types of relationship can be evaluated in terms of the kinds of relationship possible to a "Christlike God" and the Christian meaning of "trusting dependence on God" and "quality of life." Such authority cannot be final in our temporal existence, of course, (unless one accepts the doctrine of papal infallibility in certain areas of religious authority) but such value judgments must be made for Christian faith to have any unique meaning.

There is implicit in this definition of faith another criterion for the evaluation of faith which, in the light of our study in Chapter II is somewhat debatable. In this statement it is implied that a necessary test for the value or adequacy of a particular instance of faith is the quality of life which characterizes that faith. There are a number of assumptions involved here which need to be discussed later, particularly when we examine the relation of faith and love; but at this point we note that the statement as given posits a necessary connection between quality of faith and quality of life, thus tying together the faith relationship to God and the moral life.

Let us look briefly at the various terms of our first definition.

"Personal relationship" includes everything that is relevant to our definition of faith in the total response of an individual to God as perceived in the Christian revelation. It includes, but also transcends, the activity of particular aspects of personal existence--thinking, feeling, willing, etc. It implies a "dynamic" quality which provides power for life, although the nature of this power inevitably includes both positive and negative elements in relation to the various aspects of personality and to the totality of personal existence. Our psychological material should give us help in understanding the deeper meanings of "personal relationship." The "variables" which were discussed previously under this heading--commitment, communion, identification, and dependence--are relevant here, as is the dialectic of sonship--discipleship and other content of our discussion of faith as a personal relationship.

"Christlike God" is a symbol which can include whatever content can be perceived in the total Christian revelation of God. The content to be supplied would, of course, vary with the experience of the individual and his concept of the nature of the Christian revelation. In this study we are concerned primarily with the criterion which the Christian revelation provides for differentiating between God and idols (even though this criterion cannot be adequately defined and every definition is at least partially idolatrous), and the nature of the relationship which is possible with a "Christlike God." The view of revelation which is favored by the writer will be discussed briefly in the last part of this chapter.

"Trusting dependence" is included to differentiate faith from other aspects of the personal relationship of an individual to God. Without this phrase the definition could apply as easily to the love relationship of the individual to God as to the faith relationship. Some aspects of the content of "trusting dependence" have been suggested in Chapter II. They will take on more meaning as we discuss the relationship of faith to anxiety, and our psychological material will contribute to the understanding both of trust and dependence. Some reference to the nature of faith as trust, we feel, is essential to a definition which is consistent with the historic meaning of faith in the Hebrew-Christian tradition.

"Christian quality of life" is a dangerous but necessary addition. As has been suggested, it has been included in order to posit a necessary connection between quality of faith and quality of life. A wide variety of interpretations of the content of this phrase is possible. What we have in mind, briefly, is that quality of life which participates, to an observable extent, in relationships of loving trust toward God, neighbor, and self. It is life which is lived as fully as possible for the values which are revealed in Jesus Christ. The phrase is dangerous if the connection between "trusting dependence upon God" and this "quality of life" is lost and anxiety is permitted to stimulate perfectionistic and legalistic expectations which are impossible of fulfillment and may become pathological. The symbol is also dangerous if the gulf of sin which differentiates the moral efforts of most men from the achievements of Christ is underestimated.

2. Faith is the acceptance of personal existence before God.

This is a brief paraphrase of Kierkegaard's definition of faith. As such it shares some of the strengths and some of the weaknesses of his concept. We give it as a second definition because its phraseology provides a helpful "springboard" for the kind of content we have to supply for the meaning of faith. The three terms--"acceptance," "personal existence," and "before God"--can be given the kind of meaning which we feel is important for the concept of the faith experience; and the first two, especially, offer many opportunities for contact with psychological insights.

We would hasten to say that the definition as it stands has no Christian content; but for us, as for Kierkegaard, the phrase "before God" implies the God of the Christian revelation. Another great weakness of Kierkegaard's view of faith was that it saw faith almost exclusively as a relationship between an individual self and God. Our view of the self, which we shall discuss more fully in later sections, is not in agreement with this aspect of Kierkegaard's thought. His interpretation of the self was limited by his own anxieties and his intellectual background. A more adequate view perceives the self as living in continuous interaction with other selves and posits this interaction as a necessary aspect of the concept of the self. The definition might well read--"Faith is the acceptance of the self in its interaction with other selves before God"--but that is a rather awkward statement. There are, of course, other aspects of the environment with which the self is in continuous interaction, and these aspects are also important, but the interpersonal interaction is primary for the nature and development of personality.

We take a closer look, now, at the terms of the second definition:

"Acceptance" is a very ambiguous word which can mean many things. In the psychological portion of this study we shall try to define it in some detail. At this point we can stress certain aspects of its meaning as used in this dissertation; (1) accurate and realistic perception of the nature of personal existence at any given moment, including those dimensions of existence which can be labeled "divine;" (2) appropriate evaluation of the meaning and value of personal existence as perceived; that is, appropriate to the meanings and values for personal existence revealed by Jesus Christ and appropriate to the total situation; (3) mobilization of energy to respond as fully as possible to the potential for Christian growth in the total situation. In more theological terms we would describe "acceptance" as the recognition and utilization of the creative and redemptive potential in oneself and one's total situation, including the God-relationship. Further discussion will be found in Chapter V.

"Personal existence" is used here to include the totality of a given personality and its relationships to other persons, other aspects of existence, and that which transcends existence. In the context of our definition it includes the relationship of the self to God. There are three terms which need to be differentiated as aspects of "personal existence." The first is "person." We use this term to indicate the totality of the individual man, per se. It includes not only those aspects of his being which are observable in existence but also those aspects which are potential in his nature even though they may not be actualized in existence. It includes everything that the individual man possesses uniquely in himself and also everything that he possesses in himself which is possessed by all other men qua men...The second term, "personality," is used as roughly synonymous with "person" and includes all those aspects of existence which enter into "personhood"...The third term, "self," is used to indicate those aspects of a "person" or "personality" which function to perceive its own nature and its interactions with its total environment and to utilize these perceptions in ways which have meaning and value for its existence. Perception, in the sense noted here, is not limited to consciousness but includes all the various ways in which external and internal stimuli become operative in personal behavior. The term, "self" thus extends to all those activities of personality, conscious and unconscious, which are involved in perception and the utilization of perceptions in the functioning of the human organism.

The individual man, as we have noted previously, is continuously involved in some kind of interaction with his total environment. This interaction is an essential part of "personal existence." From a theological point of view Jesus described the most important elements of this interaction in his statement of the great commandments, "You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind, and with all your strength....You shall love your neighbor as yourself."[1] Both theologically and psychologically (to the extent that psychology can observe man's relationships, including his relationship to God) it is important to view human behavior in the perspective of the love commandment and the interrelationships which are implied therein.

Additional material about the meaning of "personal existence" and its various aspects will be included both in the theological and psychological discussions yet to come.

"Before God" is another way of saying "in relationship to God." It is a phrase of Kierkegaard's which in some contexts seems to have much the same meaning that was implied in his definition of faith when he described the self as being "grounded transparently in the Power which constituted it."[2] We cannot, at this point, discuss the meaning of this phrase to Kierkegaard. For our definition it is used to convey the meaning of acceptance of the self as created and redeemed for life with God, one's neighbor, and oneself. We include the potentialities and limitations established by God in His creative activity, the contradictions between potentiality and actuality and the conflicting tensions related to man's potentialities and limitations in his actual existence "before God," and the victory over these contradictions and conflicts made possible by God's redemptive activity in Christ, the Holy Spirit, and the Christian Church. The element of judgment is implicit in all of these activities of God and the human situation in relation to them. "Before God" implies a possibility of a trusting relationship to the God of Jesus Christ which makes available a dynamic and a criterion or "pattern" by which the contradictions and conflicts of man's nature can be continuously overcome,[1] but "before God" also implies a continuous experience of judgment as the individual falls short of the complete actualization of the ideal possibility of faith...From a psychological point of view the phrase "before God" might be interpreted to signify the total existence of the personality as it is perceived in actuality and potentiality in relation to ultimate meaning and value. This is to be contrasted with secular perceptions which do not include in their totality the nature and interactions of personality with the ultimate source of meaning and value (or which may include something of what is implied here but refuse to use the label "God").

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[1] Mark 12:30,31.

[2] Sickness Unto Death, p. 216.

The total meaning of "acceptance of personal existence before God" can be restated in two ways, which are to be considered interchangeable here as statements of our second definition of faith. The first restatement has already been suggested but can be expressed as : "Faith is the acceptance of personal existence (or life) as created and redeemed by God." The emphasis upon both creation and redemption is included as a corrective to some of the contemporary one-sided emphases upon the acceptance of God's redemptive activity. The second restatement emphasizes the moment to moment decisions for and against God which are made in the totality of personal existence: "Faith is the total decision for God in each moment of personal existence." "For God" in this paraphrase is understood to mean "for the meaning and value of life as created and redeemed by God," and thus stands in close relation to the other two statements of the meaning of faith. These three statements will come to have more meaning as we pursue the psychological study of the meaning of faith, and we shall not attempt to do more than suggest them as working "formulas" here.

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[1] See Appendix A for a discussion of some of the experiences of Jesus as an illustration.

The two definitions of faith which have been sketched above have provided a framework for drawing together some of the materials of our theological study of the meaning of the faith experience, and they have also suggested a point of view which will be important for our further discussion of that experience. Some of the assumptions underlying this point of view have been noted, but a more systematic statement of these assumptions may be helpful at this point. In this statement we shall attempt to relate faith to other significant symbols of traditional theology.

A Theological Context for the Meaning of Faith

The underlying assumptions of a definition of faith are very important in determining the adequacy of a particular definition. For example, the view of faith which Dean Inge expresses in his Faith and Its Psychology has much to commend it. He finds a basis for faith in the structure of human personality and includes the totality of personality in the faith relationship. His view strongly emphasizes God as the source of values--especially "Truth," "Beauty," and "Goodness"--and man as the kind of creature who assigns values to his experience. Faith is, then, primarily a relationship of man in his pursuit of values to God as the source of values.[1] The importance of this aspect of the faith experience will be seen more clearly in our later discussion of the role of values. This is an important aspect of faith, but Inge's concept seems inadequate both for the nature of God and the nature of man, and thus, for the relationship between God and man. His view of God is not sufficiently inclusive of transcendent aspects of God which leave man in inevitable uncertainty as to the application of religious values to concrete decisions and to the ultimate questions of life. His view of man does not include the anxiety which accompanies this uncertainty and which is the inevitable concomitant of the processes of valuation. This and other forms of anxiety are very important for understanding the nature of man's relationship to God.

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[1] See Inge, op. cit., especially pp. 42, 193.

Thus, we suggest that an inadequate understanding of the nature of God and the nature of man results in an inadequate understanding of the faith relationship between them.

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We proceed with a statement of some of the aspects of God and man and their interrelationships which may be helpful in evaluating the view of faith which is being expressed in this study. This statement provides some content for the terms of our definitions and some suggestions as to their interrelations. The symbols of the definitions, however, could include other content. The statement below is intended to be of help in interpreting the definitions in this dissertation. Rather than attempt a comprehensive outline, which would exceed both our limitations of space and our purposes, we shall discuss briefly some of the theological symbols which have to do with the relationships of God and man and the quality of life which is associated, in our view, with Christian faith.[1]

The Word of God.--The Bible in many ways and many places tells of a God who is, on the one hand, creator of heaven and earth, sovereign of the universe, transcendent in holiness and majesty, and mysterious in His ways; and who, on the other hand, is a God who has attributes of a Person and seeks to communicate by means of His Word with the persons whom He has created. His Word takes many forms, none of which can be completely identified with the words of the Bible. It can be said that He has made use of the events of history, the folklore of primitive peoples, the inspiration of leaders and prophets, and other ways to communicate with men and to establish a mutual relationship with them. All of the ways in which God has sought to communicate with men and the content which has been communicated may be included, for our purposes, in the symbol--the Word of God. Finally, in the "fullness of time," he sent forth a Person to incarnate the Word. "And the Word became flesh and dwelt among us, full of grace and truth; we have beheld his glory, glory as of the only Son from the Father."[1] Through the Word of God, human perception of God is possible; and through the understanding of God and His dealings with men which the Word has made possible, various aspects of the relations of God and man can be traced.

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[1] The influence of the thought of Brunner, Kierkegaard, Niebuhr, and Tillich, and others can be seen in the theological assumptions of this section, but the responsibility for the kind of statement given is the writer's.

Creation.--Human personality is that manifestation of the creative process which has within it a capacity for the response of a "self" to God and other persons. "Selfhood" or "person-ality" is a mark of a creature that has been created for fellowship with God. The God of the Bible has created man for loving fellowship with Himself and through His Word has stimulated the actualization of human potentialities for that communion. Certain significant characteristics of man as created for this kind of fellowship can be noted:

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[1] John 1:14.

1. Man as "self" can perceive his own being and his relationships with other aspects of creation. Through his capacity for perception and the various aspects of cognition such as memory, reflection, imagination, etc. he can transcend himself and his environment in such a way as to be able to ask questions. The most significant question is the question of his own being. His experience of his potentialities and limitations brings him to the borderline of his own nature, and confronts him with anxiety and the question of his ultimate nature and destiny--which is the question of the meaning and value of his existence or the question of God.

Kierkegaard has pointed to some of the dialectics of human nature which are related to his potentialities and limitations as created.[1] Man as a creature is subject to limitations of time, space, the power of his being, the scope of his understanding, and other limitations of finitude; but, on the other hand, he has possibilities of self-transcendence through memory, imagination, reflection, etc. which have no fixed limits, and he has potentialities for personal growth which can always find some kind of expression; thus, he has these and other forms of potential infinitude. His limitations and potentialities and their interrelationships give to man both necessity and freedom as aspects of his being and posit a relationship both to the temporal and the eternal. Limitations and potentialities also give man a dialectical relationship to those aspects of himself which make for the fulfillment of his personality and those which make for the deterioration and destruction of that personality. There is potential within human nature a "push" or drive of man's being to grow and fulfill its created purpose, but its actualization involves a "threat" of destruction. The world beyond man, of course, also holds these potentialities of "push-threat" for his growth. We assume that in God's creative purpose the drive toward fulfillment is primary.

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[1] Sickness Unto Death, p. 17.

Another dialectic which has been stressed by Tillich, Niebuhr, and others is that of the relationship of the vitalities of human nature to the meaning and purpose (intentionality) which seems to be implicit in the structure of his being.[1] A dialectic which is a necessary assumption of a theological doctrine of man is the relationship of each particular man to all men. This is the dialectic of particularity-universality which assumes that although each man has his own unique individuality each man also participates in those universal qualities of human nature which make man "man."

2. Man as "person" has a capacity to respond to other persons, and it is through the actualization of this capacity that the most important forms of personality growth take place. "Response-ability" is the mark of personal existence. Personality "finds itself" through "losing itself" in response to other persons and other aspects of existence. The limitations

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[1] Tillich, The Courage To Be, pp. 80-89.

of the relationships which can be established through response to persons in time and space confront man with anxiety and the question of an unlimited, unconditioned relationship; this, again, is the question of God.

3. Man as "person" with a consciousness of "self" is created with at least a "formal" capacity for freedom. As long as man remains man there is some degree of freedom to choose the nature of his responses to other persons in accordance with the perceptions which he has of those persons in relation to his own being. In existence there is much more than conscious choice involved, of course, and the degree of conscious choice can become extremely limited. The positive response of "moving toward" other persons, at least partly through conscious choice, may be called "love." Such a thing as a completely positive response is not to be found in this life. There are various forms of negative response or "moving away from" or "moving against" other persons which can bear labels such as "hate," "fear," "guilt," etc. It is our assumption that the "love" drive in personality is basic and negative responses are secondary or derivative in man as created. The "love" drive, however, is found in existence in mixed and ambiguous combinations with negative responses (ambivalence). The ambivalence of human responses to other persons confronts man with anxiety and the question of a response which is wholly love; this, again, is the question of God.

4. Man as "self" with a need for creative and satisfying interactions with other "selves" is dependent upon the

responses of other persons and the way in which these responses are perceived. For the growth of personality, experiences of need-satisfying responses by other persons is essential. Without such responses personality withers and eventually dies. Man is dependent upon what might be called the "acceptance-rejection" patterns of other persons and the ways in which those patterns are perceived. The limitations and conflicts of these patterns of human relationships confront man with anxiety and the question of the possibility of an unconditioned personal acceptance; this, again, is the question of God.

5. Man as a "person" with a potentiality for self-transcendence is the kind of creature who can ask the questions of the meaning and value of his potentialities and limitations as a "response-able" being; and, in the actualization of his nature in relation to specific opportunities he seeks answers to these questions in terms of functional criteria of meaning and value. In the limited consciousness of actual existence these criteria are partly, if not wholly, unconscious, but are operative in the personality in its totality. Because of the ambiguities of the nature of his potentialities and limitations as a self-transcendent, "response-able" being, there is inevitably ambiguity in his relations to these criteria. His uncertainties not only confront him with anxiety and the question of God but also make a relationship to a "god" or "gods" necessary for his existence. A "god" may be defined as a functional criterion upon which the personality depends for the determination of meaning and value in the actualization of

possibilities. The nature and development of the relationships of the personality to such "gods" will be a subject for study in the psychological portion of this dissertation.

6. Man as a "person" with "response-ability" has a potential capacity to respond to God with the kind of relationship which makes possible creative actualization of his own being in relation to the other aspects of his existence and the triumphant acceptance and transcendence of the anxieties of that existence.

Sin and the Fall.--The preceding interpretation of the "created" nature of man and the anxiety and questions which this nature stimulates in existence has laid the framework for a doctrine of sin which, in part, accounts for the contradiction of the Word--the contradiction between potentiality and actuality which is apparent in human existence as we know it. Man as created for fellowship with God possesses the ideal potentiality for a relationship to God which would make possible the successful facing of all the anxieties and questions of human existence. Such a possibility, however, has been actualized only in Jesus.[1] For all other men we posit that as personality becomes conscious of itself and of other persons and the questions of existence, the self is perceived as, to some degree, separated from other selves and from God and divided within itself. For each man, as for the "first man," this comes about as the self coming into actuality experiences anxiety, is unable to overcome this anxiety completely, and becomes separated from other persons and God and divided against itself through the effects of anxiety. The self, then, as conscious of itself in existence, is aware of a contradiction between what it "is" and what it "might be." The self, as conscious of itself before God (which may not happen until there is a serious confrontation of the self with the underlying questions of existence and a confrontation with God's answers to these questions in Jesus Christ), is conscious of sin, that is of a continuous state of separation from God which is manifested in various specific aspects of personality (thought, feelings, actions, etc.) and in continuous contradiction of what "is" and what "ought to be" before God...The concept of anxiety and of human reactions to anxiety is very important for this view of sin and "the Fall" and for our total discussion of faith and will receive further attention, both from theological and psychological points of view.

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[1] See Appendix A.

Redemption and Reconciliation.--The Word of God comes forth into human existence in order to actualize that which is potential in God's creative process. Human life is not the only aspect of creation which has not been completely actualized,[1] and there are various negative forces at work in the world apart from those related to human sin. The Word of God, however, comes especially to man because of the created potentialities of man. The Word comes to "redeem" that which has been lost through sin and to "reconcile" man and God. In Jesus, who as the living Word of God is called "Christ," this redemption and reconciliation has been accomplished and is being accomplished. The potentialities of human life "before God" were completely actualized in Jesus. In him creation is fulfilled; the infinite and the finite in human nature are unified; the eternal quality of life is realized in the temporal. Through Jesus, moreover, God's Word of reconciliation comes into human life. Those positive forces which make for reconciliation of man with God, man with man, and man with himself are incarnated in a Person to whom other persons can respond. The negative forces of human existence are accepted and transcended. God's unconditional acceptance of the individual person is given concrete expression in Jesus, as well as His rejection of the state of separation and the resulting concomitants of sin. God who transcends all the limitations and ambiguities of human life has participated in this existence and has accepted it and yet demonstrated His transcendence over it in the Person and Work of Jesus the Christ.

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[1] "The whole creation has been groaning in travail together"...Romans 8:22.

The possibility of personal response to the Word of God become flesh is the possibility of Christian faith. To the degree that the capacities of personality for response is actualized in the response to Jesus Christ, to that degree the individual participates in the redemption and reconciliation which God has effected and is effecting through Christ. Acceptance of Jesus as the Christ is acceptance of God's creative purpose for human life and his transcendent sovereignty over that life. It is acceptance of a quality of life which is eternal but which can be at least partially realized by men in temporal existence. Acceptance of Jesus as the Christ is acceptance of a Christlike God and of the potentialities for personal (father-son) relationship with Him which Jesus incarnated and which, again, can be at least partially realized by all men. Acceptance of Jesus as the Christ is also, however, the acceptance of the radical nature of human sin and the deep disturbances in all personal existence and personal relationships which are related to sin. Thus, acceptance of Jesus as the Christ, is acceptance of man's continuous need for forgiveness and the wonder and mystery of a God who accepts him though he is unacceptable...The implications of such response to God in Christ are many and can only be suggested here. It is important, however, to note that response to God in Christ has within it the potentiality of that kind of relationship with God which makes possible a profound degree of reconciliation with other men and with oneself. In summary, two aspects of the response to Jesus as the Christ are particularly important for our discussion of faith in its relations to anxiety and sin--the acceptance and actualization of the dynamic qualities of the relationship to God, neighbor, and self, made possible by and through Jesus and the acceptance and utilization of the criteria of meaning and value embodied in Jesus' total revelation of God. It is the dynamic power and the criteria of meaning and value which are possible for the Christian through the faith response to God in Christ, that offer the potentiality of victory over anxiety and sin.

The Church.--In the Bible response to God's Word always occurs in the context of participation in an identifiable community of persons. The Bible records the efforts of the members of a particular religious community to realize fellowship with God. In the New Testament that community becomes universal, in conception at least, but it is expressed in specific and particular groups. Response to the Word of God is inevitably related to participation in a community. The Word creates community among those who experience it. The Word comes to a community through events or through individuals or groups within the larger community and the Word is mediated by the community. Response to the Word is, in part at least, response to the community and the way in which it receives and mediates the Word, the way in which one participates in those experiences of the community which give meaning to the Word, and one's total perception of the community. The acceptance of the Word in the life of an individual is first manifested in the manner in which the individual relates to the community and its individual members. Acceptance of the Word is also, of course, manifested in relationships with persons outside the community, but relationships to those in the community continue to be primary for many reasons.

Response to Jesus as the Christ is inevitably related to response to the community which first knew him, which has continued to remember him through the centuries, and which mediates his Person and Work in every age. Response to a Christlike God involves participation in a community of those who are seeking to respond to such a God, whether the community is called "the Church" or not. The "Christian life" of faith and love relationships to other persons is impossible apart from a community, and the extent to which this life is possible, for lesser men than Jesus, is dependent upon the potentialities for redemptive interaction which characterize the primary groups in which a person participates. Ideally, the Christian quality of life of a given person would begin with his primary groups and gradually grow to extend beyond them to more and more inclusive forms of community.

The importance of participation in a community of faith will be discussed later. We point here to the role of this participation in the perception and response to the Word of God and the expression of such response in relationships with other persons.

The Holy Spirit.--The Word of God goes forth with power to accomplish His purposes. God as continuously present in the world in every age to bring creation to fulfillment may be called "The Holy Spirit." The response to the Word of God by an individual person is made possible by the power with which the Word is communicated and the forces within the individual which can be mobilized for response. The Word is mediated in various ways--the Bible, the sacraments, worship, preaching, teaching, counseling, etc.--but person-to-person communication plays a part in all of these, and we emphasize the role of such communication here. In the total experience of such communication and the response of an individual to it, many of the dynamic forces of interpersonal relationships may be activated. The deeper the interpersonal level of communication the more these forces come into operation. On the deeper levels the totality of personality becomes involved, even though in a conflicting and ambivalent manner. Much of this total response is, of course, unconscious, but the unconscious aspects enter significantly into the nature of the interpersonal communication. The total response, conscious and unconscious, in its dynamic aspects may be labeled the "spirit" of a man. In the response of the "spirit" of one man to the "spirit" of another the dynamic forces are ambiguous in their qualitative aspects. There are some aspects which can tentatively be identified as "divine" and other aspects which can be identified as "demonic." The Christian criterion of the nature of God is necessary for such identifications. We may speak also of the "spirit" of a group, which shares in this qualitative ambiguity. The "spirit" of a group is more than the sum of the individual responses of the members of the group because of those aspects of group experience which transcend the sum of individual experiences. The Word of God may be communicated by certain kinds of group experiences in which the "spirits" of individual members or non-members respond to the "spirit" of the group.

This is by no means a complete outline of the work of the Holy Spirit, but it follows the traditional emphasis on the Church as an important sphere of operation of the Holy

Spirit and directs our attention to the psychological study of the nature of interpersonal communication in order to gain greater understanding of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit.

The Resurrection and Eternal Life.--Jesus Christ as the Incarnate Word is triumphant in history over the ambiguities and limitations of human existence and will continue to be triumphant in the reign of God beyond history. The symbols of his victory are "the resurrection from the dead" and "eternal life." "Eternal life," we have suggested previously is that quality of life which was exemplified by Jesus and which, through the redemptive activity of a Christlike God, is a possibility for every man. Participation in this quality of life begins with an individual's acceptance of reconciliation with God, the degree of participation depending upon the degree of acceptance by the individual and the potentialities for reconciliation in the various groups in which he lives. Complete participation in this quality of life cannot be experienced within history because of the effects of sin, but a Christian trusts that it is possible with God who is eternal and who is working out His purposes for man beyond as well as within history. For our purposes "eternal life" symbolizes the qualitative difference between the potentiality and actuality of man's response-ability--between man as created and man as redeemed. Man as created possesses a potentiality for a relationship with God which makes possible love of his neighbor and acceptance of himself. Man as fully redeemed has freely actualized this relationship with God and enjoys reconciliation with his neighbor and himself. Between creation and redemption, however, the battle of freedom and anxiety is being fought and won, and "faith is the victory."

"The resurrection from the dead" or, to quote from the Apostle's Creed, "the resurrection of the body" is a symbol of the same kind of trust noted above--the trust that God, whose purposes for men are eternal, is working out these purposes not only within the limits of finite existence but also beyond them and that His ultimate victory, revealed in the resurrection of Jesus Christ, transcends these limits. The symbol of the "second coming of Christ" also points to this aspect of Christian trust in God's transcendence of human limitations... For our purposes "the resurrection of the body" is a significant symbol in that it affirms the significance of the totality of personality in God's eternal purpose. Rather than separating the body from the "soul," as much of Greek thought did in thinking of the relationship of man to God beyond historical existence, early Christian thought tended to affirm the totality of man's being, in his relationship to God. There has, of coume, been a necessary distinction in this affirmation between man's being as created and redeemed or "resurrected" and those aspects of human existence which are the result of human sin. This, as we have said, is primarily a qualitative distinction having to do with the quality of interpersonal relationships (especially relationship with God) rather than a distinction in the nature of man before sin, after sin, and beyond sin.

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In this sketch of some of the traditional symbols of Christian theology we have suggested some of the assumptions which are important for the meaning of the two definitions given in the first part of this chapter for Christian faith. We have sketched a view of a God who created man for fellowship with Himself and uses various means within history to help men to experience such fellowship. We have related various aspects of theology to the activity of God and man, within the Hebrew-Christian religious cultures, to bring this fellowship to actuality; and we have noted some of the more important aspects of human existence which make this difficult, noting also those symbols which signify that the full actualization of the divine-human relationship lies beyond the limits of finite existence. The content of these assumptions is but one example of the kind of content possible for our definitions of faith, but it gives a glimpse of the content these definitions will have for the remainder of this study. In terms of this content psychological material can be used to amplify and clarify our understanding of the faith experience.

Before surveying some relevant psychological contributions, however, it may be helpful to discuss the faith aspects of the personal relationship to God in relation to other aspects of this total relationship, such as anxiety, love, hope, and knowledge. Such a discussion should add some clarity to the distinctive meanings of faith.

CHAPTER IV

SOME RELATIONSHIPS OF FAITH TO OTHER ASPECTS OF CHRISTIAN LIFE

Purposes and Limitations

Beginning with the thirteenth chapter of St. Paul's first letter to the Corinthians, faith has traditionally been discussed as part of the triumvirate of "faith, hope, and love." A thorough study of the historical meanings of faith should include a careful examination of significant relationships of faith to the other members of this triumvirate. Such a study, beyond clarifying the meaning of faith, would help to show its role in the moral and ethical aspects of religious life. A thorough study is not possible here, but it is important to trace some of the interrelationships of faith, hope, and love in order to develop our theological view of faith. Two other aspects of religious life should also be considered in relation to faith because of the significance that they have assumed in the history of Christian thought. The first of these is anxiety, which we have suggested is crucial for our concept of faith; and the second is the cognitive aspect of religious life--including belief, knowledge, reason, etc.--which is important because of our cultural emphases on this part of life.

What we shall attempt to do here, rather than give a historical survey, is to develop briefly the relationships of these various aspects of Christian life which seem to be implied in the definitions and the assumptions sketched in the previous chapter. Occasional reference to material from the history of Christian thought will be given to illustrate our views and to show some consistency with what has been said before.

Anxiety and Faith

The close relationship of faith and anxiety or fear has been noted in various places in our historical survey of emphases in the concept of faith--especially in the meaning of faith in the Old Testament, the teachings of Jesus, and the more recent views of Kierkegaard, Tillich, and Niebuhr. As we have said previously, the experience of anxiety was implicit in all of the views of faith we have studied and was influential in shaping the form and content of those views. The contribution of Kierkegaard in reemphasizing the role of anxiety in man's relationship to God has been particularly important in certain types of recent theological thought and is reflected in many ways in the views expressed in this dissertation.

The relationship of faith and anxiety is a very complex one which cannot be reduced to any simple statement. There are elements of the experiences of faith and anxiety which cannot be captured by words but which need to be shared on deeper levels of communication for understanding. Some noteworthy attempts to capture the meaning and relationships of these experiences have been made, however, which provide far more extensive discussions than are possible here, including insights both from theology and psychology.[1]

Every aspect of human personality enters into the experience of anxiety. In the preceeding chapter we noted some of the characteristics of the nature of man "as created," and suggested that anxiety was associated with these characteristics. We can examine some of the relationships of faith and anxiety under these various aspects which we have assumed to be part of man's created being.

1. Man as a "self," who can perceive his own existence and his relationships to other aspects of existence, perceives that his existence consists of "I" and "not-I," but the nature of "I" and "not-I" cannot be perceived completely and with absolute accuracy and is inevitably ambiguous and uncertain. In his perception of himself man experiences potentialities and limitations and can so transcend himself that he can question the nature and meaning of these potentialities and limitations. With his own resources, however, he cannot answer his questions and in his uncertainty experiences anxiety. Similarly

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[1] See especially--Oscar Pfister, Christianity and Fear (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1944); Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952); Charles R. Stinnette, Jr. Anxiety and Faith (Greenwich, Connecticut, The Seabury Press, 1955); Wayne E. Oates, Anxiety in Christian Experience (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, c1955); Rollo May, The Meaning of Anxiety (New York: The Ronald Press, 1951). The "classics" in this respect are two books by Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread and The Sickness Unto Death.

in his experience of those aspects of existence which he perceives as not being part of himself, he can question their nature and meaning for his life, but, again, he is uncertain and is anxious.

The Biblical story of Adam and Eve can be used to illustrate this kind of anxiety. Adam and Eve possessed a potentiality for knowledge of good and evil but experienced this potentiality bothas a possibility of being like the gods and a possibility of dying. These represent the extremes of the range of all human potentialities--complete self-fulfillment to the point of deification of the self and complete self-destruction; but these extreme possibilities are ambiguous in themselves, however, for it is not possible for a man, in himself, to know either what it means for him to be "like God" or to "die." Both of these possibilities are beyond his experience and he cannot penetrate their meaning. To be "like God" holds possibilities of meanings destructive of some of the values of finite existence as well as possibilities of fulfillment, and "to die" holds possibilities of positive values in relation to some aspects of that existence as well as possibilities of negation. Both extremes of anticipatory possibility can be experienced both as fascinating and terrifying at the same time.

Kierkegaard recognized these ambiguities in the relationship of the self to possibility. He abstracted from the concrete possibilities of existence the possibility of the self becoming itself and described the experience of anxiety or "dread" in relation to this possibility. He spoke of dread "as the reality of freedom as possibility anterior to possibility" and "a sympathetic antipathy and an antipathetic sympathy," and he described Adam as being both attracted and alarmed by the infinite possibility of "being able" which posed an ambiguous possibility as its consequence.[1]

The dialectic which Kierkegaard has described, if we understand something of his meaning, is an important one. Anxiety is the concomitant of freedom. It has to do with the relationship of a finite self to possibility. Possibility confronts the self with ambiguity. The concretization of possibility requires a venture of trust, a risking of the self in a course of action in the face of the ambiguous possibilities of the consequences of that action. Possibility presents an attracting and yet alarming mixture of affirmation-negation and negation-affirmation of personal existence, in terms of those values which the self is seeking to concretize. This was illustrated by the relationship of Adam and Eve to the possibility of the knowledge of good and evil. We assumed, for the sake of our illustration, that this possibility confronted them with an ambiguous affirmation-negation of personality, on the one hand, and an ambiguous negation-affirmation, on the other. The symbolic relationship of "knowledge of good and evil" to possibilities of personal affirmation and negation is a profound one which could be analyzed further, but we are using it as an illustration of the relationship which we hold to be characteristic, in general, of the relationship of a perceiving and evaluating self to all possibilities for self-realization. This relationship can be presented in a rough diagram.

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[1] The Concept of Dread, pp. 38-40.


self

possibility
(for self-realization)

affirmation-
negation
of personal existence

negation-
affirmation
of personal
existence

anxiety

The self perceives the ambiguous relationship of itself to a given possibility for self-realization and is anxious. In order to act it must find a criterion by which a balance can be determined between affirmation-negation and negation-affirmation, and then act in spite of its anxiety. The self, in its anxiety, may seize upon an inadequate criterion for action or may seek in some way to protect itself from anxiety rather than to act, or it may combine these alternatives in an infinite variety of ways.

This dialectical relationship of the self to possibility may be viewed from various perspectives as it operates in human existence. For example, possibility confronts the self with the ambiguity of its own finitude-infinitude. The self seeks to maintain itself as a finite creature in the face of all the threats to its meaningful existence both within and beyond its own being, and it also drives toward realization of indeterminate possibilities of growth, learning, and other forms of transcendence of itself and its environment. There are a multitude of possibilities of conflict in the experience of this combination of drive-threat. In actualizing the potentiality for "knowledge of good and evil," for example, the self is confronted by the necessity for moral choice in the face of the complex and ambiguous relativities of a particular moral dilemma. The self drives toward decision while seeking to protect itself from the threat of error and its possible consequences; however, the experience of anxious drive-threat may push the self toward fantastic forms of moral pride ("playing God") or rigid forms of retreat from moral responsibility (e.g., the fantastic or vegetative existence of the psychotic).

This same kind of dialectical tension may be viewed in terms of the relation of freedom and necessity. For example, man is free to actualize his capacity for "knowledge of good and evil" in any way possible in his existence, but he must actualize this and other capacities if he is to function as a man, and he is limited by the structure of finite existence as to the status which can be given to his valuations.

There are many other dialectics of human existence which could be noted, but we emphasize one more which has already been suggested and which is important for our total thought. The relation of drive-threat which was noted in the actualization of man's infinitude-finitude we hold to be generally characteristic of the actualization of other human potentiality-limitation dialectics. We assume the existence within personality of a "drive" toward self-realization; i.e. a "drive" to concretize the potentialities of the self. The ambiguity of such potentialities and the limitations of finite existence in relation to that which is within and beyond the self mean that the "drive" toward growth is inevitably accompanied by threats of loss of self, including loss of meaning and value as well as actual loss of being. For example, growth in "knowledge of good and evil" is accompanied by various "threats," such as the growing understanding of the tragic character of human existence, the possibility of error, and the dangers of giving either more or less status to personal valuations than is appropriate to the limitations of one's knowledge.

The dialectic of personality growth may be sketched in terms of our previous diagram. The self seeking to concretize possibilities for growth is anxious in the conflict between the creative-destructive, destructive-creative ambiguities of its potentialities-limitations.



We emphasize this last dialectic of "growth" at this point because a view of anxiety which sees it as a concomitant of the experience of ambiguously related positive and negative forces is more adequate than a view which stresses only the experience of negative forces or the threat of negative forces. Paul Tillich, in his discussion of anxiety, defines it as "the state in which a being is aware of its possible nonbeing" or "the existential awareness of nonbeing."[1] This view of the "ontology" of anxiety is fundamental to his concepts of the various forms of anxiety and to much of his book on The Courage to Be. He makes anxiety equivalent to the threat of non-being or the various forms of negation of personal existence. There is implicit in Tillich's concept of "the power of being" a more adequate view of anxiety because, as he himself notes in the concluding chapter, no experience of "threat" is possible unless there is a power within the self moving toward self affirmation. His view of anxiety as stated, however, tends to neglect the "sympathetic antipathy" part of the dialectic of anxiety described by Kierkegaard and to result in somewhat inadequate concepts of courage and faith.[2]

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[1] The Courage to Be, p. 35.

[2] Wayne Oates in his Anxiety in Christian Experience also emphasizes the "threat" aspect of anxiety and neglects the role of the drive toward self-realization. He defines anxiety as "a reaction of tension to threats to the selfhood of an individual or to the groups to which he belongs and for which he feels responsible." p. 9.

Charles Stinnette, however, follows Kierkegaard more closely in saying that "anxiety accompanies freedom" and "freedom is both possibility and threat." Anxiety and Faith pp. 29-35.

2. Man as a "person" with a capacity to respond to other persons and to other aspects of his existence is anxious in his "response-ability." This aspect of anxiety is an important addition to the concept sketched thus far. Man's questions about his own being, as questions asked in and through his total personal existence, are never merely about his own being. Instead they are about his being as related to other personal beings. The potentialities and limitations of finite existence find an important part of their meaning (and their ambiguity) as they affect and are affected by other persons. The self in its total existence attempts to resolve a question which might be phrased "How can I be loved?" as part of the question "How can I become the person I really am?" The nature of man's "response-ability" is such that he reaches out to the "response-ability" of other persons in order to find the satisfactions and securities of loving and being loved. He finds his most significant growth through such love relationships. But even as he moves toward other persons in interpersonal interaction he experiences the possibility of ambiguity or ambivalence in those relationships. In the most positive of relationships there is an element of negativity and the most negative is not completely devoid of positive qualities. In interpersonal relationships the dialectic of anxiety which we have noted is relevant:



self

possibility of interpersonal interaction

positive-
negative

negative-
positive

anxiety

The self, seeking to actualize itself in relation to other persons, experiences anxiety as it moves out toward the possibility of interpersonal interaction and is confronted with the ambiguity of the possible consequences of this interaction. For example, in every moving out of the self toward other persons there is a possibility of loss of self as well as a possibility of satisfaction and self-fulfillment. Moreover, in every movement toward other persons there is a threat of rejection of that movement as well as acceptance of it by the other person. In the story of Adam and Eve we might say that Adam was anxious not only because of his relationship to the potentiality of knowledge, which we have discussed previously, but also because of the kinds of tension suggested above which were present in his relationship with Eve. In existence the patterns of anxious expectation in regard to oneself and other persons in interpersonal relationships are learned, but the potentiality of such patterns is part of the structure of finite existence; and we would include the anxiety of interpersonal interaction with the "existential" or "inevitable" anxieties of human life.

3. Some of the aspects of anxiety which pertain to man's nature as a person capable of love relationships have already been mentioned. There are many other forms of anxiety which are related to the complexities of human love. We describe only two of these here. For one, the nature of love poses the question of the totality of human personality in its most crucial form. There is an inevitable ambiguity in the relationship of the unconscious or semi-conscious aspects of love to the conscious aspects. In this ambiguity there is the possibility of self-fulfillment but also the threat of self-loss through the power of the "hidden" vitalities which come into play in love relationships. The experience of this ambiguity which has some markedly fascinating as well as alarming aspects, is, again, the experience of anxiety.[1]

The dialectic of freedom and necessity also finds its most crucial form in love relationships. It is in the self-transcendence which is possible in love that the self is most free and endows the highest forms of freedom on its beloved, but it is also in love that the most complete limitations on self-expression are found. It is in the actualization of the love capacity, moreover, that the self is most free to become itself through its "response-ability," but it is also in the actualization of this capacity that the self is most driven to find ways to express its "response-ability."

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[1] This was probably one of the most important forms of anxiety in Kierkegaard's personal experience which gave him the data for his concept of dread. See Walter Lowrie, Kierkegaard, (London: Oxford University Press, 1938), pp. 137, 138 for quotations and discussion concerning Kierkegaard's sexual "fall."

4. The dialectic of the anxiety of the self as dependent upon the responses of other persons can be noted briefly in the framework of thought we are using. There are many aspects of this dialectic but the one to be mentioned is that of independence-dependence. This is a tension between a drive for independence from the responses of other persons and a drive for need-satisfying dependence upon such responses. The actualization of both is necessary for full personality growth, but the actualization of one threatens the actualization of the other unless an ideal balance of tension between the two aspects can be maintained. Both aspects, however, are experienced as ambiguous and anxiety is inevitable.

5. As yet nothing has been said about anxiety as it characterizes man's relationship to God. Various aspects of anxiety which raise the question of a god-relationship were noted, however, in our discussion of the nature of man as created. It is our view that the anxieties which are inevitable in human existence all pose the question of God. Most important, however, is the need which man faces in his efforts to accept and overcome his anxieties--the need for a criterion of value by which he can penetrate the relativities of possibility and act in accordance with the highest possible values. Inevitably a criterion of some kind is operative in human attempts to actualize potentialities in the face of anxiety. The criterion which in the personality receives deepest trust and devotion serves as "god"* to influence the processes of valuation and action, although the relationship of the personality

to such a criterion may be such that it inhibits rather than facilitates action. In actuality the criterion may be constituted primarily by the dictates of the immature conscience, i.e. values learned in interpersonal relationship in the first years of life which bear little resemblance to the values of the God of Jesus Christ.

Inevitably there is anxiety in the relationship of the self to its "god" or "gods." The perception of the criterion of value itself is ambiguous, as are the perceptions of the possible consequences of utilizing the criterion. The "transcendent" aspects of the criterion which are experienced as unknowable or unattainable, or both, are inevitably threatening although they have some elements of fascinating attraction as well.[1] The "legalistic" aspects of the criterion threaten human freedom even though they are, in relation to God, necessary aspects of every human potentiality and limitation (every potentiality with its concomitant limitations has aspects both of gift and demand in the paradox of human freedom-necessity). In a similar manner other aspects of the relationship of the self to God could be related to the dialectical tensions of human existence, but the examples given may be sufficient to illustrate our thought.

6. Man's relationship to God potentially provides a

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[1] Theodore Bovet in his The Anxiety for the Living God, has considerable discussion of the encounter of the self with God as transcendent, according to Carl-Erik Brattemo, "The Anxiety for the Living God," Journal of Pastoral Care, IX (Summer 1955) pp. 72, 73. See also Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, pp. 12-16.

criterion or pattern of values and the power which makes possible the acceptance of the anxieties of existence and the triumphant establishment and maintenance of balance between the conflicting aspects of the potentialities and limitations of existence. This potentiality, as we have noted, has been actualized in Jesus Christ.[1] Faith is that relationship with God which receives, accepts, and makes available this criterion and this power. A detailed discussion of the meaning of faith would suggest an examination of the role of faith in the various anxieties of existence. This has been done in a partial way in Appendix A in relation to some of the anxieties Jesus faced in crucial experiences of his life and will not be attempted here. Diagrammatically, however, we can suggest the role of faith in the general concept of anxiety we have presented:

```
                              self
                                '
                                '
                          Possibility
                                '
                                '
affirmation-       ---------------------    negation-
 negation                       '             affirmation
  of personal existence         '               of personal
                                '                existence
                                '
                          faith-anxiety
```

The self experiences the ambiguity of possibility but penetrates this ambiguity by means of the values and the dynamic forces operant in the relationship of the self to God. The self actualizes the highest possible values in human existence in spite of the continuous anxieties of that existence.

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[1] See Appendix A for discussion.

The foregoing discussion of anxiety and faith in relation to the created nature of man has attempted to note some of the anxieties which are inevitable in human existence because of the structure of that existence. Such abstractions may be suggestive but cannot have a high degree of validity because of the impossibility of separating oneself from the influences of learning. For the sake of definition, however, we label the anxieties we have described as "existential" or "inevitable" anxieties which receive their content through various forms of learning but "formally" are considered to be part of the structure of human existence.

There are, of course, other forms of anxiety in human life. Certain distinctions have been made by Tillich and others. Anxiety is usually differentiated from fear in that fear is said to have a definite object whereas anxiety has no clearly perceivable object, although, as Tillich suggests, anxiety may be disguised as fear by relationship to an object.[1] "Existential" anxiety is to be differentiated from "pathological" anxiety which is conditioned by learning and tends to restrict the self in many ways in its attempts to cope with "existential" anxiety. In human life, of course, "existential" anxiety inevitably appears in forms which are, to some degree, pathological. The two can be differentiated only for purposes of thought. Stinnette's description of "neurotic" anxiety, which is his term for "pathological" anxiety, is helpful although it restricts learning to interpersonal relations:

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[1] Tillich, The Courage to Be, pp. 36-39.

> Neurotic anxiety is that condition that always bears a reference to a distortion in some basic interpersonal relation. It functions operatively outside consciousness through feelings of guilt and hostility, and it attempts by manipulative control to continue the original distortion.[1]

"Existential" anxiety is also to be differentiated from "sinful" anxiety, which is a theological symbol for the forms which "existential" anxiety takes in human life, with special reference to distortions in the relationship of the self to God. The view of the problem of anxiety which has been presented here suggests that "existential" anxiety inevitably but not necessarily becomes "sinful" anxiety. This formula is possible in the light of the optimum potentiality for faith relationship to God which has been actualized in Jesus and which is considered to be a realizable potentiality within the created nature of man. Such a statement is consistent with the Hebrew-Christian beliefs that God's creation is essentially good, that God is not the author of evil, and that man has real freedom. A comprehensive view of the origin and nature of evil in human life is not possible here, but the role of anxiety in the "fall" of man from his created goodness can be noted briefly.

Each man experiences the ambiguities of possibility which we have described. To be able to accept and overcome this "dizziness of freedom" he needs, at the least, a criterion of the highest possible values in that which can be perceived of his potentialities and limitations and their interrelations in the context of his total existence, and he needs a trusting relationship with that which is beyond the structure of his existence. Such a criterion and relationship is implicit in his created being "before God;" but for the "first man," as for every man in the state of "innocence" (the state of personal being before selfhood becomes a perceived actuality), there is a conflict between the infinite values implicit in his God relationship and the finite values implied in his relationship to himself. The "fall" occurs when man in the "dizziness" of aroused freedom grasps at his finiteness to sustain himself in "defiance" of the God-relationship implicit in his created nature. After the "first sin" of the "first man," however, the individual comes to selfhood in an historical nexus and the anxieties which are part of every succeeding man's historical situation condition the actualization of his freedom from the moment of his conception.[1]

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[1] Stinnette, op. cit., p. 29.

Such a concept of the "fall" or "first sin," ~~is~~ theoretical or "mythical" and cannot be tied to historical experience; however, it does describe something that is at the center of every historical experience of anxiety--the conflict of infinite and finite values and the anxious clinging of the self to the finite.

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[1] This historical nexus cannot be said to make sin necessary since the ideal possibility of faith posits the potentiality of transcending the historical nexus (as Jesus did).

This concept cannot be said to explain sin. Actually sin can be perceived only when the possibility of salvation can be perceived, for it is only when reconciliation is seen as possible that the nature of the self's separation from God and "guilt" before God can be perceived.

In the language of Kierkegaard this view of "the fall" has been expressed:

> Dread is the dizziness of freedom which occurs when the spirit would posit the synthesis (the self), and freedom then gazes down into its own possibility, grasping at its finiteness to sustain itself. In this dizziness freedom succumbs. Further than this psychology cannot go and will not. That very instant everything is changed, and when freedom rises again it sees that it is guilty. Between these two instants lies the leap, which no science has explained or can explain. He who becomes guilty in dread becomes as ambiguously guilty as it is possible to be.[1]

Kierkegaard's concept, in so far as we understand it, has a high degree of adequacy; however, he sometimes fails to comprehend the relationship of the perception of sin and guilt to the perception of salvation as a possibility and thus tries to describe the nature of guilt out of its proper context. Be that as it may, Kierkegaard, has identified the essence of human sinfulness. The classic statement of this "essence" is found in Romans 1:25, "they...worshipped and served the creature rather than the Creator.." Sinfulness, then, is the state of human existence in which the self makes "idols" out of certain aspects of its finite nature and certain relationships to other aspects of finite existence, especially other persons. The relationships of the self to its "idols" and the "laws" which bind it to these "idols" separate the self from God and the potentialities of its existence "before God." The state of sinfulness is characterized, then, by separation from God, contradiction within personality, and disharmony between the self and other aspects of existence, especially other persons and groups of persons. "Sinful" anxiety is that form of anxiety which is concomitant with a "sinful" state of existence. Both the state of existence and the anxiety related to it enter into every form of self-expression.[1]

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[1] The Concept of Dread, p. 55.

Love and Faith

The concept of the relations of anxiety and faith has laid the groundwork for a view of the relations of love and faith. The general formula has been expressed by St. Paul in his letter to Galatians when he wrote of "faith working through love."[2] This formula seems to be implicit in the teachings of Jesus, such as his teaching about good works proceeding from faith[3] and from the "heart."[4] St. Paul's formula is certainly exemplified in the life of Jesus. It is unfortunate that the dynamic relationships suggested in this formula have often been lost in Christian thought, beginning with some portions of the New Testament. The Johannine emphasis on love resulted, as we have seen in Chapter II, in the intellectualizing of faith and the minimizing of its relationship to love. The thought of St. Augustine played an important role in this process even though he adopted Paul's formula, "faith working through love," and quoted it again and again as if it were one unified concept. In his thought, as in the thought of the Johannine writings, the dynamic relationships of faith and love are implicit although not given clear and consistent statement. Some notes on the relations of faith and love in later theological thought will be included as our discussion proceeds.

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[1] This view is an interpretation of Romans 1:18-32. This interpretation has been developed more fully in the writer's unpublished B. D. Thesis, "The Relationship of Pride and Sensuality in the Christian Concept of Sin."

[2] Galatians 5:6.

[3] Mark 9:23; Matthew 17:20;21;21.

[4] Matthew 12:34,35; 15:19; Luke 6:45.

In general, love and faith possess a necessary dependence, one upon the other. This interdependence can be suggested under three headings: (1) Faith as necessary for love, (2) Love as necessary for faith, and (3) Love as a criterion of faith.

1. Faith as necessary for Christian love.--There are at least two aspects involved here--faith as accepting and overcoming the anxieties of existence to a degree which makes love possible and faith as a stimulus for the actualization of the love capacity in its fullest dimensions.

Love, faith, and anxiety.--The anxieties which have been sketched in the first part of this chapter, plus many others related to the dialectics of personal existence, all have an influence on the actualization of love on human relationships. A tentative definition of love was suggested in Chapter III as that form of "response-ability" in which the total personality "moves toward" other persons, at least partly through conscious choice. The definition might be broadened to include any strongly positive investment of personal interest in a particular person or aspect of existence. In existence, love, as defined, is influenced by anything which affects the "response-ability" of the total personality. This includes anything affecting the forces within personality which have to do with its responses to stimulation and anything affecting the kind of interaction which can take place between the personality and some particular aspect of existence. In other words, anxieties affecting what the personality has to "offer" and its ability to "offer" are important as well as anxieties related to the interaction of "offering" and "being received" in actual interchange with a loved object. If the self, as a perceiving and acting agent, is to be able to offer the resources of the personality in response to other persons, a balance in the dialectical tensions of the personality is necessary. This balance does not need to be, nor can it be, perfect, but the degree of balance and its stability will strongly influence the degree to which the self can offer its resources to another. For example, in the actualization of the sensual aspects of personality the self is confronted with an ambiguous "drive-threat" which is anxiety arousing as sensuality drives toward expression without regard for social reality or for other aspects of personal existence. Sinful forms of this anxiety often show a tension between fantastic or perverted forms of expression and legalistic limitations upon expression. The distortions of both "ends" of the dialectic of sensuality result in loss of energy and limitations on the extent to which personality can respond in love relationships.

As noted above, moreover, anxieties related to self-object interaction also have a limiting effect upon love. To illustrate--the act of offering oneself to another through some form of self-expression confronts the self with the ambiguous possibility of acceptance on the one hand and rejection on the other, with both of these possibilities having ambiguous meaning for the self. In its state of "sin" the self tends to protect itself from the dangers both of acceptance and rejection by limited forms of self-investment in its responses to potential love objects. Thus, again, the loving "response-ability" of the self is limited by its reactions to anxiety. There are, of couse, many other forms of anxiety which enter into this picture.

Some degree of faith, then, is needed for the self to respond in love. The ability to hold in balance the infinite ambiguity of possibility and to risk the values of the self in action is characteristic of faith as we have described it. This is the kind of faith which makes love possible. In our view, it must be faith in God, because, as we have said, a trusting relationship to God and acceptance of His values for existence is necessary for faith which can accept and achieve an equilibrium of the tensions arising out of the relations of the self to the structure of existence and that which transcends existence. Faith, acting within the personality, makes possible the creative utilization of the tensions of personal existence in love as well as in other types of positive interaction.

Kierkegaard, in writing of the relations of love and faith, discusses some of the aspects of the role of faith in meeting the anxieties of possibility. He breaks the problem down into the roles of knowledge, judgment, and belief. Knowledge, he says, is "the infinite art of ambiguity, or the infinite ambiguity; at its highest it consists of bringing opposites into equilibrium."[1] He is referring here to the dialectical ambiguities of possibility, and he suggests that the "art of the infinite ambiguity" is "to understand the possibilities and to bring them into equilibrium."[2] Beyond knowledge, judgment is necessary for the self to act. "Judgment is a disturbance of the balance by belief or suspicion, depending upon whether one is believing or suspicious."[3] Judgment acts to move the personality toward one particular possibility. Christian judgment is influenced by belief. The Christian is characterized by "lovingly believing everything." The Christian chooses to believe because he chooses God, the eternal values within the temporal.. The Christian attempts, at least, to choose the eternal value in everything, if necessary, in spite of conflicting temporal values, and to act upon this choice. And, as Kierkegaard notes, it is through the exercise of judgment and actions which follow upon judgment that the Christian or non-Christian nature of the self is revealed:

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[1] Works of Love, trans. David F. and Lillian M. Swenson (Princeton: University Press, 1946), p. 186.

[2] Ibid., p. 187.

[3] Ibid.

> Lovingly believing everything, is thus not an understanding or the inference of an understanding, but a choice which must be made just when knowledge has balanced the opposing possibilities; and in this choice which certainly takes the form of a judgment upon others, the one who judges is revealed.[1]

Faith as a stimulus for love.--The relation of faith and love described above makes love possible in the face of anxiety. There are, implicit within faith as a relationship to God, dynamic forces which also empower the actualization of the love drive. These dynamics must be examined more closely in the light of psychological contributions, but some of them can be suggested here.

Christian faith is a complex and continuous response to the Word of God as it comes to the self in Jesus Christ through various forms of communication (the Bible, the activities and fellowship of the Church, family interaction, counseling relationships, etc.). In this response powerful forces within personality may be released. The Word of God as a personal word in Jesus Christ holds the potentiality of stimulating the highest forms of personal self-transcendence. Although in this dissertation, which views the faith relationship primarily from the point of view of human participation in that relationship, a false impression may be communicated that faith is man's doing, the initiative in the relationship is God's. It is the divine initiative which makes possible the kind of faith response which is not possible through human initiative. Faith is a human response, but it is the kind of response which, potentially at least, transcends that which is possible in the sinful state of human existence.

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[1] Ibid., p. 189.

The relationship of anxiety and faith sheds some light on this seeming paradox. In our discussion of anxiety we noted the tension between the potentialities of finitude and infinitude in the personality as it moves toward the actualization of itself. We suggested that in man's sinful state he continuously "succumbs" to the "dizziness" of anxiety and clings to some aspect of his finitude to sustain himself. In himself, once he has succumbed to anxiety, he lacks both the strength and the criterion of his being through which to overcome the "bondage" to his sinful state of existence. The power and the pattern to actualize his potential dimensions of self-transcendence must come from beyond himself. Some forms of power and some criteria which enable self-transcendence can be experienced in trusting-love relationships with other persons and with human purposes which transcend self. These experiences on human levels can help us to see and understand some of the potentialities of the divine-human relationship. Human experiences of "falling in love" cast reflections of the dynamic potentialities of "being grasped" by the spirit of God in Christ. They also reflect something of the mysteries of this experience. There is an element of "being grasped" or "being laid hold upon" by a power beyond oneself in the ecstatic quality of love relationships. There is an element of "feeling inspired" to behave in ways which transcend one's previous behavior. Some forms of this self-transcendent behavior have been subject of much ridicule because of their seeming inappropriateness, but in reasonably mature love relationships this behavior demonstrates potentialities of the self which have been but dimly glimpsed previously. The paradox has been suggested previously that personality tends to find itself through "losingitself" in response to other persons and to those aspects of existence (music, art, knowledge, etc.) which can stimulate profound investment of personal interest.

Relationships on the human level, however, necessarily share in the ambiguities and contingencies of finite existence and participate in the limitations imposed upon potentialities for self-transcendence by human sin. The limitations of these relationships, as well as their possibilities, raise the question of an unambiguous and unconditioned relationship and point to the answer which, for Christians, is given in the Word of God. It is only in the personal response to the God of Jesus Christ that the power and the criteria can be received which hold the potentiality of victory over sinful anxiety and the fulfillment of man's finitude-infinitude.

The thought of the Church has in many ways described experiences of a God who comes to His people and lays hold upon their "hearts." The New Testament speaks of the experience of "being elected" or "chosen" by God and of loving Him "because He first loved us." It speaks of faith as a gift of God, as something that comes from beyond the self. Christian thought has struggled with doctrines of "election," "predestination," "prevenient grace," etc. to try to give rational expression to the experience of a relationship which stimulates forms of self-transcendence which have not been previously known. In the totality of this relationship no sharp distinction between faith and love can be drawn. The distinctions made here are for purposes of thought and, as such, are abstractions. The faith response, as it involves the total personality, possesses ecstatic qualities which are relatively indistinguishable from love. Those aspects of faith which are being stressed here, however, are fundamental for the ability of the self to "lose itself" in response to God; and in terms of the participation of sinful human beings in this relationship, faith as a trusting response can be said to be a stimulus for the ecstatic response.

Attention can also be given to other aspects of the divine-human relationship which have been included under the symbol "faith" and which are important for the development of the love drive. We note especially the aspects of personal relationship which were discussed in Chapter II--dependence, identification, communion, and commitment. All of these, as well as other dynamic aspects of the divine-human relationship, are closely related to love and cannot be tied to any sharp differentiation between faith and love.

Traditionally the changes which are worked in the "heart" through faith which make love possible are considered to be the work of the Holy Spirit. St. Paul wrote, "God's love has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit which has been given to us,"[1] and St. Augustine was very fond of quoting this text as an expression of the grace which makes possible a Christian quality of life. Luther wrote of the response of the believer to the Word as being empowered by the "Holy Ghost,"[2] and Calvin, impressed by the identification of sinful men with Christ which this made possible, wrote, "The Holy Spirit is the bond by which Christ efficaciously unites us to himself."[3]

2. Love as necessary for faith.--In our view of faith as a relationship to a "Christlike God" or "the acceptance of personal existence before God," there is implicit a necessary dependence of faith upon love. The response or relationship of faith is dependent upon experience of a meaningful love relationship. In the development of personality faith, as a trusting dependence, is not possible unless a given personality has experienced a love relationship which is found to be reasonably trustworthy. Similarly, in the Bible, faith as a response of trust requires some kind of experience of the trustworthiness of the love of God. In the New Testament it is the

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[1] Romans 5:5.

[2] See Commentary on Galatians, trans. Erasmus Middleton (London: 1839), p. 296.

[3] Institutes iii.1.

totality of the person and work of Jesus Christ which gives evidence of the dependability of God's love and calls for a response of faith.

St. Augustine, in the framework of his distinction between faith and "sight," recognized this dependence of faith on love:

> For now, He hath loved us to the end that we should believe and keep the commandment of faith; but then, He will love us to the end that we may see, and in seeing receive the reward of our faith. For even now we love by believing in that which we shall hereafter see; but then we shall love by seeing that which we now believe.[1]

3. Love as a criterion of faith.--The definitions of faith given in Chapter III tied the quality of faith to the quality of life, implying a dynamic and an evaluative relationship between them. This follows from our view both of the created and redeemed nature of man. In the created nature of man the potentiality of a faith relationship to God is integrally related to the potentiality for love relationships. In his sinful state man, having "lost" his faith relationship to God, is unable to actualize his love capacities beyond the limits imposed upon him by sin. In redemption, God in Christ revives the potentiality for faith relationship to God and makes possible its actualization. The actualization of the faith relationship, to the degree that it is effected by the Holy Spirit, should necessarily be accompanied by increased actualization of love capacities. As faith functions to accept and to penetrate the ambiguities of sinful anxiety, old limitations on

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[1] In Joan. Evang. ixxv. 4.5.

love are overcome and new valuations and increased energies are available for love responses.

Christian thought, with some exceptions, has long recognized the close connection of quality of faith and quality of life. This, to us, is the import of St. Paul's formula, "faith working through love." There have been many other statements to the effect that manifestation of Christian love is a criterion of the validity of Christian faith. We note a few:

> Matthew 7:16--You will know them by their fruits.
>
> The letter of James 2:17.--So faith, by itself, if it has no works, is dead.
>
> St. Augustine.--What now, shall I say of love, without which faith avails nothing?[1]
>
> Martin Luther.--God does not want hearers and repeaters of words, but doers and followers who exercise themselves in the faith that worketh by love. For a faith without love is not enough--rather it is not faith at all, but a counterfeit of faith, just as a face seen in a mirror is not a real face, but merely the reflection of a face.[2]
>
> "The Thirty-nine Articles of Religion."--Albeit that Good Works which are the fruits of Faith, and follow after Justification, cannot put away our sins, and endure the severity of God's judgment; yet are they pleasing and acceptable to God in Christ, and do spring out necessarily of a true and lively Faith; insomuch that by them a lively Faith may be as evidently known as a tree discerned by the fruit.[3]

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[1] Enchiridion ii.8.

[2] "The Eight Wittenberg Sermons," Works of Martin Luther, Vol. II, p. 392.

[3] Article XII. The Book of Common Prayer (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1935), p. 579.

It is important to emphasize, however, as suggested by the statement in the "Thirty-nine Articles," that traditional Protestant theology rejects any interpretation of the quality of life which says that man can be saved by his own works. Manifestations of human love compose a criterion by which the nature of faith can be evaluated, but they have no "saving power" in themselves. In the language we have used, this view might be stated to mean that no actualization of love beyond the limits imposed by sinful anxiety (and its concomitants) is possible apart from the actualization of the faith relationship to God. This view might be modified, however, to contend that the Holy Spirit operates in various faith contexts and is not limited to a Christian context; consequently a faith relationship to God may be manifested in aspects of love outside the limits of Christian faith. The values of the faith relationship to a Christlike God, however, would be used by a Christian in evaluating such exoteric love, and the Christian would hold that Christian faith presents the highest possible potentialities for fulfillment of love capacities.

There is, moreover, a dimension of the relationship of love and faith which necessitates a distinction between love as a pragmatic criterion of faith and faith as the ultimate criterion of love. Love, as a dynamic movement of the personality toward objects which stimulate personal interest, is inevitably, as we have noted previously, an ambiguous mixture of positive-negative forces in relation both to the object and the internal dynamics of the personality. As such it needs a criterion of value transcending its ambiguities. Such a criterion is potential in that which is available to the Christian in the faith response to God in Christ. Beyond any definable criterion, however, is that aspect of faith which is trust in that which cannot be reduced to any finite terms; i.e., transcendent trust in God Himself.

Hope and Faith

In this study we have described man as inevitably anxious because he can, to some degree, anticipate the possible consequences of his behavior. Following Kierkegaard, we have discussed anxiety as the experience of the ambiguity of possibility. In human life as we know it, the anticipation of possible consequences is influenced by memories of past experience, present perceptions, and future expectations. All of these are important and it is difficult, if not impossible, to isolate the aspect of anticipation except for purposes of thought. As an abstract theoretical problem, however, we can discuss the relationship of faith to the future. This is the problem of hope.

Hope is commonly viewed as faith projected into the future. John Calvin made it virtually synonymous with future expectations:

> Hope is no other than any expectation of those things which faith has believed to be truly promised by God. Thus faith believes the veracity of God, hope expects the manifestations in due time; faith believes him to be our Father, hope expects him always to act towards us in this character; faith believes that eternal life is given to us, hope expects it one day to be revealed; faith is the foundation on which hope rests, hope nourishes and sustains faith....[1]

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[1] *Institutes* iii 2.42.

J. S. Banks in Hasting's Dictionary of the Bible defined hope as "desire of future good, accompanied by faith in its realization."[1]

For man, as an anxious creature, the relationship to the future is not a simple one, however, nor is hope a simple virtue. In terms of the nature of anxiety the future participates in the present as the ambiguous opportunity-threat of the possible. As Kierkegaard notes, the future, as the possible, "is always a duality--the possibility of progress or retrogression, of building up or tearing down, of good or evil."[2] The perceiving and anticipating self can lay hold on the future either with anxiety or with hope or, more accurately in actuality, with various combinations of both. Christian hope is, in ideality, to lay hold on the future possibility of highest value. Kierkegaard says, "To lay hold expectantly on the possibility of the good is to hope."[3] Kierkegaard also insists that to "lay hold expectantly on the possibility of the good" cannot be merely a temporal hope but is an eternal one. The eternal, he suggests, is in time as the possible. Man lays hold on the eternal through the possibility of the good, and through the concretization of the possibility of the good he grows; but never exhausting the possibility of the good in temporal existence, he must continue to live in hope of the eternal:

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[1] Banks, op. cit. (1906), Vol. II, p. 412.

[2] Works of Love, p. 201.

[3] Ibid., p. 202.

> The eternal assigns only a little portion at a time in the possibility. Eternity is through the possible always near enough at hand, and yet far enough away to keep a man moving forward, progressing toward the eternal. Thus eternity draws and lures man by the possibility from the cradle to the grave, if he will but choose to hope.[1]

Hope is not possible without faith. It is only as a man responds with faith to the God of Jesus Christ that, in the Christian sense, he can have a real possibility of perceiving the "good" in the relativities of human values and of penetrating his anxieties sufficiently to be able to lay hold on the possibility of the "good." Hope is a manifestation of the potency of faith in relation to the anxiety of possibility. Hope might be briefly defined as the affirmation of possibility before God.

The opposite of hope before God is despair. Man stands in a continuous tension of hope-despair before God. In so far as he is able to affirm the possibilities of personal growth he stands in hope; in so far as he is unable to affirm these possibilities he stands in despair. Similarly, he may stand in hope-despair before God in relation to aspects of existence with which he feels identified. Christian hope, like Christian faith and love, extends beyond the possibility of the self becoming itself before God to the possibility of fulfillment in the various orders of creation and of the fulfillment of the total creative and redemptive process. St. Paul pointed to these larger horizons of hope:

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[1] _Ibid._, p. 204.

> For the creation waits with eager longing for the revealing of the sons of God; for the creation was subjected to futility, not of its own will but by the will of him who subjected it in hope; because the creation itself will be set free from its bondage to decay and obtain the glorious liberty of the children of God. We know that the whole creation has been groaning in travail together until now; and not only the creation, but we ourselves, who have the first fruits of the Spirit, groan inwardly as we wait for adoption as sons, the redemption of our bodies. For in this hope we were saved. Now hope that is seen is not hope. For who hopes for what he sees? But if we hope for what we do not see, we wait for it with patience.[1]

However, we would note that hope is more than waiting with patience for the completion of redemption. Hope is a dynamic affirmation both of the infinite potentiality of being before God and of "the next step" (the next realizable possibility). Hope, in itself, shares the tension of the dialectic of human finitude-infinitude. It affirms both the next finite possibility and the infinity of possibility, but in the tension between these two extremes, hope always stands in danger that in affirming only one aspect of the dialectic it will lose the other. Something of this tension is to be seen in the various forms of Christian "eschatology," especially the doctrine of the second coming of Christ. Eschatology at its best brings to sharp focus the relations of temporal and eternal values and gives life a perspective of being continuously lived before the eternal God, but some views of the "end of the world" and the "second coming of Christ" focus so strongly on the possibility of the eternal that they lose the possibility of the "next step" in temporal existence.

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[1] Romans 8:19-25.

Knowledge and Faith

Before closing the primarily theological portion of this dissertation, it seems appropriate to sketch some of the relations of the conscious processes and products of human thought to faith as defined here. There has already been some discussion of the interrelations of intellectual activity and faith in Chapter II, but at this point we want to discuss those interrelations which are particularly relevant to the concept of faith sketched in Chapter III.

Faith is not necessarily in conflict with reason, knowledge, wisdom, and other aspects of conscious thought. It can and does supplement them in finding answers to some of the questions of life which cannot be answered adequately for the purposes of living by the use of reason or knowledge alone. In several ways knowledge and faith can supplement each other, especially in the living process of dealing with such questions as "Who am I and what is the purpose of my life?" "Where do I come from and what happens to me when I die?" "How can I make the most of life?"

Let us look first at some of the limitations of conscious thought and see the need for faith which is posited by these limitations.

1. Complete knowledge of the nature of a personal being is impossible. There is, of course, much that has been learned and much more that can be learned about personality and what it means to be a person. The inmost core of being of any given person, however, remains relatively impenetrable to the person himself and, certainly, to other persons. These limitations

on the possible knowledge of a person contribute to the uniqueness and loneliness of each individual person and point to the need for the kind of faith which has been described, which can provide a criterion of the nature of personal existence and a basis for trust in what cannot be known about oneself and other persons. The limitations of knowledge also apply to the knowledge which is possible of God as person, but the limitations are much greater in respect to God and the need for faith is greater.

The limitations on empirical knowledge of the "self" need to be stressed here in order to clarify the relations of the theological and psychological sections of this study. The "self" as the perceiving, evaluating, and willing aspect of personal existence cannot be reduced to a perceptual object, either as object of its own perceptions or of the perceptions of an observer. The psychological portion of this dissertation uses such a reduction for the purposes of study, but the dimension of the self which indeterminately can transcend its own perceptions tends to be lost in such a study. The mystery remains of a "self" which transcends itself in the very act of perceiving itself (can perceive itself perceiving itself, etc.) Faith is necessary to provide some understanding of the ultimate nature of such a "self."

2. Complete knowledge of the nature of interpersonal relationships is impossible. The limitations noted above mean that the self, as subject, cannot be sure what is happening in itself when it relates to another person. It means also that

the self is even less certain of what is happening in the person or persons to whom it is seeking to relate. The anxieties of the self, moreover, in their sinful or pathological forms, distort the perceptions of the self and limit the knowledge which is theoretically possible. There is, also, a third "mystery" in interpersonal relationships; i.e. the nature of the relationship itself, and what can be known of this likewise is limited both by the potentialities of knowledge and the affects of anxiety. Faith, as a foundation for trust in oneself, other persons, and one's relationships is needed as well as faith as a criterion of personal being and of the potentialities of relationships.

3. The influences of anxiety and its concomitants which, as suggested above, condition all conscious processes of thought as well as the less conscious aspects of learning and the acquisition of knowledge point to the need for the kind of faith which can reduce anxiety and overcome some of its effects.

4. In addition to the "mysteries" of the interactions involved in interpersonal relationships, there are the vagaries and ambiguities of the means of communication by which much of the interaction is facilitated (or hindered). A brief discussion of the problem of language symbols was presented in Chapter I. The view presented there involved some recognition of the limits of conscious knowledge in relation to such symbols. The meaning of most word symbols is dependent upon the experience or experiences which are being symbolized, and

understanding of this meaning requires participation in the relevant experiences on something more than a conscious level. A high degree of participation in mutual experiences, however, does not guarantee a high degree of comprehension of meanings which are intended in interpersonal communication. Anxiety is always present to work its distortions and there is always an element of private experience which cannot be shared and which gives symbols unique meanings for the person who is using them. Moreover, every symbol is a mixture of meaning and "mystery" as it is used to communicate levels of meaning which can never be completely reduced to conscious formulations....These, and other limitations on the knowledge of symbols used in interpersonal communication, indicate the need for a community of trusting faith as well as a community of participation if there is to be reasonably adequate communication.

Religious symbols, of course, share in such limitations of conscious meaning. The degree of "mystery" present in religious symbols tends to be greater than that present in more common symbols of interpersonal communication. There is usually less intimate sharing of experience involved in the use of religious symbols and thus a greater degree of "private" meaning. The historical, cultural, and linguistic remoteness of contemporary participation in some of the experiences underlying religious symbols also strongly limits the possibilities of accurate communication. These limitations, however, tend to make for a high potentiality of private meaning for religious symbols, which can be both helpful and dangerous for religious living.

5. The limitations which have been noted also affect the perceptions and the possibilities of knowledge which the self can have toward the non-personal aspects of existence and that which lies beyond existence. Other limitations are also important. As difficult as it is for man to penetrate to the inmost core of his own nature, how much more difficult it is for him to penetrate to the inner being of other forms of life. He can learn much from the controlled observation of behavior of other living things, but he cannot enter into the secret places of their nature. Nor can he, apart from faith, perceive that which lies behind or beyond the behavior of the universe. Such knowledge as is possible for him poses ultimate questions which cannot be answered by human efforts. In order to achieve the highest possible values in relation to the non-human aspects of existence and in relation to that which lies beyond existence, then, some kind of faith is necessary, and we have attempted to suggest a view of faith which makes this a possibility.

Five limitations on the possibilities of knowledge have been described and a need for faith as a supplement to knowledge has been indicated. These limitations and the related needs for faith are important if the nature of personality as sketched in Chapter III holds much validity. Some of the deepest and most crucial questions of existence, such as those cited at the beginning of this discussion of faith and knowledge, are closely tied to the knowledge-faith which is possible concerning the nature of personality, interpersonal relationships, and the relations of the self to various aspects of existence and that which lies beyond existence. The search for knowledge is vital as it contributes to the understanding both of the questions and the possible answers, but the undergirding power and pattern of faith is even more vital for life which must be lived on the basis of some kind of answers to these questions in the totality of personal existence.

The roles of knowledge and faith in relation to these questions are not easy to delineate. In general we can say that knowledge contributes to the formulation of the questions and the interpretation of the answers provided by faith. This is the purported role of knowledge in this dissertation, for example. The answers, however, must come, if they are come to at all, from a consciousness which can penetrate that which is impenetrable to human consciousness. In the Christian view the answers come from God who reveals as much of His own nature to men as it is possible for men to perceive and comprehend and, in so doing, reveals the inmost nature of human personality and of existence itself. The Creator alone can reveal His own nature and the nature of His creatures.

In the response to God's revelation and the answers to human questions which are implicit in that revelation, conscious formulation and interpretation of the content of revelation is, of course, a necessary and valuable process. The content of the last part of Chapter III is a rough example of this process, and Appendix A provides another example. Such formulations inevitably are conditioned by personal and corporate experiences and anxieties, but they help to give meaning for living to God's revelatory activities and they provide tentative definitions of those criteria of the nature of God and man and their interrelationships which are necessary for the evaluation and utilization of the resources of faith. Because of the limitations imposed by experience, anxiety, and private idiosyncrasies, any individual statement of the content of revelation, however, needs to be evaluated in the light of the thought and experience of the Bible and the Church.

The relation between faith and knowledge which has been sketched has long been a part of Christian thought. One of the earliest statements is one of the most profound. John 8:31-32 quotes Jesus as saying, "If you continue in my word, you are truly my disciples, and you will know the truth, and the truth will make you free." This statement can be interpreted, in the lightof what has been said here, to mean that fundamental to knowing the truths which pertain to the deepest questions of human life is a relationship to the Word of God. Such a view was foreshadowed in the Old Testament by references to the "fear of the Lord" as the "beginning" of "wisdom" or "knowledge."[1] The "fear of the Lord" in these passages is interpreted to mean "reverence for the Lord, and is a comprehensive term for the worship, ritual, and morality of Israel,"[2] thus it is a comprehensive term for the relationship of Israel to God....In the Christian Church the problem of faith and knowledge has been complicated by many things, particularly the questions of the authority of the Bible and of the Church. Unfortunately, the relational language of the Bible has often been obscured by rational formulations, but the formula of St. Augustine, although varying greatly in content, has long held validity in the Church--"we believe in order to know."[1]

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[1] Psalm 111:10 and Proverbs 1:7.

[2] W. Stewart McCullough, "Exegesis" of Psalm 111, _The Interpreter's Bible_, (New York: Abingdon Press, c1955), _Vol._ IV, p. 595.

Summary

In this chapter the meaning of faith as defined in this dissertation has been discussed in relation to other aspects of the Christian life. Within the conceptual framework which had been suggested in the previous chapter some of the relationships of faith to anxiety, love, hope, and knowledge have been described. This discussion noted some of the important differentiations and interrelations that characterize these aspects of Christian living.

Other aspects of Christian life are important for faith, particularly the nature and functions of Christian community, but some of these will enter into our psychological study in Part II. Perhaps enough has been presented in Part I to provide a foundation for the correlations to come in Part II. We have surveyed various emphases in the Christian interpretation of the nature of the process of having faith and have proposed two definitions which represent some of the more significant meanings of the faith experience, as interpreted here. A theological framework for the understanding of these definitions has been suggested, and they have been discussed in relation to certain other aspects of the Christian life. We move on now to Part II in which our definitions of faith will be restated in psychological terms, insofar as such terms can include the meanings developed in Part I, and a psychological framework for the interpretation of faith and its development will be sketched and related to pastoral work.

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[1] Augustine In Joann. Evang. xl.9.

PART II

PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

CHAPTER V

A PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE MEANING OF FAITH

Questions for Psychological Study

In the first chapter of this dissertation two questions were raised to which this study proposes to make a contribution -- "What is the meaning of faith?" and "How does faith develop?" Certain limitations concerning the nature of the possible contributions of this study were suggested, and Part I proceeded within those limitations to seek theological meanings for faith. Part II will seek psychological answers for the questions noted above and will try to bring together the theological and psychological approaches in ways which will be relevant to the work of the pastor and the Church.

In order to carry out these tasks, the following steps are proposed: (1) to define psychological questions suggested by the points of view expressed in Part I; (2) to sketch a theoretical framework in terms of which psychological material relevant to these questions can be organized; (3) using this framework, to outline a theory of the development of those aspects of personality which are related to the development of faith; (4) to present the life history of a person who has experienced serious problems in the area of faith and to interpret the development of this person and the task of pastoral counseling with her in the light of the contributions of the theological and psychological theories presented in this study; (5) to summarize and evaluate the relevance of the total study for the work of the pastor and the Church.

The two definitions of faith which were offered in Part I suggest certain questions for psychological study. Faith was defined as (1) a personal relationship to a Christlike God, characterized by a trusting dependence upon God and manifested in a Christian quality of life; and (2) the acceptance of personal existence before God. Combining both definitions, we come up with questions such as the following: What does "acceptance" mean psychologically? What constitutes "personal existence?" Can "before God" be defined in psychological terms? How does the ability to accept "personal existence before God" develop? What is the role of "trusting dependence" in interpersonal relationships? What other aspects of behavior are important in interpersonal relationships and how do they develop?

These are complex questions to which only partial answers can be given. The kinds of answers that can be given here will be determined partly by the methodology used in approaching our problem and the theoretical framework used to formulate it. The original questions of the study require a method of approach which is primarily developmental theory. As a guide to such a developmental theory we shall try to define a "pastoral" approach to the psychology of personality.

A Pastoral Approach to the Psychology of Personality

An examination of the literature of personality theory and the development of personality discloses that theories vary widely and there is much confusion. Different schools of psychology take quite different approaches. The differences are bewildering to those of us who are unsophisticated in many areas of psychological inquiry. The temptation is to follow one's own biases and to use an approach or combination of approaches to personality which is meaningful in terms of those biases. The writer began this study with a strong bias toward certain psychoanalytic theories and hoped to use these theories in the psychological portion of this study. This tendency has been somewhat checked, however, by two concerns: (1) Psychoanalytic studies tend to present a closed conceptual system using variables such as "libido," "ego," and "unconscious" which are difficult to define operationally and to subject to objective verification; (2) Psychoanalytic views of personality tend to be inconsistent with predominant approaches to personality in contemporary "pastoral counseling." It has seemed important to the writer to undertake a broader study of psychological materials to supplement and, in some instances, to correct insights which have developed in psychoanalytic study and experience.

The tentative theoretical framework which has taken shape has been influenced by a number of considerations. One of the most important has been the desire to make use of a frame of reference which was meaningful for the work of the writer as pastor (chaplain) to patients in a mental hospital and, more recently, as teacher-pastor-counselor to students in a theological seminary. The theory and practice of "pastoral counseling" was an important influence, as we shall note later. Other important objectives can be listed: (1) Formulation of a developmental theory which would have meaning not only for "counseling" relationships but also for the wider range of relationships of the pastor and the Church from birth to adulthood; (2) conceptualization of "normal" personality and its development in so far as psychological data helps to define the "normal" range within our culture; (3) development of a broad or "global" type of theory which can comprehend "personal existence," and the interrelations of the individual person with his unique world of experience.

The objectives listed are not easily reconciled into a unified theoretical framework. There are some difficult conflicts to be recognized and overcome, if possible. For example, the kinds of psychological observations and measurements of development which help to define the "normal" range are not easily harmonized with the kinds of clinical observations of a counselor that suggest the subjective world of an individual person. Nor is the historical view of personality implied in developmental studies easily adapted to a "global" or "field" theory of behavior, which is often described as "ahistorical." There are difficult theoretical problems involved here, but when we look at the work of the pastor a tentative synthesis begins to emerge.

As the pastor of a church with responsibilities for the pastoral care of persons from the cradle to the grave, with concern for an educational program for all ages and various kinds of group activities for different age groups, with a need to understand personal and religious development at every stage of growth--the pastor needs a developmental theory of personality. As a professional person who comes into direct or indirect contact with the individual person in many phases of his total situation--personal, family, community, vocational, etc.--the pastor needs an understanding of the relations of the individual to his total environment. As a minister engaged in "pastoral counseling" or some other form of the "cure of souls," the pastor needs to understand the individual person from the "inside." He needs a combination of attitudes, discipline, and theory which will help him to see the world as his troubled parishioner sees it and to see the relations of the self of the parishioner to that world in the same way.

It is in the work of the pastoral counselor that we find the key to a view of personality that we can use in our study of the relations of faith to personality and its development. Discussions of pastoral counseling by Hiltner (53), Johnson (64), Wise (115),[1] and others have emphasized the responsibility of the pastor to enter empathically into the experience which is being communicated by the counselee. These writers in various ways make use of the interpretation of counseling which has been described by Carl Rogers. The following passage from Rogers' Client-Centered Therapy gives a brief statement of his view:

> This formulation would state that it is the counselor's function to assume, in so far as he is able, the internal frame of reference of the client, to perceive the world as the client sees it, to perceive the client himself as he is seen by himself, to lay aside all perceptions from the external frame of reference while doing so, and to communicate something of this empathic understanding to the client (89, p. 29).

This form of counseling, then, makes the perceptual world of the client the primary focus of attention. The word "perceptual," however, seems to the writer to be too narrow a term. The reports of the client include statements concerning the meaning and value of perceptions to the client. More complex processes than perception seem to be involved, and we would prefer to say that the primary focus in counseling is on the "experiential" world of the client, including the world as experienced by him and the meanings and values attached by him to his experience.

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[1] References for Part II follow the form suggested by the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association (Washington: The American Psychological Association, Inc., c1952). The numbers in parenthesis refer to works listed in the Bibliography for Part II. Footnotes throughout the remainder of Part II will serve as supplements to the text.

The interpretation of counseling which has briefly been described above can be stated more broadly as a view of human behavior and a method for studying human behavior. As a view of behavior it assumes that the individual person behaves at any given moment in accordance with the way that he sees himself and his relations to his world at that moment. An interesting statement of this view of behavior has been given by Robert Peck in a book for public school teachers:

> The child, and the adult for that matter, reacts to the world not 'as it is,' but as he thinks it is. Similarly he feels happy or unhappy with himself not 'as he is' to others, but as he sees himself. The lonely child whose defensive antagonism keeps other children from giving him valentines finds it vitally necessary to convince himself that other people don't matter. Picturing himself as an isolated, self-contained person, he is apt to behave in ways consistent with this picture. The fact that he desperately needs affection from others is precisely the thing that he cannot accept in himself. It is not surprising if he continues to be withdrawn and antagonistic and to reject any direct attempt to show him that he does need people (80, p. 73).

A more technical discussion of this view of behavior will be given in following sections: First, we want to characterize the method of studying human behavior which seems to us most relevant to the theory of pastoral counseling noted above. This would be a method of studying the way a particular individual sees himself and his relations to his world at a given moment. In more technical terms it would be a method of describing the psychological "field"--"perceptual," "experiential," or "phenomenal field"--of the individual and attempting to understand and, perhaps, predict his behavior in terms of this description. The following sections will also discuss this method more fully as it is to be used in this study.

The interpretation of pastoral counseling has given a key to a theory of behavior and a method of study, but there are other aspects of counseling and of pastoral work which suggest that it is important to try to relate a developmental view of personality with a "field" theory of behavior. The pastoral counselor, for example, sometimes needs to understand present behavior of his counselee in the light of the past experience or future anticipations of the counselee. He may also find it helpful to have a concept of "normal" development of personality in order to understand how deviant behavior patterns of the counselee have developed. As the pastor of a church, moreover, as we have already noted, he needs to understand the developmental problems of every age group and to have some idea of the kinds of resources which may be helpful to individuals and groups who are struggling with these problems. It is in the light of these pastoral concerns that our psychological study of faith will try to make use of a "phenomenal field" approach to the understanding of personality in a context of historical development of the individual.

The way in which such a conceptual framework will be used here will become clearer in later chapters, but at this point we can formulate some questions which are relevant to such a framework. A general question would be--"How is the behavior of an individual influenced by his interactions with his environment?" This general question can be broken down into other questions which are important for each stage of personality development, such as: "What does the individual bring to a stage of development?" and "How does he interact with the environment as he finds it at this stage?" The first question can be divided into the two general categories: (1) the level of maturational development which is characteristic of the individual at a given stage, and (2) the learned patterns of behavior which he brings to that stage as a result of previous experience. The second question can be divided into various kinds of interaction between the developing individual and his environment. As we shall see, this kind of generalized adaptation of a "field" theory of behavior will be used to describe stages of personality development in the next chapter. A similar method will be used to present and interpret the history of a person with problems in the area of faith. It has been found that such a method is the simplest way of presenting this material, but it is to be remembered that such a method greatly over-simplifies the task of describing the actual phenomenal field of an individual. Such a method also tends to lose the perspective of the pastor who usually relates to a person in the light of that person's present relationships with the present environment, and then gradually explores the past and future dimensions of that person's life as he comes to know him better.

Having suggested a theoretical framework for personality study which seems to have relevance for pastoral work, we turn now to a more precise statement of the concepts which are important for that framework.

The "Phenomenal Field"

The term which we would like to use to denote the psychological field of the individual comes from Snygg and Combs' work on Individual Behavior (101). The "phenomenal field" is defined by these writers as "the entire universe, including himself, as it is experienced by the individual at the instant of action" (101, p. 15). They report that the terms "personal field, private world, behavioral field, psychological field, and life space" have also been used to convey similar meanings. We would prefer, however, to use the term "phenomenal field" noted above, or the term "experiental field," or simply "field" in this study.

We have proposed to use a phenomenal field approach to personality in a context of historical development in order to study the interactions of the individual with his environment at various stages of development. The purpose of such an approach to a study of faith is to make possible the statement of our view of faith in psychological terms, in so far as our theological concepts can be given psychological statement. If our theological faith "variables" can be related to psychological processes or "operations," then perhaps the functional relationships of these "variables" with other aspects of the psychological field can be traced. "Personal relationship," "trusting dependence," "quality of life," "acceptance," and "personal existence" can be given psychological meaning and the psychological functions of the more theological symbols can be suggested; and questions such as these can be asked: "How do the other forces operating in the phenomenal field affect the operations of the faith variables?" and "How do the faith variables influence the perception of the total field and the mobilization of behavior in response to the field?"

The phenomenal field can be said to be the "field" of "personal existence" as it is experienced by the individual at a given moment. It is important to try to conceptualize the complexity of such a field before attempting a psychological simplification of it. The field concept has been found by the writer to be helpful in his attempt to relate the contributions of various disciplines to the understanding of human behavior. As a broad concept it can help the pastor to avoid the dangers of an overly specialized approach to personality and the errors of naive "cause and effect" reasoning.

Einstein defined a "field" as "a totality of coexisting facts which are conceived of as mutually interdependent" (in 70, p. 919). There are many different kinds of facts which can be conceived of as interacting with each other or "mutually interdependent" in relation to the behavior of an individual person. All of these facts are not included in the conscious awareness of the individual or the "differentiated" portion of his phenomenal field, but they may be interacting with each other and influencing his behavior just the same. We can suggest some of the different kinds of facts which may be considered to be influencing the behavior of the individual at a given moment: (1) the facts of his own personality structure; (2) the facts of his family life; (3) facts concerning other people and groups of people beyond the family who are important for his behavior; (4) physical facts of the environment, such as the kind of dwelling he lives in and the physical-chemical make-up of his environment; (5) economic facts which affect his food, clothing, work, shelter, security, energy, health, etc.; (6) cultural facts concerning patterns of need satisfaction and appropriate conduct; (7) political facts concerning privileges, responsibilities, political freedom and security; (8) geographical facts pertaining to climate, vegetation, soil, accessibility to other persons and groups; (9) technological facts of the techniques and tools for need satisfaction and enrichment of life; (10)

historical facts relevant to the particular time and place; (11) cosmological facts about the relations of the world of the individual to the rest of the universe; (12) "existential" facts concerning the nature of the existence of an individual person, such as the facts of death and finite limitations of time, space, energy, and thought; (13) "theological" facts from which the "god" or "gods" and the meaning and values of the existence of the individual are derived.[1]

This listing of some of the facts which may be operative in the total field of personal existence at a given moment is not exhaustive but is long enough to give some idea of the complexity of that field and the difficulty of any comprehensive description of it. For practical purposes, of course, the various organizations of facts must be divided among specialists. For our purposes we must limit our study to the psychological or social phychological material related to the first three groups of facts listed. Even these three categories contain more than can possibly be included here. Personality structure, for example, is a very complex category. Personality can be viewed as a highly organized entity or "field" in itself, and the field of personal existence thought of as a "field" within a "field":

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[1] "Theological" facts would include those experiential data which are used by individuals and groups in the development of concepts of a god or gods and the individual and group relationships to such god(s). It would also include the data used by individuals and groups to develop value systems which may not be explicitly related to god-concepts. The term "god" is defined functionally to mean "that to which an individual or groups attributes supreme worth" (see Luther's definition of a "god" on page 29). "Theological" data, so conceived, can be studied empirically, but the fullness of the theological meanings of such data can be understood only by participation in the experiences of a particular group which give meaning to its theological symbols.

> A personality is a structured organism-environment field, each aspect of which stands in dynamic relation to each other aspect. There is organization within the organism and organization **within** the environment, but it is the cross organization of the two that is investigated (78, p. 8).

Within the organization or structure of personality there are various categories of facts which are studied by specialists. One listing of such categories might be given: (1) the facts of physical structure, which would include the complex data studied in physiology, anatomy, neurology, biochemistry, genetics, etc.; (2) facts concerning feelings and emotions; (3) facts pertaining to cognitive or intellectual functioning; (4) facts of conative or integrative behavior which organizes the total personality in a purposive or goal-oriented manner. Such a listing tends to violate the "field" nature of personality as a dynamic organization of mutually dependent or interacting facts, but it illustrates the complexity of the problem. Psychological study is concerned with the interactions of all four categories plus the interactions of the total personality with the environment, as is indicated in the quotation above.

To limit our study of the total organism-environmental field we shall focus upon interactions within personality and between personality and its interpersonal environment. Particularly, we shall focus upon the interactions between the "phenomenal self" and the "phenomenal field" at various stages of development.

We have already defined the "phenomenal field" as "the entire universe, including himself, as it is experienced by the individual at the instant of action." We need to look now at some of the characteristics of the phenomenal field.

Any of the "coexisting facts" which have been listed in our analysis of the field of personal existence can be a part of personal experience and can influence behavior at any given moment. The psychological view of the experiential field, as conceived here, emphasizes the perceptual and evaluational activities of the individual in relation to these facts as the significant determinants of behavior. The person behaves in accordance with the way he "sees" himself and his relations to the various facts of his existence, rather than behaving in accordance with the facts of his world as an observer might interpret them to be in "reality." Snygg and Combs postulate, "Behavior is determined by and pertinent to the phenomenal field of the behaving organism" (101, p. 15). We shall hold to this postulate in so far as possible in this study, but it is our understanding that the phenomenal field includes the total experiential field of the individual at the instant of action. It cannot be limited to those aspects of the field which are included in the awareness of the individual or can easily become part of his awareness. The influence of unconscious or undifferentiated stimuli upon behavior must not be underestimated.

The phenomenal field, then, is the field of personal existence as it is experienced by the individual at a given moment; and for psychological study of personality we are interested in the relation of changes in the field to changes in behavior. We want to study the interactions of the individual and his personal world from the point of view of the effects of his experience of changes in himself and his world upon his behavior. If we accept Snygg and Combs postulate, which was quoted above, then we assume a close correspondence between changes in the phenomenal field and changes in behavior. Understanding of changes in the phenomenal field should provide understanding of changes in behavior.[1]

We assume that the phenomenal field always possesses some degree of organization, even though at birth the organization may be minimal and under the influence of some types of trauma the field may become highly disorganized. The organization of the field consists primarily in the relations of the various aspects of the field to the individual which have meaning for his existence and the fulfillment of his needs. Organization may be defined as "a relation between (or among) two or more aspects or facts of the experiential world of the individual which have meaning for and influence on his behavior." There is organization in the total field and there may be organization within parts or regions of the total field. One of the most important part-organizations is the "phenomenal self" which "includes all those parts of the phenomenal field which the individual experiences as part of or characteristic of himself" (101, p. 58). In this study we shall refer to this important part of the total field as the "self as experienced" or the "self-organization," as well as the "self" or "phenomenal self."

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[1] A one-to-one correspondence between changes in the field and changes in behavior may be assumed, but it is recognized that the kind of knowledge of a complex experiential field which would be necessary to establish such a correspondence would be difficult if not impossible to obtain.

Changes in the phenomenal field are changes in the organization of the field. Lewin has indicated some of the important kinds of changes which take place. The field may change in scope; that is, in regard to

> ...(a) what is part of the psychological present; (b) the time perspective in the direction of the psychological past and the psychological future; (c) the reality-irreality dimension (70, p. 924).

The field may also change in regard to the degree of differentiation and levels of differentiation, the degree of organization, and its fluidity or rigidity (70). These changes are important for the study of the development of the individual. They also denote some of the important characteristics of the field at each stage of development. For our purposes we emphasize the changes in the psychological present in regard to geographical extension of the field, opportunity for interpersonal relations, and opportunity for all types of learning experiences. The psychological past is important as pertaining to the ways in which past learning influences present experience and the ways in which this influence changes. Memory is an important part of the psychological past, but only a part. The psychological future is significant as anticipations of future possibilities add to the meaning and value of present experience. Within the phenomenal field the reality-irreality dimension is important in terms of the role of fantasy activities (play, daydreams, imaginative anticipation, etc.) in individual experience, the changes in this role, and the ability of the individual to differentiate between reality and irreality.

The meaning of differentiation and the relations of differentiation to organization in the phenomenal field require special consideration. Differentiation is a complex process (or combination of processes) which cannot be adequately discussed here but needs some definition. Snygg offers this definition:

> Differentiation may be defined as knowing a difference, the basic act of knowledge. It is the manifestation of the continuous process by which the integrity and organization of the field are maintained ...

He goes on to discuss differentiation in terms of "figure" and "ground" relationships:

> The emergence of a new entity or character into figure implies the lapse of other characters into ground. Both are necessary for the existence of a difference and are not two independent processes but complementary aspects of the same process, which might be called 'change.' Since, however, it is the newly emerged figure, the focus of the behaver's field, which is the most directly potent in determining behavior, it seems more practical to emphasize the more effective aspect of the process and call it 'differentiation' or 'individualization' rather than the non-valuative 'change.' (100, p. 420).

For Snygg and Combs differentiation is the product of the search of the individual for details and meanings which will better enable him to satisfy his need. Elements or characters of the field rise into "figure" and lapse into "ground" in relation to their meaning for need fulfillment (101). This is a useful concept as long as conscious awareness is not a requirement for differentiation but is recognized as the "highest" level of differentiation. Snygg and Combs tend to equate "figure" and differentiation with awareness, but this emphasis overlooks important aspects of learning which take place below the level of awareness. We would prefer to think of different levels of differentiation and to use the term to include learning of any kind which is determinative for behavior. In this context differentiation refers to the process of movement in learning from a vague, non-specific response to a total stimulus pattern (undifferentiated response) to a discriminating selection of the part or parts which will best fulfill the motivating need(s). Differentiation refers both to the process of movement from the whole to the parts and to the learning which takes place in relation to need satisfaction.

The discussion of various kinds of changes in scope and differentiation of the total field has turned our attention from the general characteristics of change in the field itself. The field tends to change as whole. The emergence of one element into "figure," for example, means that other elements have lapsed into "ground." The total relationship has changed. New organizations of the field cannot arise spontaneously. New elements in the field are experienced by the individual in relation to the elements of the field as it was experienced in the previous moment. Behavior can be studied and predicted in terms of the organization of the field at different moments of time.[1]

The phenomenal field as the experiential world of the individual at a given moment tends, as we have noted, to be organized in relation to the continuance of the existence of the individual and the fulfillment of his needs. The individual makes meaningful and purposive changes in his field in relation to his needs. His needs motivate the progressive differentiation of an expanding field in order to fulfill his developing needs in more satisfactory ways. With Rogers we may postulate that the basic human striving is "to actualize, maintain, and enhance the experiencing organism" (89, p. 487).[1] The "experiencing organism" is, for us, the "phenomenal self" or the self as experienced. The experience of the self is an important determinant of the interaction of the self with the total field and, consequently, of the organization of the field. Motivation, for example, is dependent upon which aspects of the self are experienced to be actualized, maintained, or enhanced at a given moment. The phenomenal self is a complex organization with which we shall be much concerned in our study of personality development. Many aspects of experience come to be included in that portion of the field which is differentiated as the self, and the interaction of the individual with the field strongly influences the developing self-organization. Some of the aspects of experience which come to be part of the experience of self can be listed here: the experience of the body and its meaning for the self; developing capacities, interests, and skills; feelings and emotions; conceptualizations of the self as a certain kind of person in certain situations; patterns of status and role interactions with other persons and groups of persons; extensions of the self to include things, ideas, activities, groups, etc. as "mine;" a system of values by

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[1] for discussion see Snygg and Combs (101, pp. 21-51).

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[2] A biological theory of a drive for "self-realization" is formulated by Kurt Goldstein (46, 47). Various psychoanalysts--Fromm (41), Baruch (14), Rank (66, 86), Horney (57), *et al.*--assume an impulse to grow or striving toward self-realization as basic in personality.

which the positive and negative values of experience for the self are judged. These and many other things enter into the organization or structure of the self. How they are included in the phenomenal self and what meaning and value they have for the self is determined by the interaction of the individual with his total field as the self develops.

Of particular importance for the relations of the self to its field is the experience of "threat." Rogers notes the summary of a study of "threat" by Hogan (55).

1. Threat occurs when experiences are preceived or anticipated as incongruent with the structure of the self.
2. Anxiety is the affective response to threat.
3. Defense is a sequence of behavior in response to threat, the goal of which is the maintenance of the structure of the self.
4. Defense involves a denial or distortion of perceived experience to reduce the incongruity between the experience and the structure of the self.
5. The awareness of threat, but not the threat itself, is reduced by the defensive behavior.
6. Defensive behavior increases susceptibility to threat in that denied or distorted experiences may be threatened by recurring perceptions.
7. Threat and defense tend to recur again and again in sequence; as this sequence progresses, attention is removed farther and farther from the original threat, but more of experience is distorted and susceptible to threat.
8. This defensive sequence is limited by the need to accept reality (in 89, p. 516).

The experience of threat, then, can be said to stimulate the need of the self to maintain or preserve itself and to interfere with the striving to actualize and enhance itself. We shall return to the significance of threat again in our study of the development of the self.

The striving of the self to actualize, maintain, and enhance itself is limited not only by threat but by anything which interferes with the perception and utilization of the resources which are available to the self in its total field. Many things can work to limit and distort the actualization of the self and the full potential of the field. The concept of "reality" is useful as a means of interpreting the distance between actuality and potentiality. "Reality" in relation to the phenomenal field of a given individual means the interpretation of that field by one or more observers who are in a position to give a more objective appraisal of the field than the individual can give. Any person can make an appraisal of the way a particular individual "sees" himself and his world in relation to the observer's estimate of the "reality" of that person and his world. Hopefully, a trained observer by the use of clinical interviews, psychological tests, social history, and other methods would be able to develop a reasonably valid estimate of what constitutes individual and social "reality" for a counselee or client. We shall have occasion to make use of the concept of "reality" in our discussion of the development of a particular person in a later chapter. The developmental study of the next chapter should provide some material which will be helpful for the definition of social "reality" in our culture.

A number of important concepts concerning the phenomenal field and the phenomenal self have been discussed in this section. We need to know now how these concepts can be used to give psychological meaning to the theological definitions of faith proposed earlier.

Faith and the Phenomenal Field

We have been talking about the phenomenal field in relation to personal existence. What we have said about the phenomenal field may make it possible to define psychologically what is meant by "the acceptance of personal existence before God." We sketched a theory of a phenomenal self operating in a phenomenal field. Both the self and the field change as new differentiations are made and new organizations arise in relation to the motivations of the individual. Behavior changes as the field changes. The basic motivation of the self is to actualize, maintain, and enhance itself. We might say that the basic need of the self is to grow. The basic direction of change of the behavior of the self, in the light of its basic striving, should be the direction of optimum growth.[1] In terms of the relation of the individual to reality, the direction of change in the self should be toward the acceptance of all aspects of reality, available within the field, which are needed for growth. But what do we mean by "acceptance" in this context? Snygg and Combs offer a clue. They define "acceptance" in relation to change in the phenomenal self as "the inclusion of a new concept into the phenomenal self by means of a new differentiation of self" (101, p. 94). The term "concept" seems too narrow for our purposes, but the definition seems useful. "Acceptance" can be given a broader definition to mean the inclusion of a new differentiation in the total field or any organized portion of the field, including the self. We can break this general definition down into three parts: (1) inclusion in the self-organization of a portion of the total field which had not previously been differentiated as belonging to or characteristic of the self; (2) inclusion in the total field of a portion of the universe which had not previously been experienced; (3) inclusion in the self-field relationships of a new differentiation of those relationships. We need to add certain normative qualifications to this statement of the process of "acceptance." In the light of the normative direction of movement in the phenomenal field, we would say that the new differentiations which are to be included should be "realistic" in the direction of "Christian growth" for the individual. At least they should be moving toward "reality" and "Christian growth."

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[1] "Optimum growth" is to be defined in terms of "Christian" values for this study.

A brief description of optimum "acceptance" may be significant at this point. This would mean: (1) inclusion in the phenomenal field of all aspects of the universe accessible to the experience of the individual, and differentiation and organization of the individual's experience of the universe in ways which will promote his maximum Christian growth; (2) inclusion in the phenomenal self of the total reality of the self and differentiation and organization of the various aspects of the self in ways which promote its meximum growth; (3) realistic differentiation and organization of all the relations of the phenomenal self with the phenomenal field. In order to promote maximum growth, differentiations and organizations of the field and its regions would need to be inclusive of all relevant and available experiential facts; they would need to be accurate and realistic; and they would need to be accessible for the direction of behavior.

To this psychological statement of "optimum acceptance" would need to be added a theological dimension, if the point of view of Part I is of significance for the growth of the individual. Optimum experience of the universe would need to include optimum experience of the God of Jesus Christ, including experience of His creative activity in every aspect of existence and experience of His redemptive activity in Christian community and in personal relationship with Jesus Christ. Acceptance of the total reality of the self would need to include the criterion of the identity of the self which God has given in Jesus Christ and the creative and redemptive power of the self which is possible through relationship with Him and the Christian community. Acceptance of self-world relationships would need to include the redemptive potentialities of Christian love toward persons and Christian stewardship toward all created things.

A "realistic" note might be added to both the psychological and theological statement of "optimum acceptance." There is no growth without the experience of threat. The organization of the self and its world cannot change without experience of the ambiguity and incongruity of new potentialities. "Optimum acceptance" would also mean the inclusion of new differentiations in the organization of the self and its world with a minimum of defensiveness against the anxiety associated with threat and a maximum use of such anxiety to motivate growth. From our theological point of view, it would mean the inclusion of the faith criterion which is offered by God through Christ in the organization of the self and the use of the meaning and power of the God-relationship to take the risks of growth.

It is necessary to add the theological dimension to the psychological description of "acceptance of personal existence," as has been done above, but we should also note that the terms of the psychological description are in some ways quite similar to the theological. The psychological statement emphasizes the inclusion of the "reality" or the "growth potential" of the phenomenal self and the phenomenal field in the operational organization of the self and its field. This is as close as we can come psychologically to a theological view of faith as the acceptance of life as created and redeemed by God in Jesus Christ. The phenomenal field concept emphasizes the moment to moment nature of acceptance of personal existence, and this is psychologically close to a theological emphasis on faith as a moment to moment existential decision for God.[1]

In this discussion thus far we have tended to neglect one of our definitions of faith--"a personal relationship to a Christlike God, characterized by trusting dependence upon God and manifested in a Christian quality of life." The term "personal relationship to a Christlike God" we would assume to be included in the descriptions which have been given of optimum acceptance of the phenomenal self and its relations to the experiential world. "Trusting dependence" would be included in the acceptance of realistic relations of the self with itself and its world. Realistic relations of the self with itself and its world would mean knowing what could be trusted in oneself and one's world and what could not, knowing what could be expected and what could not. Realistic limits would be established for the amount of trust and dependence which could be experienced in relation to the self and the finite world. The nature of unconditional trust and dependence in relation to a Christlike God would be known and experienced without false hopes of what this trust would mean in finite terms. Such trusting dependence would also be reflected in certain attributes of a "Christian quality of life." Humility, for example, is the acceptance of the finite limitations of the self and its world and the refusal to give to man what belongs to God. The realistic trust in God and man which accompanies humility makes possible love of oneself and one's neighbor for God's sake and for the sake of that which is of God in oneself and one's neighbor. The security of trust in God takes away the fear of the risks involved in human love relationships. It gives the individual hope, as the acceptance of the Christian potentialities of life, and makes it possible for him to face the pains involved in limited and ambiguous human relationships.

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[1] See the theological discussion of the meaning of faith on pp. 118-123.

There is a question raised by the term "Christian quality of life" which is important for our theoretical discussion of psychological meaning of faith. In our theological statements about faith we drew a distinction between "faith" and "works." This distinction also needs to be made in relation to our psychological definition. It is our understanding that the processes which we have defined in relation to acceptance of personal existence are covert processes preparatory to overt action. Differentiation, organization, inclusion, etc., are processes which give to the individual an interpretation of the present field in the light of its own structure and its relations to past experience and future anticipations in order that the individual may direct his behavior toward the satisfaction of the needs which are most important to him at the moment. His actions, then, will disclose the outcome of these preparatory processes. The value of these processes for growth will be measured by the amount of growth which is accomplished in action, although growth may have taken place in the covert processes as well.

Theologically, we need to ask whether this psychological view of faith makes it a covert form of works by which man is to be saved. The most important answer to this question is that acceptance, as the inclusion of new differentiations in the organization of the self and its world, is dependent upon the content of experience to determine what can be included as a new differentiation at any given moment. God cannot be included in the phenomenal field unless the possibility of experiencing Him becomes actual within the field. God in Jesus Christ cannot be included until He actually can be experienced in some way. Faith as defined here theologically and psychologically is a human response to God's revelation of Himself when this revelation becomes an actuality in the experience of the individual. We could also add that it is our view that a real experience of God in Christ includes in it relationship dynamics which function to empower the human response of faith.

Faith, the Phenomenal Field, and Developmental Theory

We have set forth a view of faith in relation to the phenomenal self and the phenomenal field. This gives us a conceptual framework in which we have developed some correlations between psychological and theological contributions to the meaning of faith and shall develop further correlations in succeeding chapters. This takes us part of the way in our answer to the question "What does it mean to have faith?" The second question which was posed for this dissertation was "How does faith develop?" and we shall try to outline some psychological material in the next chapter which will contribute some answers. First, however, we need to relate the phenomenal field concept to developmental theory.

It is our view that any stage of personality development can be approached from the standpoint of the organism-environment field. In terms of the phenomenal field this would need to be done, ideally, in terms of the experience of a particular individual. An effort in this direction will be undertaken in Chapter VII. For theoretical purposes, however, Chapter VI will try to generalize about the nature of self-world relationships at certain specific stages of development. At each stage, in terms of our conceptual framework, there are certain questions which we will need to try to answer: (1) How does the development of the individual himself (maturation) affect his ability to accept himself and his world? (2) How do the relationships of the changing individual to his changing environment affect his ability to accept himself and his world? In order to have a more workable outline we shall divide these questions into five major areas to be studied at each stage of development:

1. General characteristics of the developing individual.
2. Changing characteristics of the environment as experienced by the developing individual.
3. Significant interactions between the individual and his environment.
4. Summary of important features of the organization of the self and its self-world relationships.
5. The meaning of these developments for the acceptance of personal existence before God.

A copy of the more detailed outline which has been developed under these headings will be found in Appendix B.

CHAPTER VI

FAITH AND PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT

A Developmental Approach

In the light of the conceptualizations and the questions suggested in the preceeding chapter, we can sketch the development of faith in relation to the development of personality. This is a complex task. There is much material, both theoretical and factual, which could be included. A comprehensive study is beyond the scope of this chapter, but we need some idea of the kinds of material which are relevant to the questions posed at the end of the preceeding chapter. Two methods of presentation of such material are included here. The first makes use of an outline form to present in some detail the kinds of data which might be included in a syllabus on the development of faith for use with theological students. The second presents the same kinds of data in a briefer, less detailed, summary form which draws the important developmental changes together in a more concise and coherent form than the outline permits. Both types of presentation serve as illustrations of the type of developmental approach which seems consistent with the point of view of the preceeding chapter.

Assumptions

The principles of development which are implied in our developmental approach cannot be discussed in detail, but some of them can be listed.

1. "Behavior is determined by and pertinent to the phenomenal field of the behaving organism" (101, p. 15).
2. Within the individual there is a powerful impulse to grow or "to actualize, maintain, and enhance" himself (89, p. 487).
3. The growth of the individual is a patterning process in which the total organism and its experience interact to produce change (43). This process involves both "maturation" and "learning."
   a) Maturation ("ripening") precedes and anticipates changes in function and the learning of new behavior.
   b) Learning is "a process of progressive differentiation of an uncharted cognitive field" (8, p. XV).
   c) Learning to behave as a person takes place through interaction with other persons.
4. Growth tends to show consistency and continuity.
   a) There is consistency in the development of significant characteristics that differentiate one person from another (61).
   b) The personality can be said to show a tendency toward self-consistency and to resist the inclusion of inconsistencies in its self-organization (68).
   c) " ... all significant experience leaves a functional residue in personality structure ... The relevance of prior experience is derived from the fact that it either (1) constitutes in itself a preparatory phase of a continuing developmental sequence, or (2) differentially influences the process whereby later development takes place" (8, p. 47).

d. Some factors contributing to continuity in development.

(1) Genetic and constitutional prepotencies (8).

(2) Perceptual constancy and selectivity.

> ... well-established conceptual 'sets' may exert such a prepotent influence on the resulting perceptual content that the actual properties of the stimulus...may prove all but irrelevant (8, p.183; cf. 95, 101).

(3) Consistency in the environment.

(4) The consistency of certain central dimensions of personality structure (8).

(5) "Canalization"

> ...general motives (which are at first rather non-specifically related to a class of stimuli) tend, upon repeated experience, to become more easily satisfied through the action of the specific satisfier than of others of the same general class (78, p. 162).

5. Growth is characterized by fluctuations between organization and disorganization, equilibrium and disequilibrium within the over-all pattern of continuity (43).

6. For purposes of study personality development can be divided into various "stages." Listings of such stages tend to vary with the criteria used for definition. The criteria important for the stages to be used in this outline have been conceived in terms of definable changes in maturation, personality structure, or environment (or combinations of the three) which seem to be significantly correlated with changes in the organization of the phenomenal self and its relations to the phenomenal field. For the purposes of organizing the data of the outline, some arbitrary age limits for various stages have been defined. Actually there is wide deviation as to the age at which different individuals move from one stage to the

next. The stages of development suggested for study are:

a) The prenatal stage.

b) Infancy.

    (1) The neonate--from birth to four weeks

    (2) The pre-verbal infant--from four weeks to the age of learning the basic requirements of verbal communication (eighteen - twenty-four months).

c) Early childhood--from the establishment of verbal communication to the entrance into formal education (five - six years).

d) Late childhood--from the entrance into school to the age of puberty (ten - eleven years is taken as an arbitrary age).

e) Early adolescence--from puberty to the emergence of some relatively stable, adult-type physical, emotional, and social patterns within a predominantly adolescent orientation (fifteen - sixteen years).

f) Late adolescence--continues until a predominantly adult organization of the self and its relationships is established (? years).

7. The combination of physical maturation, the pressure of cultural processes upon the individual, and the desires, aspirations and values of the emerging personality at various stages of development can be defined in terms of "developmental tasks" (50, 111). Such definitions suggest the process of "normal" development within a given culture or sub-culture.

8. Norms for growth are relative to the stage of development of the individual. Each stage of growth for a particular person is to be evaluated in relation to the "norms" or "tasks" relevant to that stage as well as to performance of the "tasks" of previous stage.

9. The individual cannot grow without conflict. Conflict may be defined here as the experience of ambiguity or inconsistency in the organization of the self and its relations to its world. Anxiety

is the experiential concomitant of conflict. Growth involves learning to preserve and enhance the phenomenal self in the experience of conflict.

10. The development of each individual personality varies in many ways from the development of all other individual personalities.

11. Every aspect of development of the individual which influences the differentiation and organization of the phenomenal self and the phenomenal field is significant for the development of faith as "the acceptance of personal existence before God." Certain aspects of development, which will be stressed in the outline, are more significant than other aspects in terms of their effects upon:

    a) The comprehensiveness (scope) of the phenomenal field of a particular individual.

    b) The adequacy of the interpersonal relations within the phenomenal field for education in personal, social, and theological reality.

    c) The accuracy of differentiations of the self and its field.

    d) The adequacy of the self to include changing differentiations in the operational organization of the self and the field.

    e) The accessibility of differentiations to the mobilization of behavior.

The assumptions or underlying principles of developmental theory which have been stated are not the only ones which enter into the outline that follows, but they express some of the important conceptions.

Prenatal Development

I. Introduction.

The normal course of development of the human organism within the uterus is described in detail in studies of embryology and need not be repeated here. It may be valuable, however, to emphasize that the embryo or fetus, from the moment of conception, is a developing organism in continuous interaction with its environmental field, which is constituted primarily by the uterus of the mother. The primary channel of interaction is through the placenta, but the fetus does react to important changes which may be transmitted to it through other portions of the field. There are many variables which can influence the course of development of the organism within the uterus and the outcome of its fetal existence, but apart from marked deviation from the norm, we can assume that these variables are not of determinative significance for faith in extra-uterine life. We are primarily concerned with normal development in this study, but some of the possible deviations can be noted.

II. Possible deviations within the developing fetus.
There is always a possibility of genetic deviation from the "norm" which may affect the development of various aspects of the organism.

III. Changes in the environment which may affect development (79).

1. Maternal malnutrition may be associated with complications in the health of the mother such as anemia, toxemia, miscarriage, premature delivery, still

birth, and prolonged labor. In addition to possible early termination of the fetal life, maternal malnutrition may be reflected in nutritional deficiency in the fetus.

2. Certain drugs in the maternal blood stream produce temporary dysfunction in the fetus; and over-sedation of the mother at the time of delivery may produce breathing difficulties in the baby, anoxia, and possible brain damage.
3. Diseases such as smallpox, syphilis, measles, chickenpox, and mumps can be transmitted from the mother to the fetus. Rubella (German measles) in the mother during the first three to four months of pregnancy may produce deaf-mutism, cardiac lesions, cataracts, or various forms of mental deficiency.
4. Exposure to excessive amounts of radioactivity can produce abnormalities in the fetus.
5. Incompatibility of Rh blood factors in mother and fetus may lead to destruction of red blood cells of fetus.
6. Prolonged emotional stress is associated with increased movements of fetus and may have lasting effects--hyperactivity, irritability, frequent feeding and elimination in the newborn (104).

7. Various types of stress may produce strong fetal responses--maternal fatigue, unusual abdominal distress, violent and repeated sounds.
8. An injury or temporary malfunction of the placenta which affects the supply of oxygen to the fetus may have adverse effects on the development of its central nervous system.
9. It is possible that some of the reactions of the fetus to stress in the environment are learned. Some studies indicate that the fetus responds to repeated sounds, and some attempts have been made to teach the fetus a "conditioned response" (105).

IV. Prenatal development and the development of faith.

1. The norm for prenatal development is a "healthy" mother and a "healthy" fetus. Assuming that health includes emotional acceptance of the pregnancy as well as physical well-being, such conditions provide optimum conditions for the development of those aspects of the personality which are significant for faith.
2. Deviations from the norm may constitute problems for faith development if they limit or distort the ability of the individual to differentiate and organize his experiential field. Particularly significant are deviations which affect:

   - a) Ability to perceive the environment and the interactions of the personality with the environment (eye, ear, or other sense organ defect) (1).
   - b) Ability to communicate with the interpersonal environment.
   - c) Ability to organize experience into appropriate patterns for need-satisfaction.
   - d) Ability to make adequate physical responses.
   - e) Physical appearance to an extent to constitute marked deviation from cultural or familial norms.

3. Deviations in either direction from the norm may be significant in terms of later interactions between the personality and the environment.

Infancy--The Neonate

(the first four weeks of life)

I. Influences of the birth experience.

1. Prolonged delivery~~,~~ fetal position at birth, instrumental trauma, excessive sedation of the mother, unsterile conditions, and other variables may have an adverse effect on the newborn and may produce permanent damage. The healthy offspring of a healthy mother, however, is a remarkably resilient creature and can endure wide variations in birth experience without serious injury. Difficulty in delivery does not seem to be correlated with be-

havior problems apart from actual damage to the newborn (79).

2. Premature birth may be associated with a "prematurity syndrome" in behavior, but parental reactions are important and it is difficult to isolate the variables necessary to establish such a syndrome (98, 58).
3. Psychoanalytic assumptions concerning "birth trauma" as a significant experience of separation (66) or excessive stimulation (38) have been questioned by studies showing the perceptual immaturity of the neonate (7, 61) and the lack of correlation between difficulty of delivery and behavior problems (90, 114). Such assumptions may have symbolic significance, however, beyond their questionable literal meaning. The "birth experience" may be referred to symbolically as a prototype of experiences of separation from security and of extreme helplessness (anxiety) in an undifferentiated field.

II. Characteristics of the neonate as a functioning organism.

- A. General characteristics.
    1. Compared with the newborn of other species the human infant is characterized by extreme helplessness.

   2. Behavioral organization is somewhat precarious as manifested in fitful waking, startle reactions, irregular aspirations, sneezing, choking, regurgitation, variations in elimination, etc. (42).
   3. The pace of growth is rapid and much of the energy of the infant is expended in maturational processes.
   4. There are wide variations among individual infants in perceptual responses and irritability and activity levels (61).

B. Although most of the behavior of the neonate is random and generalized, some functional patterns are present at birth. These and other patterns which soon appear show rapid development.

   1. Physical movement.--In addition to generalized movement, there are the more specific movements involved in sucking, swallowing, excreting, defecating, vomiting, salivating, hiccoughing, sneezing, yawning, crying, etc. Such movements occur in relation to external or internal stimuli and do not involve volition by the infant (61).
   2. Emotional responses.--Specific emotional responses do not appear until later. Responses at this age are highly generalized in terms of

varying degrees of excitation. The same stimuli may evoke different responses according to the motivation of the infant (61).

3. Perceptual ability is quite limited (42, 61).
    a) The eyes fixate briefly but the visual field is limited and differentiation of objects is learned gradually.
    b) Hearing has been present since before birth but is not fully developed.
    c) Reactions to pressure and contact seem to be important means of experiencing the environment.
    d) The infant responds to certain tastes, odors, temperature changes, pain stimuli, and changes in bodily position in addition to stimuli noted above.
4. Social responses include a brief "stare" at a human face, changes in behavior at the sound of a human voice, soothing responses to being held in comfortable and warm position.

III. Characteristics of the environment as experienced by the neonate.

A. The total field.

1. The neonate experiences the environment as an undifferentiated field in which there is no distinction between itself and the world (7).

Differentiations develop through experience.

> The life space of the newborn child may be described as a field which has relatively few and only vaguely defined areas. The situation probably corresponds to a general state of greater or less comfort. No definite objects or persons are distinguished. No area called 'my own body' exists. Future events or expectations do not exist; the child is ruled by the situation immediately at hand (70, p. 923).

2. Differentiations develop gradually in relation to the facilities and persons necessary for need-satisfaction.

B. The interpersonal environment.

1. In most cultures the interpersonal environment for the neonate may be described as "nurturant" for the infant; that is, devoted to meeting the needs of the child in accordance with cultural and familial patterns. There are exceptions, of course. If the child is unwanted, its sex is unacceptable, or it is considered physically or mentally unfit, it may be seriously neglected or destroyed.
2. The first persons who take care of the child may be especially trained for the task and relatively free of anxiety, but the parents may be characterized by some anxiety related to the unknown and unfamiliar aspects of the neonate and their own parental role. In view of the perceptual immaturity of the infant, it is

doubtful that such anxiety will be experienced by the child unless it is experienced as need deprivation resulting from parental inadequacy.

3. For every child the environment is unique, not only because of the particular conditions of its birth but also because of the unique constellation of familial attitudes into which it is born and on which it begins to make its own impact after birth.

IV. Significant interactions between the neonate and its environment.

  A. The scope of the environmental field is limited by the perceptual and physical immaturity of the infant.

  B. There is interaction between the infant and the interpersonal environment from the beginning of life.

    1. Individual variations in the irritability and activity levels influence the scope of the environment in which the infant participates and the responses of other persons to it. An active, irritable infant participates in a wider environment than a quiet, phlegmatic one and invites different reactions from those who share the environment with him (26).

    2. The environment is changed by the presence of the neonate within it. The attitudes of the

parents toward the actual infant are different in degree and kind from the attitudes before its birth. The experiences of the mother during delivery and the "shock" of seeing the newborn may be important for the early attitudes of parents. Physical deviations in the neonate may be significant for parental attitudes at this time.

3. The primary contact of the neonate with its environment is with the mother person in feeding activity. The normal infant either sucks at birth or soon learns to make appropriate sucking responses. Within a few days it will show some anticipatory responses when held by the mother in feeding position. The "nipple-in-lips" interaction with the environment (106) is a focus of learning as well as nourishment, but the feeding relationship is a totality including a sense of position in being held securely and comfortably, warmth, contact with the mother, and some generalized responses through vision and hearing. The infant soon learns to enjoy contact after nutritional needs are satisfied (87).

4. Satisfying experiences in feeding and other contacts with the mother (bathing, dressing,

rocking, etc.) contribute to the gradual development of a sense of security (42). Some psychoanalysts emphasize the security involved in the sense of body position as the core of this developing sense of security (32, 108).

5. Relative instability of the breathing mechanisms of the infant in the early days of its life may be overcome by contact with the mother (87).

V. Faith and the neonate.

   1. Basic need satisfaction [needs for oxygen, temperature regulation, sleep, nourishment and fluids, and elimination (79)] in a consistent and dependable manner, within the limits imposed by individual variation in the infant's need-satisfaction patterns, is important for normal development in all aspects of personality.
   2. Adequate need-satisfaction contributes to development of a sense of security in relation to the infant's own physical well-being and its relationships to the environment. This sense of security is essential for the "acceptance of personal existence" at all stages of development.

The Pre-Verbal Infant

(4 weeks to 18-24 months)

I. General characteristics of the developing infant.

- A. Summary of motor developments (43) which effect the scope of his environment.
    1. First quarter of the first year, he gains control of the twelve oculomotor muscles.
    2. Second quarter (16-28 weeks), he gains command of the muscles which support the head and move the arms. He reaches out for things.
    3. Third quarter (28-40 weeks), he gains command of his trunk and hands. He sits. He grasps, transfers, and manipulates objects.
    4. Fourth quarter (40-52 weeks), he extends command to his legs and feet; to his forefingers and thumbs. He pokes and plucks.
    5. By the end of the second year he walks and runs, articulates words and phrases, and acquires bowel and bladder control.
- B. There is a gradual differentiation of emotional responses from the general state of excitation (79).
    1. First quarter, the infant shows differentiated distress and delight reactions.
    2. Second quarter, he begins to show anger, disgust, and fear.

3. Third and fourth quarters, he begins to show more specific reactions of elation and of affection toward adults.
4. Fifth and sixth quarters, he shows reactions of affection and jealousy toward children.
5. Seventh and eighth quarters, he develops a specific response of joy.

C. Developments in intellectual functions show increasing differentiation and complexity. The general sequence of significant changes as described by Piaget (84):

1. The neonatal patterns are random, diffuse, mass reactions.
2. The next step is seen in reactions that initiate and prolong certain types of activities which have already developed--thumbsucking, grasping, and sucking objects, etc.
3. A further step is seen in the repetition of a simple action which previously produced an interesting result, such as kicking his legs to make a toy suspended in the crib swing to and fro.
4. Rudimentary means-end behavior is shown in using already established behavior to obtain goals; e.g., knocking down a pillow to obtain a desired object hidden behind it.
5. Active experimentation occurs in trying out new variations of behavior, using trial and error to

solve simple problems such as obtaining an object that is out of reach.

6. By eighteen months more complex intellectual processes are manifested--memory (imitating a model no longer present), planning, pretending, and insightful solutions to problems (e.g., using a stick as a tool to obtain objects out of reach).

D. Developments in perceptual responses show increasing differentiation and comprehensiveness of contacts with the world

1. During the second month the infant shows differentiated response to the approach and voice of an adult. By the fifth month he shows active perception of another child (25).
2. By sixteen weeks he "recognizes his mother and other familiar attendants in numerous inarticulate but patterned expectancies implanted through feeding, bathing, dressing, and expressions of affection" (42).
3. Mouth, lips, and tongue are important perceptual areas during the first year, decreasing in significance after thirty-six - forty weeks (42).
4. Neuro-motor maturation influences development of perception. The general direction of maturation moves down through the body and out to the

extremities (42).

a) First quarter--mouth and eyes;

b) Second quarter--head, neck, and shoulders;

c) Third quarter--trunk, arms and hands;

d) Fourth quarter--legs, fingers, feet, including tongue tip, finger tips, and toes as perceptually sensitive areas.

5. By eighteen months he makes rudimentary distinctions of space and form (inside-outside, container and contained, aboveness, verticality, etc.); differentiates common objects and some details (eye, ear, nose, hair). He has a perceptual sense of the completion of an event (42).

6. Even though perception shows increasing refinement, it continues to involve diffuse neuromuscular patterns. Movement and perception are closely related.

7. There is much disagreement among studies of various kinds (especially between psychoanalytic and psychological studies) as to the degree of perceptual sensitivity of the infant to subtle aspects (ambivalence, anxiety, tensions, etc.) of parental attitudes and methods in relating to the child. Ausubel concludes "the weight of evidence goes against the hypothesis that infants are sensitive to subtle aspects of parental

attitudes (7, p. 268). Gross neglect or extreme emotional deprivation produces developmental retardation or failure, but more subtle experiences seem to have little lasting affect.

E. Developments in communicative ability show changes in responsiveness to the interpersonal environment.
   1. By the second month the infant gives different cries for hunger, pain, and discomfort (61).
   2. In the second month he reacts to gross changes in the human voice (25).
   3. At sixteen weeks he responds to a familiar voice.
   4. In the sixth month he differentiates between angry and friendly inflections in the voice (25).
   5. At twenty-five weeks he engages in social babbling to another person (61).
   6. At ten - fourteen months he imitates sounds, gestures, and expressions of adults and produces one or more "words" as certain sounds are fuund pleasurable and are reinforced by adult responses to them (72, 74). Mowrer suggests that vocal sounds may be learned partly because of effects in relieving loneliness and feelings of separation (76).
   7. By eighteen months the infant understands many more words than he can reproduce but has developed a command of a few words. Personal "jargon" is

the primary form of communication in play.

8. Development of vocabulary from ten to twenty-four months is shown in a study by M. K. Smith (99):

At ten months the average number of words was--1
At twelve months 3
At fifteen months 19
At eighteen months 22
At twenty-one months 118
At twenty-four months 272

II. Characteristics of the environment as experienced by the pre-verbal infant.

- A. Differentiation and organization of the total field.
    1. Differentiation proceeds in accordance with maturation of abilities to investigate and experience the environment.
    2. The scope of the field is gradually increased with development of perceptual abilities and physical control over posture (sitting and standing). There is a rapid increase with the development of the ability to crawl, walk, and climb.
    3. Imitation as a form of learning serves as an important means of giving structure to the field.
    4. Verbal "labeling" becomes one of the most significant forms of differentiation.
- B. The interpersonal environment tends to continue to be nurturant toward the relatively helpless infant, but

becomes increasingly demanding as the infant develops, or is expected to develop, controls over various functions.

1. The parents more or less adequately try to teach the child patterns of the culture for wearing clothes, eating, eliminating, sleeping, etc.
2. Development of abilities for movement and communication are both encouraged and limited.
3. The anxieties of the parents in relation to social and cultural demands--as well as their own personal problems--may become important in the ways they make demands upon the infant and set limits for him.
4. The relation of social and cultural expectancies for behavior become increasingly important as they are realistically or conflictingly related to the maturation of the infant.

III. Significant interactions between the infant and the interpersonal environment.

A. The most important early interactions take place in the feeding relationship, which is a totality involving not only food but also various forms of perceptual contact (visual, auditory, olfactory, kinesthetic, and sense of body position) and physical satisfaction (warmth, motion, position, etc.).

1. The infant's first interpersonal response is to the mother person who satisfied the needs for food.
2. Consistent satisfaction of needs for food leads to gradual development of sense of confidence and security. By the fourth or fifth month the secure infant is able to "wait" when it perceives cues that food will be available soon (15). The gradual development of this confidence during the first two years provides the foundations for affectional relationships and for the development of self-other differentiations.
    - a) It precedes and underlies affectional relationships (15, 17, 112).
    - b) It permits increased responsiveness of the infant to its total environment and greater learning (16).
    - c) It promotes the development of a sense of confidence in the infant's own ability to perform necessary physical functions when adequate and consistent resources are provided (29).
    - d) It makes possible development of frustration tolerance--the ability to bear delay without responding immediately with the primitive rage pattern (7).

   e) It promotes the development of identifications with the trusted person in the environment (17).

3. Experiences of frustration of the need for food and experiences of separation from the mother stimulate differentiation of the phenomenal field.
   a) The infant is motivated to perceive that which is beyond himself which can satisfy his need. The mother person becomes a significant figure emerging out of the undifferentiated field.
   b) Crying becomes more than a random activity as its efficacy for bringing mother and food is learned.
   c) Excessive frustration may lead to excessive crying and other dependency reactions (79). Excessive frustration may produce an apathetic child (106).
4. Changes in feeding patterns stimulate further differentiation of the field.
   a) More persons become involved in feeding, eating methods change, self-feeding develops with neuro-muscular maturation.
   b) Interpersonal conflict may be involved in changes of feeding patterns, especially

weaning, self-feeding, and introduction of unfamiliar foods.

B. Changes in the dependency patterns of the infant vary with different kinds of dependency relationships.

1. The maturation of motor abilities permits the development of a degree of physical independence insofar as this can be permitted by the parents.

2. The infant tends to develop increasing dependence upon the love and protection of the mother as she becomes a more highly differentiated figure in the total field. This dependence varies with the degree of security that the infant feels in relation to the relatively strange or unstructured aspects of the field but tends to reach its height between eighteen and twenty-four months (88).

C. The total relationship between the infant and the significant persons in its environment provides important opportunities for social learning.

1. The parents are the primary models and teachers since they are the primary need-satisfiers.

a) The parents are learning models:

> To the child, the world of interpersonal relations is at first completely unstructured; and for the first few years of life, most of the differentiation of this unstructured field is performed by his parents. Hence, in the absence of any other framework of reference for basing his expectations of what people in the outside

> world are like, it is most natural for him to refer to the model provided by his parents. Also ... the primacy of a given model in relation to an amorphous field of experience endows its specificity with disproportionate significance, making it the conceptual equivalent of the abstracted or composite content of an entire series of models (7, p. 275).

b) Need-satisfaction patterns developed in relation to parents become "canalized."

c) Experience with the mother tends to be generalized to other persons. Both satisfying and tension-producing experiences become attached to the totality perceived as "mother" and she comes to have considerable learned reward value for the infant.(79).

d) Imitative responses approved by the parents tend to be strongly reinforced (74).

e) The parents function as representatives of society to educate their children in socially approved customs concerning clothes, eating, eliminating, exploring, etc. Interpersonal relationships are important in the success of such education. Frustration tolerance patterns developed in relation to parental demands and expectancy patterns associated with those demands may be generalized toward other persons in accordance with the principles noted above. (1) The total quality of the interpersonal relationship is important--the appropriateness and flexibility of the demands in relation to the needs and abilities of the infant, the consistency of the demands in relation to a particular form of behavior, the kinds of encouragement and support given to the infant to help him meet demands, the kinds and degrees of punishment inflicted for non-compliance, and the degree of personal involvement of the parents in the demand situation.

(2) Experiences in relation to demand situations may be important for the development of confidence and security. Some of the possible areas of conflict are feeding patterns, biting behavior, weaning, anal and urethral control, explorations of certain areas of the body, and the scope of activities related to crawling, walking, and climbing.

2. In the fifth month other children are differentiated from the field and by the ninth month they serve as models for imitation (25). Siblings may become increasingly important in the social learning of the infant, and older siblings may

have some of the same significance as parents for social learning.

D. The differentiation of the self of the infant from the environment takes place through a gradual process of interaction.

1. The earliest differentiations occur in relation to satisfying activities. There is no awareness of differentiated persons involved in these experiences at first, but experiences of nursing, dressing, bathing, fondling, etc. are integrated into relatively discrete patterns with some differentiations between the parts that different individuals may play in these activities (108).
2. Experiences of frustration and separation interfere with patterns of need satisfaction and stimulate differentiation between self-initiated and other-initiated aspects of these patterns (7).
3. Integration of various experiences with the mother figure makes possible a vague perception of her as a unified image. The mother's outline serves as a perceptual anchorage point for the slowly accumulating self-pattern. Other persons contribute in accordance with the frequency and importance of their appearance to the child (78).
4. Concomitant with the differentiation of the "other" involved in need-satisfaction patterns is

the gradual differentiation of the infant's own body, voice, image, etc. from other objects in the field. These perceptions are slowly unified into self-perceptions which can be related to perceptions of other persons in the environment (43).

5. Gradual exploration of the body and interpersonal experiences in relation to bodily functions contribute to the gradual development of a vague and poorly organized "body image." Certain areas of the body which serve as the foci of need-satisfaction and/or cultural demands may assume primary importance in the "body image." Pleasant and unpleasant experiences in relation to these areas are important for the early development of a value system and primitive valuations of the self (7, 29, 106).
6. The body, especially a thumb or finger, is experienced as an invariable source of satisfaction, unless parental punishment interferes, as contrasted to the variability of satisfactions which depend upon other persons. Sullivan sees such experiences as the basis of the illusion of personal individuality (106).
7. Development of verbal labels provides an important means of organization of differentiations

of other persons and the self.

8. Development of methods of autonomous satisfaction--finger-sucking, play, perceptual activity, locomotion, etc.--increases confidence and encourages development of a vague sense of individuality.
9. Learning to meet parental demands successfully without disruption of supportive relationships or excessive or premature demands upon his own abilities is important for growing confidence in the infant's ability to adjust to his world.
10. Learning to exercise his maturing capacities and to meet the demands of his interpersonal world requires that the infant learn to tolerate the ambiguities and uncertainties of unstructured experience (e.g. learning to walk as an ambiguous experience of being able-not being able, finding satisfaction-finding pain) until a secure structure is established. This may be described as learning to live with a rudimentary form of anxiety--the ambiguity of unstructured or undifferentiated experience which must be met in order to grow.

E. Summary of patterns of organization of the self and the field.

1. The most important development of the pre-verbal period is probably the sense of confidence and

security of the infant in relation to himself as a "going concern" and his world as relatively consistent and dependable.

2. Some observers suggest that in the experiential immaturity of his relations to his world the infant develops a sense of "omnipotence." In spite of experiences of helplessness, frustration, and separation the infant may learn that his wishes are satisfied by his world. His wishes and later his cries and his words may be associated with a sense of omnipotence (7, 32, 33, 108). It is the view of the writer that there is some validity in this interpretation but that reality-testing of such "omnipotence" begins with the differentiation of other persons in the family constellation. The development of confidence permits the acceptance of limitations on wishes in relation to the requirements of family living, especially if there are siblings who are demanding as well as indulgent.
3. Sullivan suggests that rudimentary organizations of the self and of relations to other persons are developed as integrations of satisfying and painful experiences in relation to the bodily self as "good me," "bad me," and "not me," and in relation to mother (or other persons) as "good mother" and

"bad mother." The labels are not verbalized by the infant but refer to his interpretations of related groups of experiences (106).

4. The establishment of verbal communication permits the consolidation of the vague differentiations of the self and other persons of this period into labeled organizations.

5. The "developmental tasks" of the pre-verbal period have been summarized by Tryon and Lilienthal under eight headings (111, pp. 84-87):

   a) Achieving an appropriate dependence-independence pattern--

      The infant both establishes himself as a very dependent being and begins the establishment of self-awareness.

   b) Achieving an appropriate giving-receiving pattern of affection--

      The infant develops a feeling for affection.

   c) Relating to changing social groups--

      The infant becomes aware of the alive as against the inanimate, and the familiar as against the unfamiliar and develops rudimentary patterns of social interaction.

   d) Developing a conscience--

      The infant begins to learn to adjust to the expectations of others.

   e) Accepting and adjusting to a changing body--

      The infant learns to adjust to adult feeding demands and cleanliness demands and adult attitudes toward genital manipulation.

f) Managing a changing body and learning new motor patterns--

He develops relative physiological equilibrium, eye-hand coordination, and satisfactory rhythms of rest and activity.

g) Learning to understand and control the physical world--

He begins to explore the physical world.

h) Developing an appropriate symbol system and conceptual abilities--

He develops pre-verbal communication and the rudiments of verbal communication and concept formation.

V. Significant developments in the pre-verbal stage for the development of faith.

A. Developments related to the acceptance of personal existence.

1. Normal maturation is necessary for development of physical, perceptual, conceptual, and communicative abilities involved in the differentiation and organization of the phenomenal field.

2. Interpersonal interaction influences the degree to which developing abilities can be actualized. Parental understanding and acceptance of maturation and learning processes is an important variable.

3. The areas and degrees of confidence developed are important for all learning and relatedness. We might emphasize the influence of

confidence on the development of perceptual "sets" which will be important determinants of later differentiations and organizations. Confidence is also important in relation to frustration tolerance, level of aspiration, value system, and other significant dimensions of the phenomenal self.

4. The generalization of confidence or trust to other persons and other aspects of existence is a significant process in total relation of the self to its world.

B. Developments in the God-relationship.

1. The God-relationship does not ordinarily become a differentiated part of the world of the infant, but the developments noted above are influential in the acceptance of the self and the world as created by God. Confidence or trust is especially important as it becomes the core of later developments which are generalized in relation to God.
2. Parental God-relationships may be important determinants in attitudes of parents toward the infant and their abilities to meet difficult situations involving the child.
3. The most important tasks of the Church in the life of the child at this stage may be said

to be education of parents for the acceptance of the child as created by God and for the development of Christian relationships to the child.

Early Childhood

(from 18-24 months to 5-6 years)

I. General characteristics of the developing child.

  A. This is a period in which the physical growth rate and physiological processes are becoming stabilized after the rapid growth of infancy.

    1. Motor development (42).

      a) There is gradual improvement in postural stability and flexibility and the development of coordinated movements involved in walking, running, climbing, etc.

      b) There is gradual refinement of muscular controls involved in reaching, copying, building, self-feeding, dressing activities, grasping and releasing, throwing.

    2. Both height and weight growth curves show a marked decline in rate of increase from two to six years (109, 111).

  B. Gradual differentiation of emotional responses continues and organized patterns of giving and receiving affection are developed.

1. Fear responses.

   At two the child tends to show fear responses to tangible objects and immediate situations--specific objects and noises, falling and danger of falling, strange objects and persons. From two to five there is a decline in such fear responses and an increase in fears attached to imaginary creatures, the dark, being left alone or abandoned, etc. At any age the fear response may vary if the child is with a familiar adult or is engaged in an absorbing activity (61). Children tend to show the same fears as their mothers (48). Phobias and night terrors may appear during this period.

2. Anger is expressed in relation to forcible restrain, interference with movement, blocking of activities that are in progress, and thwarting of wishes. It may occur as the result of the child's own ineptitude and sometimes is projected on the environment (61).

   > Anger...can be conceived of as a learned emotional response accompanying the expression of resistance to any interference with goal-directed voluntary activity (7, p. 128).

3. The child gradually develops the ability to give affection to his parents and then to other familiar persons. He also learns to share

affection with siblings and peers if he is secure enough in his relation to his parents to overcome his jealousies (111).

4. The child tends to show an "all or none" emotional reaction. When angry, for example, he is angry all over and his anger tends to be unmixed with other emotions (65). With learning, development of memory, and differentiation of relationships emotional responses become more complex. Ambivalence becomes a normal phenomenon.

C. Intellectual development shows increasing ability for conceptualization and differentiation and organization of the field in the direction of the psychological past and future and the reality-irreality dimension.

1. The development of time concepts shows increasing scope of the psychological future and past. A study by Ames shows that "today" is used at twenty-four months, "tomorrow" at thirty months, and "yesterday" at thirty-six months (6).
2. Imagination appears as early as the ability to talk, earlier in some children. Markey found a six-fold increase in the number of imaginative episodes in the behavior of children between the ages of two and a half to four years (73).

3. Gesell (42) summarizes the development in "adaptive behavior" in his groups of subjects (above average intelligence, upper middle class children living in or near New Haven, Connecticut).
    a) At two the child seems to think with his muscles. He responds physically to words and ideas. He demonstrates rudimentary counting, color discrimination, and the use of objects in means-end relationships.
    b) At three he shows readiness to conform to the spoken word and comprehension of directions. He actively labels and relates objects. There is increase in both the quality and quantity of his differentiations and in his interest in organized relationships.
    c) Four shows increased powers of generalization and abstraction and limited comprehension of the past and future. His span of attention continues to be short and his play is poorly organized. He tends to be literal in his thinking and to react with his muscles. His immediate memory span is four digits and twelve-thirteen syllables in a sentence.

d) At five he has increased awareness of order, form, and detail. Memory and concentration are improved. He can continue an activity from one play period to another and remembers a whole story or song. He shows conclusiveness and self-criticism in his activities and is increasingly realistic. Immediate memory span is four digits and sixteen-eighteen syllables.

D. Perception continues as a total response but shows increasing differentiation, especially at five (42).

1. The two year old perceives the difference between black and white, round and square, one and many; differentiates a few letters and many pictures.
2. The three year old shows many perceptual differentiations connected with names and relations of objects--in, on, under, into, and part-whole differentiations.
3. At four he is primarily concerned with generalization and abstraction.
4. At five he shows increased perception of form, order, and detail. Number discrimination is refined and perceptions tend to be more realistic.

E. Communication progress is one of the most important developments in differentiation and organization and "consensual validation" (106) of perceptual and conceptual activities.

1. Number of words increases almost ten-fold from two to five (99):

At two years the average vocabulary includes	272 words.
At three years	896
At four years	1540
At five years,	2072

2. Gesell summarizes developments in communicative activity from year to year (42).
    a) At two "jargon" disappears and many words are used but with varying usefulness. Sentences are short--three-four words--and past and present tend to be confused.
    b) At three many more sentences are used and words are instruments for differentiating and relating. Words are used experimentally in play. There is also notable listening activity in attention to the words of other persons.
    c) Four uses words for questioning and chattering. He may engage in involved conversation. He likes to play with words.

d) The five year old uses more mature articulation and is more matter of fact and less experimental in his talk. He gives pragmatic definitions and uses complete and complex sentences. There are some attempts at socially organized conversation, but these are more nearly "collective monologues."

II. Changing characteristics of the environment as experienced by the child.

A. Important factors in changes in the scope of the phenomenal field.

1. Maturation and learning in physical control, perception, conception, and communication make possible the kinds of changes which have been suggested in section I.
2. The extent of change is partly dependent upon the developing interests and skills of the individual child and any handicaps he may have.
3. The extent of change also depends upon the willingness and ability of parents to encourage and permit freedom of movement and development of interests and skills.

B. Important changes.

1. The geographical horizons of the child gradually extend from his own house and yard to

his neighborhood. Occasional family excursions and activities in a nursery school or Sunday School may give the child contact with the community beyond the neighborhood.

2. Increasing mobility makes possible more active exploration of the changing geography of the field.
3. Increasing skills permit the use of vehicles and tools for play and exploration.
4. Contacts with people beyond the home make possible new experiences with words, ideas, attitudes, values, etc.
5. The gradual development of intellectual abilities makes possible organization of the environment in more and more complex patterns, making use of time and space differentiations and cause and effect relations (limited).
6. The dimension of fantasy becomes an important part of the experiential world, especially from two to four.
7. The interpersonal environment tends to be experienced as less nurturant and more demanding as the child becomes able to take more responsibility for his needs and moves toward areas of potential danger in his exploration of his abilities and his world. The interpretation of

the amount of responsibility and the degree of danger the child can experience are strongly influenced by parental-social-cultural norms, as well as the child's actual abilities and the realistic limitations and potentialities in his environment.

III. Significant interactions between the child and his environment.

   A. The family continues to be the most important nexus of social learning.

      1. Some of the complex variables involved in the relations of parents with children have been listed in the "Fels Behavior Rating Scales" which have been used for the study of patterns of parent behavior. The variables listed are (12):

         a) Warmth--child-centeredness, approval, acceptance, affectionateness, rapport, intensity of contact

         b) Possessiveness--babying, protectiveness, solicitousness

         c) Democracy--justification of policy, democracy of policy

         d) Intellectuality--acceleration, readiness of explanation, understanding

         e) Restrictiveness--restrictiveness of regulations, coerciveness of suggestions

         f) Severity--readiness of enforcement, severity of penalties

g) Interference--readiness of criticism, quantity of suggestions

h) Adjustment--adjustment, discord in the home, effectiveness of policy, disciplinary friction

i) Activeness--activeness of the home, duration of contact, clarity of policy, emotionality

2. Baldwin's studies of the relations of general home atmosphere and behavior of nursery school children indicate that among the children studied those from "democratic" homes score high on socialization; children from homes that score high on control and low on democracy tend to be socially passive and conforming; those from indulgent and inactive homes tend to be socially unaggressive and physically inadequate (10, 11, 12, 13).
3. Other studies suggest that homes rated high in frustration tend to produce children who are aggressive with peers unless aggressive responses are inhibited by punishment, but displaced aggression may be shown in doll play. Permissiveness may encourage aggression (56, 93).
4. Bishop demonstrated the generalization of patterns learned in mother relationship to behavior with a neutral adult (18).
5. Other aspects of social learning in the family will be discussed under other headings.

B. Social behavior with peers becomes increasingly important for development (61).

1. At age two children become more interested in each other although they do not tend to play together. Friendly and cooperative responses predominate in most children. The number of playmates usually is small.
2. At three children engage in "parallel play" with occasional interchanges with others and cooperative play gradually increases with group activities increasing in duration. Play groups remain small in number.
3. From four to six children tend to develop stronger friendships and to be more interested in a few children. The majority of children show a desire to excel and understand the idea of excelling in relation to other children.

C. In various ways the child develops control over its own abilities and its environment.

1. Play and fantasy serve a variety of functions:
    a) To repeat and relieve the anxiety of traumatic situations (32).
    b) To anticipate danger (32).
    c) To test roles and role relationships.
    d) To consolidate satisfying social patterns.
    e) To provide expressional outlets for feelings and emotions.

f. To develop skills.

2. The use of words and ideas to differentiate and organize experience helps to reduce the mystery of the unknown and uncontrollable and the anxiety related to ambiguous and threatening situations.
3. Communication becomes a means of social control.
4. Motor skills and coordination developed with maturation permit greater control of posture and physical activities.
5. Development of tolerance of tension states permits postponement of immediate discharge and direction of energies into alternative outlets.
6. Differentiation of emotional responses makes possible gradual labeling of such responses, through interactions with parents, and direction of emotional expression into appropriate channels.

D. Differentiation of the self from the field progresses slowly.

1. Differentiation proceeds through the same kinds of interactions with otherpersons as in infancy but differentiations are more comprehensive and refined and better organized through the affects of maturation and increased interaction with a wider environment.

2. Between eighteen and twenty-four months the child begins to refer to himself in the third person--"Peter runs"--. Between twenty-seven and thirty-six months he begins to speak of himself as "I". By twenty-one months he may show conceptualization of possession of object as "mine" and some recognition of the possessions of others (7).
3. The organization of his world is predominantly "egocentric" (82).
4. Developments in conceptualization and verbalization make possible increasing consolidation of "personification" of himself and other persons as related to him. Some reality-testing or consensual validation of these "personifications" is possible in play and communicative activity.
5. As the child encounters more and more parental and social expectations for conformity, a "pseudo self" (41) or "ideal self" (57) may emerge which is rewarded for conformity and avoids disapproval and punishment but does not permit development of important aspects of the maturing potentialities of the child.
6. The bodily aspects of the self are differentiated and organized in relation to developing

skills and increasing opportunities to compare size, structure, and function of various parts of the body, as well as the totality, with siblings and peers. Experiences with the body which are associated with interpersonal conflict may be important for suppression of certain portions of bodily experience to low levels of differentiation.

7. Efforts for emotional control or redirection in conformity to parental demands may have both positive and negative affects on the confidence of the child in himself and his world. Some painful forms of emotional response may be suppressed to low levels of differentiation. Other forms of emotional response which are satisfying or rewarding may become unrealistically significant in the self-organization.

E. Status and role interactions with parents are especially important at this stage.

1. The "omnipotence" of the infant was tested in various ways in infancy; but as the child becomes increasingly a participant in a wider environment, he is confronted with the task of accepting his status and role in a world which no longer revolves around him but must be shared with other persons. Some of the steps

which should take place in this "devaluation" process (7) can be suggested:

a) The gradual testing of his biosocial status as dependent and independent in day-to-day relations with parents and in play.

b) The development of independence in areas in which abilities and environmental pressures permit and the continuance of dependence in areas in which abilities and/or environmental pressures do not permit.

c) The internalization of such development with a minimum of conflict.

d) The development of relationships with other persons, especially parents, which are consistent with a-c, including

  (1) Respect for parental authority to set realistic limits.

  (2) Confidence in parental ability to satisfy needs consistently in a non-exploitative manner.

  (3) Confidence in own ability to develop within limits set by parents.

  (4) Gradual recognition of the rights and property of others.

  (5) Exchange of warm and affectional feelings with parents, with oppor-

tunity for expression of negative feelings without hurting other persons or experiencing punishment for realistic expressions.

(6) Playing and living through the fantastic elements of interpersonal relationships.

2. The testing or learning processes involved in "devaluation" go on at all times, but special periods and forms of testing behavior can be noted (7, 42):

   a) From eighteen months to two years temper tantrums may be frequent and the negative response "no" may often be heard.

   b) The three year old tends to be more conforming but some negative behavior and dawdling may be seen.

   c) The four year old tends to engage in "out of bounds" behavior, to be argumentative and dawdling and to have a "know-it-all" attitude.

   d) The five year old is more self-critical, realistic, and ready to accept his dependent status.

   e) The five and six year old begin to show that parental and social expectations have been learned as rigid, legalistic rules for behavior.

3. The ideal outcome of the devaluation process might mean:
    a) Realistic devaluation of the infantile sense of omnipotence.
    b) Development of an acquired sense of status by virtue of dependence upon and identification with reliable adults.
    c) Increasing importance of approval of parents in relation to feelings of security, adequacy, and personal worth.
    d) A frame of reference for assimilating values which closely corresponds to the parental frame of reference.
    e) Learning through identification.
    f) Continued growth in independence in appropriate areas and learning through task or object-centered exploration and independent trial and error.
4. Development of sexual identification is a complex process which is difficult to interpret.
    a) There may be stronger "emphathic" ties with the parent of the same sex (106).
    b) Family and cultural pressures may be experienced as rewards and punishments for

appropriate sex role behavior (76).

c) Role-testing in play activities and associated social rewards and punishments may be important.

d) Conflicts in interpersonal relationships may complicate the identification process.

F. Both positive and negative aspects of a value system undergo important developments in this stage.

1. The negative "conscience."

a) Until the child develops perception of himself as an entity, "conscience" is primarily a "warning system" that certain behavior will result in punishment if the child is observed. The "warnings" tend to be connected with specific actions and do not function when there is no anticipated danger of punishment.

b) With the development of self-other awareness and increasing dependence upon the approval of others, "conscience" begins to be an organized system of values. Adherence to these values becomes a matter of personal loyalty and failure to keep them is associated with feelings of guilt. This organized and internalized "conscience" may be relatively well established as a set of rules for behavior by the age of six (7, 83).

2. The positive "conscience" or organization of desirable ideals for behavior develops through identifications with significant persons and the rewards for such identifications, as well as through rewarding personal experience.

G. Conflict and anxiety play crucial roles in the differentiation and organization of the self and its world.

1. Anxiety, like fear, may be contagious and may be "caught" from the parents or other important adults (106).
2. As the self becomes an organized and differentiated portion of the field, experiences which are markedly inconsistent with the developing self-organization are threatening to it.
3. Anxiety may be experienced in relation to unstructured or ambiguously structured situations in which both positive and negative values are involved.
4. Inconsistencies between dependency needs and aggressive drives, (57), between positive and negative feelings, (107), between desires for

pleasure and fears of punishment, (38), between desires for interpersonal contact and experiences of loneliness and isolation, (106), may be contributive to the development of pathological forms of anxiety.

5. The sense of helplessness in the face of an experience of some aspect of himself or his world which seems beyond his control may be an important aspect of anxiety. The presence of a familiar and trusted adult may reduce or overcome such anxiety (38).

IV. Summary of patterns of the organization of the self and the field.

    A. Maturational advances make possible important steps in the differentiation and organization of the self, especially

        1. Increasing differentiations of physical, emotional, conceptual, perceptual, and communicative reactions to the total field.

        2. Conceptual organization of the self and the field in the direction of the psychological future and the past and the dimension of reality-irreality. Labelling and gradual development of pragmatic and generalized relationships are important.

3. Interaction with a wider world of places, things, people, ideas, and values.
4. Consensual validation of differentiations and organizations through communicative activities.

B. Interactions with the interpersonal environment strongly influence the self-organization.

1. Identifications with significant persons form the dynamic core of the self-organization.
2. Status and role expectancies become relatively organized.
3. Experiences with the maturing potentialities of the self are included in the self-organization in accordance with the rewarding or non-rewarding experiences encountered in interpersonal relationships in relation to specific potentialities. Different levels of differentiations are established within the self-organization and some aspects of maturing potentialities may be dissociated from the self-organization.
4. Level of aspiration, frustration tolerance, friendliness and other important dimensions of self-expression and self-control are

strongly influenced by the interactions of the maturing child with his interpersonal environment.

C. There are important developments in the autonomy of the individual and his mastery over himself and his environment.

   1. Various abilities combine to permit the kinds of organization of experience which permit some control over it--conceptual structure, physical coordination, verbalization, etc.
   2. The continuing development of realistic confidence permits the use of aggression and other resources to meet threatening situations and work them through.
   3. Patterns of tolerance of tension permit reorganization of the field in order to meet social expectancies.
   4. The beginnings of internalization of values facilitate socially appropriate behavior in various spheres.

D. The developmental tasks of early childhood have been summarized by Tryon and Lilienthal (111, pp. 84-87).

1. Achieving an appropriate dependence-independence pattern--

   The child adjusts to less private attention: becoming independent physically (while remaining strongly dependent emotionally).

2. Achieving an appropriate giving-receiving pattern of affection--

   Developing the ability to give affection. Learning to share affection.

3. Relating to changing social groups--

   Beginning to develop the ability to interact with age-mates. Adjusting in the family to expectations it has for the child as a member of the social unit.

4. Developing a conscience--

   Developing the ability to take directions and to be obedient in the presence of authority.
   Developing the ability to be obedient in the absence of authority where conscience substitutes for authority.

5. Learning one's psycho-socio-biological sex role--

   Learning to identify with male adult and female adult roles.

6. Accepting and adjusting to a changing body--

   Adjusting to expectations resulting from one's improving muscular abilities.
   Developing sexual modesty.

7. Managing a changing body and learning new motor patterns--

   Developing large muscle control.
   Learning to coordinate large muscles and small muscles.

8. Learning to understand and control the physical world--

Meeting adult expectations for restrictive exploration and manipulation of an expanded environment.

9. Developing an appropriate symbol system and conceptual abilities--

   Improving one's use of the symbol system. Enormous elaboration of the concept pattern.

10. Relating one's self to the cosmos--

    Developing a genuine, though uncritical, notion about one's place in the cosmos.

V. Significant developments in early childhood for the development of faith.

   A. Developments related to the acceptance of personal existence.

      1. The interaction of the maturing child with a wider environment means that many new experiences can be included in the phenomenal field and higher levels of differentiation and organization are possible.

      2. The continuing development of confidence in himself and his world is contingent upon:

         a) Success in learning to use developing skills, and the comparative evaluation the child makes of his skills in relation to important adults and peers.

         b) The outcome of interpersonal conflicts in relation to status and role.

         c) The interpretation the child develops concerning the dependability of his interpersonal environment in relation to the confusing changes which he experiences in himself and his world.

d) The child's success in actualizing his emerging potentialities in an interpersonal context, and the ability of parents to participate in the process of recognizing his potentialities and giving them appropriate direction.

e) The child's total interpretation of his place in the family and society in terms of--

    (1) Feelings of belonging.
    (2) Ability to give and take in appropriate ways.
    (3) Worth as a unique individual.
    (4) Comparative values of the self in relation to other persons.

3. The child who is "intrinsically valuated" by his parents as a person of worth apart from his conformity or accomplishments develops a "residue" of security and adequacy which tends to persist through future stages (7).

4. The perceptual and conceptual frames of references which are developed in early childhood

tend to persist and to influence later perceptual and conceptual organizations. The self is the central point of such frameworks.

5. The child who experiences security in his interpersonal world begins to move out toward close relationships with other persons before the end of this period.
6. The child develops more realistic confidence in the impersonal aspects of existence as he becomes aware of the dependability of natural forces and events, appreciates the values of things, and learns some of their potentialities and limitations.

B. The God-relationship may become verbalized and included in both differentiated and undifferentiated portions of the field.

1. The process of generalization of confidence and other aspects of parental relationships to God continues.
2. The God symbol may be introduced by parents and/or other adults or peers.
3. The differentiation of the self becomes an important variable in the God-relationship. The child tends to see himself in relation to God as he sees himself in relation to one or both parents.

4. The identification with values of the parents tends to include identification with their moral values which may be related by both the parents and the child to God and the Church.
5. Experiences in the Church or Sunday School may become an important part of the child's world and he may tend to identify with "his" church and adults he knows there.
6. Understanding of the God-symbol and other religious symbols is limited by the nature of his phenomenal field.

C. Some of the tasks of the Church at this stage.

1. To educate and support parents in their efforts to maintain Christian relationships with their child.
2. To help the child develop a sense of "belonging" to his part of the Church and a realistic sense of worth in relation to his participation in the Church program.
3. To clarify generalizations which are made from parental relationships to God--to help the child understand similarities and differences between parental relationships and God relationships.
4. To help the child experience respect and reverence for the values of created things.

5. To make the Church a satisfying part of the child's world.
6. To give the child mature and trained teachers as models for his identifications.
7. To interpret religious concepts and symbols to the child in terms that are relevant to his phenomenal world.

Late Childhood

(from school age to puberty)

Note--The outline of the preceeding stages of development provides an illustration of the kinds of data which can be related to our approach to the development of faith. The material for this stage and the succeeding two stages will be presented in summary form in order to present the major changes in somewhat less detail. This should serve our purposes and, at the same time, conserve time and space.

I. General characteristics of the developing child.

The child who has made a successful journey through early childhood should be ready to move out into the world beyond his home when he is old enough for school. He should be physically ready to learn the skills involved in reading, counting, adding, writing, drawing and the other activities of the early grades. He should be big enough and have enough background experience to be able to take care of himself in the school situation. He should be secure enough in himself and his family relationships that he can leave home without undue anxiety and make friends with his teachers and his peers. He should be sufficiently in control of himself to be able to hear and follow his teacher's directions. He should be ready to learn about the world in which he lives.

His years in school, until he reaches puberty, will be relatively stable ones in his physical growth and his physiological processes (79). Gradually he will learn control of his smaller muscles and develop finer coordinations. As he grows bigger and stronger he will enjoy and develop some skill in active games and sports with other children. (19). Sexual interest and activity (masturbation and sex play) will continue, but other forms of activity will assume increasing importance (8, 21, 79). His emotional life, too, will be relatively calm although it may become a little more stormy as he approaches puberty. He may have some fears and occasional anger outbursts, but much of his emotional energy will be used in accomplishing the adjustments of the early school years and his physical activities. He will not be notably moody and daydreaming will give way to a realistic concern for facts, skills, and relationships. His affections will broaden to include new people and, perhaps, a pet or two, and he will develop some mutuality in affectional relationships (19, 44).

Some of his most important growing during the early school years will be in his abilities to comprehend abstract relationships, to reason and to generalize. His reasoning powers will not be different than they were, but he will be able to make use of them in relation to a rapidly growing world of experience and to develop true causal reasoning (61, 82). The development of reading skills will open the door to a multitude of new facts and ideas to use in organizing his world. On every side in his school world he will be confronted with the ideas and experiences of other people to supplement and correct his own.

Gradually the older child grows out of his egocentric world and becomes more interested in other people and the wider world and shows perceptual ability to recognize the needs and feelings of others and communicative ability to talk with them in mutual terms. He learns from them and is able to share with them in turn (7).

II. Significant changes in the environment as experienced by the child.

The wider world of late childhood means many things for development. The scope of the environment includes many more people, places, things, and activities. There are new people with whom to identify, new systems of values with which to compare one's family's values. There are new expectancies to meet in the school situation and peer relationships. Many new avenues for learning are open. Beyond the school there are other activities which are now open to the older child--church groups, activity groups, clubs, etc.

Not only is a wider world open in late childhood but new ways of differentiating and organizing that world are possible as concepts of time and space develop and causal relations become meaningful. Everything can be named and names can be related to each other in more and more complex ways. Imagination also helps to flavor ideas and add zest to plans and ambitions.

III. Significant interactions between the child and his world.

The parents continue as the primary authorities in the child's life. He remains dependent upon their approval, and he continues his basic identification with them (7). The extent of his freedom depends upon the limits set by his parents and he continues to need their support, protection, and guidance. The wider world of late childhood, however, and the developing conceptual and perceptual abilities mean that loyalties and identifications established earlier are coming under critical examination. Teachers and other adults serve as representatives of other values and ways of living. Heroes in books and movies or television come to be important, if transitory, figures. Other children and other families also represent new perspectives from which to examine one's own family. But parental ties are strong and their relations to the child's status and worth are too important to be seriously challenged at this stage. Parental rules are to be obeyed, although resistance may appear in various ways and may increase in strength from ages nine to eleven (19). The ties to the parent of the same sex may be particularly important for development of sex role and identification (79).

An important source of social learning in late childhood is to be found in peer relationships. Friendships are formed along sex lines--boys with boys and girls with girls--and there is little social mixing of the sexes (61). Friendships tend to be relatively short-lived and unstable until late in this period (106). There is a tendency toward development of "in-groups" and "out-groups," and "gangs" begin to form at about nine or ten. The peer groups serve for learning experiences of various kinds--techniques of success and failure with authority, differentiation of sex roles, comparison of values, validation of differentiations of the self and other persons, methods of social living (7, 79, 106).

The various skills learned in the wider world of late childhood make possible the development of a variety of controls over the self and its world. The development of skill in the use of the tools which are appropriate to the child's sex role is one of the most important aspects of development in this period. Accomplishments of all kinds in school and home and on the playing field are important for the developing confidence of the child in himself. Such accomplishments and the sense of status related to them are included in the self-organization. The self-organization becomes increasingly differentiated as the child has opportunity to relate and compare himself with his peers and to test his worth in relation to various adults (7). Identifications with persons beyond the home, especially heroes or glamor figures and admired teachers or leaders are included as part of the self, at least transitorily (51). Peers may also be objects of identification; and these various identifications serve to modify and weaken the power of the primary identifications with parents. The self comes to be seen also as related to an increasing number of activities, interests, possessions, and non-family groups. The ability for self-criticism begins to develop but tends to be accomplishment oriented. There is a greatly increased consciousness of sexual differences, and there may be some associated self-consciousness.

Some of the developments in the child's values system have been suggested. In general, this is a period of stabilization and increased internalization of a sense of moral obligation and responsibility, but there is a gradual movement away from viewing parental precepts as rigid absolutes and toward a more relative view of moral principles. Some general principles of fair play, sharing, honesty, etc. become important (7, 83). Ideals for the self are found in various places but especially in persons who are seen as heroic or glamorous. The conflicts between conscience and desires may continue to be an important source of anxiety. Other sources of anxiety may be experienced in the uncertainties and ambiguities of the school world and its relationships, especially in relation to problems of status, success, specific skills, and value conflicts.

Even though some phases of development are relatively stable and orderly during late childhood there are important changes that occur in the organization of the self and its world. The accomplishment orientation means that level of aspiration, self-esteem, frustration tolerance, independence, etc. become more closely and realistically related to actual abilities and status. As the child becomes more capable and responsible he can experience more freedom of activity and movement and know increasing reliance on himself and his friendships and less on his parents. Anxiety can be met more realistically through activity and accomplishment with less need for fantasy and play, although play continues to be important. One of the most important developments is the gradual direction of his interests away from himself toward other persons and the world in which he lives.

Tryon and Lilienthal summarize the developmental tasks of late childhood (111, pp. 84-87):

1. Achieving an appropriate dependence-independence pattern--

   Freeing one's self from primary identification with adults.

2. Achieving an appropriate giving-receiving pattern of affection--

   Learning to give as much love as one receives; forming friendships with peers.

3. Relating to changing social groups--

Clarifying the adult world as over against the child's world.
Establishing peer groupness and learning to belong.

4. Developing a conscience--

   Learning more rules and developing true morality.

5. Learning one's psycho-socio-biological sex role--

   Beginning to identify with one's social contemporaries of the same sex.

6. Accepting and adjusting to a changing body--

   (no task listed)

7. Managing a changing body and learning new motor patterns--

   Refining and elaborating skill in the use of small muscles.

8. Learning to understand and control the physical world--

   Learning more realistic ways of studying and controlling the physical world.

9. Developing an appropriate symbol system and condeptual abilities--

   Learning to use language actually to exchange ideas or to influence one's hearers.
   Beginning understanding of real causal relations.
   Making finer conceptual distinctions and thinking reflectively.

10. Relating one's self to the cosmos--

    Developing a scientific approach.

IV. The significance of developments in the period of late childhood for faith.

The developments which have been suggested in this summary all would need to be included in the operational organization of the self and its world for optimum faith development as "the acceptance of personal existence" at this stage. The maturing abilities and the learning experiences which take place in relation to the child's world make possible differentiations and organizations of experience which were not possible at earlier stages and these would need to be accomplished in accordance with the "reality" of the situation of the individual and his potentialities for optimum growth.

The continuing development of confidence and trust in this period becomes increasingly related to performance in school and play and other activities, as such performance is evaluated by the child in his interpersonal frame of reference. As he sees himself as succeeding and as finding other rewards in his moving out into the wider world of people and activities, he is able to accept new dimensions of himself and his world and to meet his conflicts with increasing courage and richer resources. He also learns more realistic trust and expectations toward other people and develops some discrimination between different kinds of social relationships. His differentiations of himself and other people tend to be shaped by the perceptual and conceptual frames of reference which he brought with him into this period, but the opportunity for reality-testing of these frames of reference in experience and consensual validation through communication permits some modification of them.

The underlying patterns of differentiation and organization developed in interpersonal relations tend to carry over into relations with the impersonal aspects of existence, but the opportunities for learning the facts and feel of many aspects of experience for himself can mean a widening and more realistic trust of natural processes and the things of his world. Responsiveness to the beauty and values in his expanding world means new sources of satisfaction and new resources for living.

In relation to God and the Church many important developments can take place in late childhood, only a few of which can be noted here. The role of the parents continues as the most important determinant of the God-relationship, but facts and ideas contribute some clarification to this relationship and new identifications expand and modify it. The God-relationship may be an important part of the life of some of the heroes of the child and enter into his identification with them and the ideals shaped by them. The stabilization and internalization of a moral code is important, but equally as important in the later years of this period is the development of some flexibility and adaptability and the loosening of the ties between God and the relativities of such a code. Awareness of God's creative activity and appreciation for the values of His creations may be an important part of the child's experience with his expanding world. God's redemptive activity may come to have some meaning as the child becomes more concerned with guilt and aware of the contradictions between potentiality and actuality in his life. His estimates of his own worth in relation to other people and to God is a primary variable in his ability to accept forgiveness and to experience reconciliation.

Certain opportunities of the Church can be stressed. The activities of the Church tend to make up a larger part of the scope of the child's life at this stage than at most others. There is an opportunity to help him find status and worth through his performance in these activities and to learn through the activities, but also to help him experience relationships with persons which are not determined by his performance. There is an opportunity to help him learn to trust himself and other persons as he struggles to perform--to hold up realistic standards of accomplishment before him but to help him learn that failure to meet these standards need not mean humiliation or disapproval but can mean the kind of encouragement and support which makes for better performance. There are also significant opportunities to present to the child in vivid ways heroes whose lives embody Christian ideals and relationships with which he can identify. The direction of awareness to God's creative activity, the clarification of generalizations from parental relationships, the communication of the nature of religious life--these and many other opportunities are available; but one of the primary responsibilities of the Church continues to be with the parents and their efforts to help the child develop his life "before God."

Early Adolescence

(Ages eleven to sixteen)

Adolescence is a period of life which has been much studied from various points of view. We present a brief summary of a theory of normative development stressing some of the changes which seem significant for this study.

I. General characteristics of the developing adolescent.

The relative stability of growth and development of physiological processes comes to an end as the processes related to puberty begin to take place. There is wide variation in the age at which these processes appear, but many girls begin to show changes about the end of the eleventh year and boys about two years later. There is a two year period during which many changes take place rather rapidly, and then the rate of change slows down. During these two years there is a spurt in height with a weight spurt lagging somewhat behind. There are also significant changes in the endocrine system and in the physical attributes related to primary and secondary sexual characteristics (8, 45, 67). The rapid changes in physical structure mean a period of awkwardness for most adolescents, since functional capacity tends to lag behind structural growth (8). The physical changes are also associated with a generally heightened emotional reactivity (8). Many developmental problems are experienced in the total adjustment to these changes, and some of these will be discussed later.

Intellectually, the adolescent continues to show increase in general intelligence until age eighteen. Some of the directions of intellectual development noted by Ausubel (8) are: the ability to generalize, to manipulate abstractions, to reason from the standpoint of abstract propositions. The adolescent is increasingly aware of a world of time and space which includes the entire universe, the historical past and the historical future (especially in these "space age" days), and his thinking in interpersonal issues is from the specific to the general, from the concrete to the abstract, and from the personal to the impersonal. His intellectual growth combined with his abilities to explore a widening world mean that he develops many new interests and activities (45). His perceptual operations discriminate in more refined and sophisticated ways in his widening world, but during the early years of adolescence he tends to be too absorbed in his own changing self to be very accurate in his perceptions of others. His communicative abilities are well developed and he possesses the tools for extensive use of these abilities.

II. Changing characteristics of the environment as experienced by the adolescent.

The changes in the environment are not as marked for the adolescent as they were for the older child. The scope of his freedom to move about and explore continues to increase and he tends to spend much more of his time away from home. The environment into which he enters is a complex one and important dimensions of time and space and past and future are added to it, as has been noted. Fantasy or irreality may also become an important dimension in his world again as an emotional outlet and part of his struggle with his adjustment problems. The world of creative fantasy in books, movies, television, art, music, etc. may also contribute to his environment. Some of the most significant changes, however, take place in his interpersonal environment. In our culture the adolescent finds himself in a confusing position. He is growing rapidly toward adult size and capacities; he is no longer a child, but cannot be given adult status or experience adult freedoms or responsibilities. He finds himself in an "interim" world between childhood and adulthood (8). The social expectations for his behavior in this "interim" world are inconsistent and confusing. In some ways he continues to participate in the world of childhood, in others the world of adults, but he belongs in neither and is not permitted to identify with either very strongly. The expectations in regard to sexual roles and identifications are more clear cut, but these too can be confusing.

III. Significant interactions between the adolescent and his world.

The general direction of the social movement of the adolescent tends to be away from his home toward the world of his peers. The resistance to parental authority may begin before adolescence, but it tends to become strong in early adolescence, although this is not an inevitable development. Confidential communication with parents tends to decline (110) and close friendships develop with persons of the same sex. Relations with parents tend to vary from year to year (45) and day to day, but the movement is toward increasing independence from parental restraints and the adolescent's own identification with his parents. In his friendships the adolescent tends to become more selective on a person-centered--rather than activity-centered--basis (79). Interest in the opposite sex appears first in girls about thirteen (or earlier) and about fifteen in boys (67). Activities tend to become oriented more toward social relations and less toward physical sports and games. Identifications tend to be established in relation to a few friends or a "clique," and such ties tend to become more stable. (67, 79). The peer group functions to help the adolescent develop social attitudes and skills, clarify his sex role and accumulate sexual information (or misinformation), explore new concepts, "talk out" his anxieties, and test his perceptions and evaluations of himself. It gives him a source of status in his interim world and support in his efforts to test his parents' values and authority. The price of status may be superficial conformity, but the peer group also offers some recognition of the adolescent as a person and encouragement for his striving to be a person (8, 67, 79). The intensity of his own problems may prompt the adolescent to withdraw from his peers as well as his parents, at times, but he tends to be dependent upon his peers and to return to active interaction with them.

The adolescent in his confusing world has some difficult tasks to accomplish to develop mastery over himself and those aspects of his world which are accessible to his control. One of his most perplexing tasks is the reorganization of his body image as it changes rapidly with the growth and development of his body and his skills. The sexual drive which emerges needs to be related to his changing personal-social world and to find appropriate expression in that world. The conflict with social expectations and his own value system means a trial and error process of finding forms of expression appropriate to the individual and his world. Peer patterns and adult understanding and support can be of help (106). Physical appearance is also a source of concern and self-consciousness, especially for the early or late developer, and physical coordination and skill are also troubling. Fortunately many intellectual and emotional resources and outlets are available to help with the tasks of mastery.

Conceptualization dispells some of the mysteries of personal development, as well as the world at large, if based on accurate information. Introspection can help with self-understanding, if not carried too far and if corrected by communication with others. Friendships, study, activities, vicarious experiences, fantasy, and communication all provide emotional outlets. Developing social skills also help to strengthen courage to face the world and find a place in it, and the peer group offers a community of persons who are struggling with the same problems.

All of the interactions which have been mentioned contribute to the tasks of differentiating and organizing the self in adolescence. Perhaps the most difficult task is that of finding one's own identity.(29, 96). The adolescent separates himself from his family only to become lost, for a time at least, in a rigidly conforming peer world. But if his ties with his family were well established previously, the separation tends to be superficial and his more basic problem is coming to know who he is in relation to the rest of his family and the family history, struggles, and ambitions, Beyond the family there is the whole world--past, present, and future--in which to find a place. For a time he finds a place with his peers, but there are individual potentialities to be actualized and bigger values to be experienced than those of his peers. These he comes to know as he comes to know himself better, to identify with "successful" persons in his environment, and to examine different value systems for himself. The choosing of a vocation is a particularly crucial task of self-identity with which he struggles in early adolescence and usually must resolve by late adolescence. Meanwhile he tests himself in relation to his family and his peers to see how much he can do, what his skills are, how to handle his emotions and physical drives, and, in general, what his resources are for personal and social life.

The development of his value system deserves a special note. His ideals tend to become more realistic and he tends to see them embodied in attractive and successful young adults in his community or "composite" images formed from various past identifications (50, 51). Some of his ideals and values come from his peer group and may be in conflict with those of his parents. In order to free himself from parental authority he will tend to identify with his peers against his parents if there is open conflict. The resolution of such conflicts comes later in the development of a more realistic integration of his earlier values and those of his present situation. In early adolescence, however, he tends to be governed by expediency and conformity (8). His own developing intelligence and understanding of his world, his increasing independence, and his exposure to different views of life make possible increasingly critical examination of his own value system as well as those of others as he moves toward integration. His conscience becomes less authoritarian and there is greater freedom to choose between conflicting loyalties. His loyalties are less binding emotionally as his dependency is broadened to include more individuals and groups and he can depend more on his own values. His guilt feelings tend to diminish and to become more realistic.

The most serious conflicts in adolescence occur in relation to his problems of interim status and his struggles with the tasks of individuation and socialization. Some of the specific forms in which his anxieties are expressed are shown in a study by Pressey (85)--examinations, money, appearance, self-consciousness, ability, and work problems are all given as reasons for anxiety, ranking above moral concerns. Ausubel emphasizes the "transitional anxiety" which accompanies the "crisis of maturation" and the "interim status" of adolescence.

IV. Patterns or organization of the self and its world.

The developmental tasks of early adolescence are summarized by Tryon and Lilienthal (111, pp. 84-87):

1. Achieving an appropriate dependence-independence pattern--

   Establishing one's independence from adults in all areas of behavior.

2. Achieving an appropriate giving-receiving pattern of affection--

   Accepting one's self as a worth-while person, really worthy of love.

3. Relating to changing social groups--

   Behaving according to a shifting peer code.

4. Developing a conscience--

   (No task listed. We would emphasize the testing of parental values and authority by identification with peer values).

5. Learning one's psycho-socio-biological sex role--

   Strong identification with one's own sex mates.
   Learning one's role in hetero-sexual relationships.

6. Accepting and adjusting to a changing body--

   Reorganizing one's thoughts and feelings about one's self in the face of significant bodily changes and their concomitants.
   Accepting the reality of one's appearance.

7. Learning to understand and control the physical world--

   (No task listed).

8. Developing an appropriate symbol system and conceptual abilities--

   Using language to express and to clarify more complex concepts.
   Moving from the concrete to the abstract and applying general principles to the particular.

V. Significant developments in early adolescence for faith.

All of the developmental tasks of adolescence are important for faith. Many changes in the developing individual and his world need to be included in his acceptance of personal existence. The physical, emotional, intellectual, and social changes are all important and need to be differentiated as realistically as possible as they emerge and to be organized into patterns which are conducive to growth.

The confidence which has been developing in the self and its world through previous stages can be seriously shaken by the conflicts of adolescence, and successful resolution of such conflicts in the light of individual and social potentialities for growth is necessary, for faith. We would emphasize the problems in the inclusion of physical changes in the phenomenal self, the struggle for interim status and individual identity, and the search for values. If the adolescent does not become too absorbed in such problems, however, he has the capacities to come to know much more of himself and his world both through examining himself and through looking out to and communicating with the vast resources beyond himself. To come to know himself and his world is to become increasingly aware of the inconsistencies and the ambiguities in both, and part of the task of development in faith is to develop more and more realistic expectations and yet to hold to values which transcend the limitations and ambiguities of knowledge.

Confidence in God and adherence to His values offers one possible relationship to such values. For the early adolescent years the God-relationship, however, will have little meaning except as it has a relevance to the adolescent in his peer group. The personification of God in parental terms needs to be overcome, in its childish forms at least, along with the childish value system that tends to go along with it. The adolescent who is able to join with other adolescents, with whom he can identify, in a search for a more mature picture of God and a more realistic system of values may be able to achieve a more mature God relationship. This would offer the primary opportunity of the Church with the early adolescent individual. The adolescent also needs to find young adults in the Church with whom he can identify, and he needs to learn all he can about the historical and contemporary identity of his particular church and the symbols, practices, and disciplines of his particular faith. The more subtle concepts of God's creative and redemptive activity may have to wait until later but the human experiences of creation and redemption can have meaning for him.

Late Adolescence

(Age sixteen to ?)

I. The changing individual and his changing environment.

No clear line can be drawn between early and late adolescence and many writers make no distinction between them. Much that has been said here about early adolescence applies also to late adolescence. The chief reasons for noting a later stage is that in our culture adolescence tends to be prolonged for several years after physical, emotional, and intellectual maturity is reached. This can mean a period of stabilization and organization of the tasks which have been begun in early adolescence and the gradual transition to adult-type and adult-oriented patterns of life. Some adult-type patterns emerge in late adolescence although the orientation of life tends to be more toward adolescence than adulthood.

The individual may reach the peak of his growth in stature at sixteen (girls) to eighteen (boys) (67). At eighteen he reaches his peak of general intelligence (67) and he should be physically, emotionally, and intellectually ready for the responsibilities of adult life, although often he is not. The environment that he experiences may tend to keep him immature, although its expectations toward his behavior tend to be inconsistent and clear patterns are difficult to find. Many things may keep him from adult status--lack of vocational opportunities, need for more education, unresolved adolescent problems in himself, parental domination, etc. He has the capacity to experience an adult world, but his status may keep him in an "interim" world.

II. Interactions between the individual and his world.

The kinds of interactions open to the older adolescent may vary widely. In general, there is a movement toward closer relations with his family which combine both more freedom and more responsibility than characterized his earlier relations. He is no longer dependent for status and approval from his parents, but he experiences and expresses some strong emotional ties to them. Some conflicts may continue concerning appropriate degrees of parental authority over him. In relation to his peers he is less dependent upon a "clique" or in-group and is more selective of his friends and more intimate with the friends he has (79). He is able to participate in more give and take with his friends and to be less conforming in his relations to them. He continues to need his peer group, however, for many of the same reasons as the early adolescent.

The tasks of mastery which confront the older adolescent are crucial if he is to move on to a responsible participation in the adult world. He must master the knowledge and skills necessary for his vocation; he must learn to use his intelligence and to control his emotions in ways which will permit effective work and relations with others; he must develop the social skills and personal strengths which are needed to find a mate and establish a successful marriage. He has available educational, social, and personal resources to help him in these tasks if he can make use of them.

Perhaps his most crucial problem is the continuing struggle to find his own identity (29). A satisfying vocational choice depends upon reconciling his growing sense of identity with the opportunities which are available to him. His establishment of a marriage requires the development of a sense of his own identity and integrity that is secure enough not to be seriously threatened by the give and take of married life. The choice of a life partner procedes most favorably if he has come to know himself in close relationships with the opposite sex and to know what kind of person he really wants as a mate. The development of a consistent and realistic set of values is dependent upon his knowing what he wants and where he wants to go in life and what values will fit these desires and ambitions. The establishment of such identity is a long process of testing and exploring of the self in relationships.

The older adolescent continues to live with many of the same conflicts and anxieties as the younger adolescent. Hopefully, he is not as shaken by them and has learned how to use more of the resources available to him to meet them. Some of the problems will continue to be with him for many years to come. The special problems of status in adolescence will tend to disappear as he is accepted into the adult world, but status will continue to be a problem in a status-oriented culture. Success and failure will continue to be high in the value system, as will performance. Resolution of the problem of his own identity in relation to a value system that transcends his particular culture, however, will permit some freedom from the restraints of a "price-tag" culture.

III. Patterns of organization of the self and its world.

The primary task ~~of~~ the older adolescent is to differentiate and organize his phenomenal self in relation to a system of values that will promote his optimum growth. The tasks of late adolescence have been summarized by Tryon and Lilienthal (111, pp. 84-87):

1. Achieving an appropriate dependence-independence pattern--

   Establishing one's self as an independent individual in an adult manner.

2. Achieving an appropriate giving-receiving pattern of affection--

   Building a strong mutual affectional tie with a (possible) marriage partner.

3. Relating to changing social groups--

   Adopting an adult-patterned set of social values by learning a new peer code.

4. Developing a conscience--

   Learning to verbalize contradictions in moral codes, as well as discrepancies between principle and practice, and resolving these in a responsible manner.

5. Learning one's psycho-socio-biological sex role--

   Exploring possibilities for a future mate and acquiring 'desirability'.
   Choosing an occupation.
   Preparing to accept one's future role in manhood or womanhood as a responsible citizen of the larger community.

6. Accepting and adapting to a changing body--

   Learning appropriate outlets for sexual drives.

7. Developing an appropriate symbol system and conceptual abilities--

   Achieving the level of reasoning of which one is capable.

8. Relating one's self to the cosmos--

   Formulating a workable belief and value system.

IV. Significant developments for faith.

The acceptance of change in one's self and the world is perhaps less important at this stage than the utilization of abilities which have already developed and the world which is at hand to differentiate and organize the self in the direction of growth.

The continued development of trust is defined in terms of the realistic differentiation of what can be expected from the self and the world and the organization of these expectancies into a workable pattern of adjustment and growth. It is our assumption that such realistic differentiation would mean a serious confrontation of the individual with the limitations of his own resources and his world, as well as its potentialities. These potentialities and limitations pose for us the question of God and His values which was raised in the theological portion of this study. In these terms, full growth would not be possible apart from the acceptance of a relationship of trusting dependence upon God as a source of values transcending finite limitations and a power for actualizing finite potentialities in the face of the inconsistencies and ambiguities of human existence. Conceivably other value systems might serve some of the same purposes but it is the testimony of the Christian Church that Jesus Christ reveals the God who is ultimately dependable and incarnates the values of His eternal kingdom. It is the task of the Church to mediate the reality of the

Christlike God to persons who are searching for the meaning and value of their own existence. This task becomes relevant to the search of the older adolescent for his own identity as the Church is able to make it relevant. The various tasks in which the older adolescent is involved need to be recognized by the Church and its program, but the opportunity to meet him where he is in his search for identity before God should be the Church's primary concern.

Adulthood

The limits of this study have suggested that our developmental outline end with late adolescence. Obviously the development of faith does not stop here. Growth toward the optimum faith conceived in Chapter V continues, ideally, throughout life, and each phase of life has its own developmental tasks. The continuation of this outline through all periods of life is a project for the future, however. At this point we want merely to indicate the relevance of the developmental approach to study of the adult years.

The same questions which have been raised for the periods of life discussed thus far are important for the later stages. A study of the faith of a man in middle life, for example, would want to ask what changes he had experienced in his own person--physical, emotional, and mental--and also what changes he had experienced in his total environment. The interactions of these various changes and their meaning to Mr. A., our middle-aged man, would also be important and could be studied in the various areas of behavior which have been emphasized previously--patterns of social behavior, mastery over self and the environment, status and role, value system, conflict and anxiety, and general patterns of organization of the self and self-world relationships. Such developmental data would then need to be evaluated to provide an estimate of the extent of Mr. A's "acceptance of personal existence before God." The following questions might enter into such an evaluation:

1. What are the potentialities and limitations for Mr. A's growth which continue in middle life from previous periods of development?
2. How accurate and comprehensive are Mr. A's perceptions of his previous development and the present changes in himself and his world?
3. How adequate are his efforts to include these perceptions in the organization of himself and his world?
4. How effective is the organization of his world in the maintenance and promotion of his growth?

The data which have been suggested and their evaluation should give some idea of the potentialities and limitations of Mr. A's growth in middle life and the extent to which he is accepting such potentialities and limitations. Additional data would be needed, however, to evaluate the extent of his

Christian growth. We would need to know about his past and present growth in the knowledge and love of God and his practice of a Christian life. If data concerning his opportunities for such growth could be obtained, questions similar to those suggested above could be used to evaluate his use of such opportunities.

Goals of Growth

The growth of Mr. A. or any other adult toward maturity needs to be viewed in the light of both psychological and theological goals of growth. Growth is dynamic and moves toward something. It has direction, and the direction can be defined in terms of goals. Goals may be both positive and negative, and criteria are needed to determine the difference between goals which may mean fulfillment for a particular person and those which may mean some form of destruction. Goals may be expressed in terms which are too ideal for attainment in existence as we know it, but they can suggest ideal potentialities which are derived from careful study of actual potentialities. Formulations of goals vary with the assumptions which the author of a particular statement holds concerning the nature of personality and his criteria of value. Two statements are included here to suggest the kinds of goals which may be derived from psychological study. Leon Saul's formulation grows primarily out of his study and experience in psychoanalysis. His views may be summarized (91):

1. Independence from the parent.

   This assumes a satisfactory solution of the problem of the drive to be free and independent vs. the regressive attraction to return to the protection and dependence of childhood. Such a solution implies the ability to maintain function even in the face of great frustration.

2. Increased productive capacities and decreased receptive needs.

   This requires a well-proportioned balance of productivity with the enjoyment of play, dependence, receiving, and other respites from independence, responsibility, and giving.

3. Relative freedom from the constellation of inferiority feelings, egotism and competitiveness.

   Such freedom is made possible by finding adequate satisfactions from the enjoyment of productive use of powers and of relationships which are basically parental, kindly, and cooperative rather than competitive.

4. Adequate conditioning and training for socialization and domestication.

   The crucial problem is that of conscience. Solution of this problem means a conscience that is integrated with and supportive of biological development toward parental attitudes. Such integration and support makes possible the finding of the major pleasures of life in the exercise of the adult capacity for productivity and loving.

5. Achievement of the 'genital level' of sexual development with a mature capacity for 'object interest' in people and things outside oneself and a capacity for love and productivity, both social and sexual.

   This implies an integration in a proper balance of the needs for love, self-love, and self-interest with a high degree of enjoyment of the loving, activities, and interest-responsibility involved in relationships to loved ones, work, and friends.

6. Re-direction of hostile, aggressive impulses and energies into parental and creative channels.

   The problem is to make aggression available for constructive and productive patterns rather than for infantile and sadistic ones which are destructive of self and/or others.

7. A firm sense of reality.

   Especially important is a grasp of the nature of personality and what one can expect from others.

8. Flexibility and adaptability.

   The basic problem is freedom from stereotyped reactions arising out of childhood patterns and the development of a capacity to use this freedom to make realistic adaptations to problems as they arise.

Gordon Allport, out of his years of study in various forms of psychology, has suggested three criteria of maturity (5):

1. A variety of psychogenic interests concerned with ideal objects and values beyond the range of viscerogenic desires.

2. Ability to objectify oneself--insight plus a sense of humor.

3. A unifying philosophy of life.

In Chapter V we suggested some of the necessary conditions for "optimum faith" in the light of the conceptual framework of our psychological study. Our goals for growth are primary theological, however, and have been defined in Jesus' statement of the two great love commandments. These two commandments imply an integration of the total personality in loving relationships with God, neighbor, and self. Such maturity, in the theoretical terms of this dissertation would require: (1) The kinds of experience which would provide opportunities for a comprehensive and realistic relationship to the love of God as expressed in Jesus Christ and in His total creative and redemptive activity; (2) Inclusion of such opportunities in the organization of the self and its relations to its world as the dynamic core of a life lived as a total response to God's love. Such a total response would be manifested in love-oriented social behavior, status and role patterns, value system, confidence, etc. It would require various kinds of complementary maturities, such as perceptual maturity to make possible recognition of and empathic response to the needs and feelings of persons (including oneself); communicative maturity to facilitate full sharing with other persons and with God on both verbal and non-verbal levels; and integrity to make possible participation of the total personality in love relationships. As Christian acceptance of personal existence it would include honest recognition of and humility and gratitude toward the potentialities and limitations of human existence before God.

In the light of the emphases of this study the primary task of the Church in helping persons grow toward Christian maturity is to provide or promote those kinds of interpersonal experience which will best communicate the love of God to individuals and groups and promote their efforts to organize their lives around His love.

Summary

In this chapter we have presented a psychological approach to the development of faith with some comments on the meaning of these developments for the work of the Church at each stage of development. The development of faith as defined in this study has been traced from conception through late adolescence. At each stage answers have been sketched for five questions: (1) What are the characteristics of the changing individual? (2) What are the changing characteristics of the environment as experienced by the developing individual? (3) What are the significant interactions between the individual and his environment? (4) What are the important patterns of the organization of the self and its self-world relationships? (5) What is the meaning of these developments for the acceptance of personal existence before God?

These questions can be restated in terms of their relations to our view of faith in order to see more clearly what has been done in this chapter. Theologically this view of faith has been stated, "Faith is the acceptance of personal existence before God." This definition has been stated for psychological purposes to mean the inclusion of all available aspects of reality in the operational organization of the phenomenal self and the phenomenal field. The questions of our developmental approach to faith attempt to determine some of the important aspects of reality to be included at each stage of development, reality being defined in terms of what seems to be "normal" development in our culture.

"The general characteristics of the developing individual" is the question of the maturational changes at each stage, with emphasis on those changes which affect the differentiation and organization of the self and the total field. "Changing characteristics of the environment as experienced by the individual" is the question of the changes in the scope of the environment made possible by maturation and the changes in the responses of other persons to the individual as he matures. "Interactions between the individual and his environment" refers to kinds of interactions which take place between the changing individual and his changing environment and the affects of these interactions upon the differentiation and organization of the self and the field. "Patterns of the organization of the self and the self-world relationships" summarizes some of the more gross patterns resulting from the interactions noted under the previous topic and defines the developmental tasks related to such patterns. The final question asks what has happened at each stage for faith development from both the psychological and theological point of view.

CHAPTER VII

A PERSON WITH FAITH PROBLEMS

Miss C. reported to her pastor that she felt she was "godless" and that she could not "have faith like other people." She wanted help. She wanted to be able to have faith. How could the pastor help her?

Miss C's story is presented in this chapter. The next chapter will seek to correlate the theological and psychological material of this study to illustrate how such a correlation contributes to the understanding of a person with faith problems and to pastoral work with such a person.

The story of Miss C. and her religious difficulties is included here both as an opportunity for practical application of the theoretical chapters and also to give more concrete meaning to those chapters. Her story, like the story of any real person, is not an illustration of ideal faith development. In many ways her development deviates from the norms which were suggested in the previous chapters. Some of her problems were so serious that she became one of those persons that our society categorizes as "abnormal," but the problems she experienced differed only in the degree of severity from those of many "normal" people. The understanding of her development and her problems can be approached in the same way as the understanding of the development of a more "normal" person.

The material for this life history comes from various sources. Most of it comes from memories and impressions of her life which Miss C. reported to her pastor, a chaplain in a mental hospital (the writer), in interviews which took place over a period of almost four years. Other material comes from the interviews of the pastor with members of Miss C's family and from hospital records concerning Miss C. and her family. In Appendix C a psychological evaluation of Miss C. by a clinical psychologist will be included to provide another source of interpretation of her personality and her interpersonal relations.

The two types of data will be kept separate in this chapter in so far as possible, and it will be indicated which material comes from Miss C. and which came from other sources.

Family Background

Mary Entwell Conley[1] was the first child of a marriage between two schoolteachers. Both parents were well educated for the communities in which they lived. Mr. Conley held a college degree in agriculture but had a strong interest in teaching. Both parents also had a strong interest in religion. The father, however, was viewed by his family as a "fanatic."

There is a history of emotional disorders on the father's side of the family. His grandmother was a morphine addict, and he and one of his brothers were hospitalized for mental illness. Mr. Conley was committed for two short periods to the hospital in which his daughter later became a patient. His hospital record discloses that he was brought up in a very authoritarian home and revolted against his parents in order to follow what he felt was a religious mission. In his late teens there was sufficient evidence of emotional disturbance in relation to his religious ideas to cause him to be committed to a mental hospital for thirteen months. He retained his ideas of a religious mission throughout his life, however, and was hospitalized again for a short period twenty-three years after his first commitment. He spent the rest of his life on "furlough," returning to the hospital for only one more short admission. The conditions of his "furlough" required that he remain away from his family and that his financial affairs be handled by a "committee" appointed by the court. He had inherited some money from his mother which took care of his material needs, and he spent the remaining years of his life living with or near various relatives and distributing religious literature.

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[1] All names are fictitious.

There is no evidence of mental illness in the mother's family. Members of the hospital staff, however, characterized the members who were known to them as "quite neurotic." The Entwell family was known to be rather rigid and moralistic.

Birth and Early Infancy

1. Data from hospital records and family members.

Mary Conley was born in 1915 in her grandmother's home. The birth occurred spontaneously after a prolonged labor in which the mother was heavily sedated. After birth the infant had difficulty for a short time establishing a breathing pattern.

At the time of her birth her father was away teaching school and did not come to see the infant until she was three weeks old. However, there were several adult members of the Entwell family present in the home who were very interested in the new baby.

The infant had feeding problems from the beginning of her life. She had to be fed frequently and showed little appetite. She slept poorly but was a "quiet" baby.

Mrs. Conley took care of her child for the first eighteen months. She and the infant stayed in the Entwell home, and the other adults in the home helped with the care. In the fall of the second year of the infant's life Mrs. Conley returned to her work as a teacher and was with Mary only on week ends. Mr. Conley visited infrequently and did not seem to be interested in his daughter. When Mrs. Conley returned to teaching, one of her sisters, Grace, assumed the responsibility for the care of the child under the supervision of the grandmother. The mother continued to do the necessary sewing for Mary.

Mary was a small child who did not eat well and did not seem to grow properly. She began to walk at ten months and to talk at thirteen. Her toilet training was "easy."

2. Miss Conley's impressions of her birth and infancy.

Miss Conley mentioned the breathing difficulties which she was reported to have had after delivery and associated these with the heavy sedation of her mother. She said that she had had problems in eating since the beginning of her life, and she thought she may have experienced difficulty in breast feeding. With some pride she talked of learning to walk and talk at an early age. She pictured herself as a very small child who could walk under tables and disappear from the view of the adults in the home. She believed that she was the center of much attention in her grandmother's home but that things went wrong between her and her mother from the very beginning.

Early Childhood

This stage of Miss Conley's life can be said to have lasted from the time she was eighteen months old until she reached the age of seven. Her verbal patterns were probably well established by eighteen months, and there was no significant change in her environment until she was seven. For physical reasons, she was not permitted to enter school at the usual age.

1. Data from the hospital records and family members.

Mary was under the care of her Aunt Grace and her grandmother for the first seven years of her life. Her mother continued to teach school, and she and the father were present in the home only on week ends or during school vacations.

The family looked upon Mary as a "weak and sickly" child. Appetite and eating problems continued and she did not seem to grow properly. She had many "sore throats" during the winters and often these meant a high fever. When she had the measles, this proved to be a real illness and she ran an extremely high temperature. At the age of four she began to show signs of rheumatism and some nervous difficulty. She was taken to a doctor who said that she had some thyroid trouble and rheumatism. He advised that she be kept out of school until she was nine years old and that she not be permitted to engage in active play. Her rheumatic spells and tonsilitis continued, however. She was not permitted to play with other children except on rare occasions, and when she did play with others she tended to become very "keyed up." If her play was not limited she would play very hard for a day or two and become over-excited, elated, and unable to rest. Then she would become physically exhausted, apathetic, and inactive for a few days. Most of the time she played by herself or with adults. She developed a fear of becoming soiled in the activities of other children and was an unusually clean child.

Miss Conley's physical history also includes a "bad fall" from the porch of her grandmother's home at age four or five. She fell on her head, suffered nausea and vomiting, and was unconscious for about an hour. The significance of this fall for her development is not known.

2. Miss Conley's memories and impressions

Although Miss Conley looks upon the first seven years of her life as the happiest years of her life, her specific memories tend to be unhappy ones.[1]

She reported only a few memories of her mother and none of her father for this part of her life. In at least two interviews she recalled an early Christmas. Her memory was that she received nothing from her mother but a made-over doll dress, and she remembered feeling very disappointed. As a child, she could not let her mother touch her, and she thought this difficulty had begun very early. One of her strongest impressions was that her mother believed she could not learn and took her to a doctor because of this. Her mother was very critical of her thinking and learning ability and made her feel very unhappy and inadequate. It seemed that no matter what she did she could not please her mother, and at times she became very angry toward her. On one such occasion she kicked her mother in the stomach.

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[1] The mood of her memories tended to vary with the predominant mood of her phenomenal field.

Miss Conley had rather mixed impressions about her relations to the other adult members of her mother's family. On the whole she thought that they gave her a great deal of attention and "spoiled" her. During those years she sometimes felt "like some kind of queen" and was "sure that everyone loved children." She tended to have particularly pleasant impressions of her Aunt Grace, her Uncle Herbert, and her grandmother. At times she recalled her relations to these persons with great nostalgia and longed for restoration of those early relationships. Her Aunt Grace was the central figure of her life, and she thought that, on the whole, her aunt treated her very well although she punished her occasionally. Specifically, she was punished rather severely one day because she walked across the room to the hired man and grabbed his trousers in the region of his penis. She hurt him; he screamed; and her aunt punished her. Such experiences made her feel that there was something shameful about sex and that sexual interests and experiences must be kept hidden. When a "moron" who was working on the farm made sexual approaches to her, she knew it was wrong and felt insulted but did not dare tell her aunt. There were other occasions for punishment, too, such as slapping a little boy across the face, riding horses "boy style," and talking and acting like her Uncle Herbert.

Miss Conley described her Uncle Herbert as an unconventional kind of person who was quite different from the other members of the family. His language and conduct were often disapproved by the others. Mary, however, enjoyed being with him and often wished that he were her father. Uncle Herbert would take her places and buy gifts for her, ride horses with her, etc. Mary liked to copy his language and behavior but found that this brought her criticism or punishment from other adults.

The limitations on her play with other children troubled Mary at times. She remembered feeling very lonely and wishing for playmates, but the relations she did have with other children were problems to her. She easily became "agitated" and she seemed somehow to get other children into trouble when she played with them. She would encourage activities which were considered dangerous or inappropriate by the watching adults. In various ways she felt different from other children. In some ways she thought she was superior to them because her mother was so critical of other families and other children. Her family was, in her eyes, better than the others. In other ways Mary felt quite inferior to other children. She was sure she could not learn; she thought she was weak and sickly and "homely;" and she knew that she did not have a home with a father and mother like other children.

Miss Conley did not describe many activities during her years on her grandmother's farm. Her favorite sport was riding horses, which she liked to do "boy style." When she was too small to mount from the ground, she would climb up on a fence post and mount from there. She enjoyed the amazement of the adults who could not understand how she could get on the horse.

Toward the end of this period of her life Miss Conley began to wish very strongly that her father and mother would establish a home of their own and that they could be together as a family. She wanted to "have a family like other children." When this actually came to pass, she believed that somehow she had brought it about.

Late Childhood and Adolescence

These periods are taken together to include, for Miss Conley, the years that she lived with her father and mother, from age seven to age seventeen. Her memories of this period tend to run together and can best be reconstructed in terms of a relatively unified period of time.

1. Miss Conley's memories and impressions

When Mary Conley was seven years old, her father decided to give up teaching in order to live on a small farm and raise chickens. Mary's mother also gave up full-time teaching in order to make a home for the family.

Mary soon regretted the move. Life with her father was not pleasant. He was more concerned with his religious ideas than with raising chickens and taking care of a farm, and he tried to force his religious ideas on the family. He believed that poverty was a necessity and the things of the world were not to be enjoyed. Luxuries such as ice cream were forbidden, and seasoning was not permitted in the food if Mr. Conley could prevent it. A bread and water diet was sometimes used as a form of punishment for disobedience. Bible reading was a required part of family life, and the father preferred sections having to do with guilt and punishment. It seemed to Mary that, at times, he would "preach" to the family for an hour about their "sins" and the certainty of Hell's punishment. A strong distinction was made between the "worldly," which was wicked and must be forsaken, and the "godly," which was good and must be followed. Obedience to duty was an important part of the "godly" life, and any failure on Mary's part to fulfill her duty was severely punished. Her friends must also be "godly," and Mary was not allowed to play with a girl who would not get down on her knees and pray.

Mr. Conley's disciplinary methods were severe. Mary was placed on the bread and water diet for as long as three days at a time for failure to do her chores. Whippings were the most common punishment, however, and were vividly recalled. Mary's father believed that she had been "spoiled" by her grandmother and that it was his duty to remedy her poor training. Sometimes he would whip her in anger, but he preferred to have her come to his room early in the morning in her nightgown in order to receive her whipping for some misbehavior of the previous day.

Mary could find little encouragement or comfort in her mother. At times Mrs. Conley would protest against her husband's disciplinary methods and received some of the blows which were intended for Mary. But when her mother tried to comfort her, Mary could not let her come near her physically; and most of her memories of her mother were unpleasant. Mary believed that her mother was always "fussing at her" and that there was much argument and anger between her and her mother. No matter what she did she felt she could not satisfy her mother and she found little encouragement to do anything around the house. Sometimes Mary became so angry with her mother that she wanted to hurt her or destroy things that belonged to her mother. Occasionally she did take out her anger on her mother's possessions.

Looking back on her relationship with her mother in these years, Miss Conley suggested that she tried to compete with her mother but could not succeed. Instead she became more and more convinced that she could not learn and that she did not belong in such a smart family. Her mother's standards were too high for her to meet. Her mother particularly wanted her to be a "proper little lady," and this Mary could not be no matter how hard she tried, and often she did not feel like trying. She felt guilty about her own failures, but also believed that her mother blamed her for anything that went wrong around the house. She felt "crushed" by her mother and her demands, but also wanted to compete with her mother and tried to do it by "outtalking" her. Mary thought that she became a talkative person in order to try to impress people and to convince them that she did have "good sense."

During these years Mary felt that she was in the middle of a bitter conflict between her father and mother. Her parents argued about discipline and about religion, among other things. Tension became so strong that Mr. Conley refused to eat at the table with his wife. Mary was required to wait on him while he ate, but she was never quite sure when or where she was supposed to eat, and she found this to be a very troubling experience.

After two years of family life on the farm, a second child was born to the Conleys--a boy, Hiram. Even though Mary had longed for a brother or sister during her years at her grandmother's house, she did not find that the coming of her brother brought her any happiness. As she saw it, both parents preferred the second child to her, and she could not play with him or share his world. She remembered no feelings of hatred toward him, but she recalled feelings of guilt for rocking his cradle so hard that he fell on the floor. She also remembered thinking that if her brother had not been born the family might have separated and she might have been able to live elsewhere.

Increasingly Mary's desire was to leave her father and mother and to return to live with her Aunt Grace. She saw her Aunt Grace and her grandmother Entwell as her refuge and hope. She felt so strongly that her Aunt Grace should do something to take her out of her troubles that she developed some feelings of resentment toward her aunt for not taking action. She was able to spend some summers and other brief periods with her aunt, but she wanted more. When she was with her own family, she "tried to hang on" and "stand things" until something would happen to take her out of her situation.

One of the things Mary wanted to do was to go to school. She had not been permitted to enter school at the time other children did because of her health. When she was eight years old, however, she was permitted to go to a school in which her mother was teaching. She did not do well in this school and was removed. She spent part of the next year with her father's sister and was encouraged to attend school again. She made good grades but had to return home at the end of the school year. From this time on she attended school fairly regularly. There were many problems in her school life, but she was able to get along and by the time of her graduation from high school she ranked fourth in her class. She believed that she would have ranked higher if she had not suffered a few weeks in which her "mind went blank" during her last year of high school.

In school Mary had difficulty with the daily work but did well on the examinations. She daydreamed much of the time and received "demerits" for not paying attention. Reading was a problem for her. She read slowly, was easily distracted, and would often need to read materials several times in order to remember them. Getting started in her work was another problem. She believed that she could not learn and started slowly in her school work every year, but gradually improved as the year went along.

In high school Mary had a few girl friends of whom she was quite fond, and she enjoyed visiting them in their homes. She found their homes peaceful and pleasant in contrast to her own. There were no boy friends in her life because she believed that no boy would be interested in her and she was afraid that her father would not permit her to date a boy. She experienced one "crush" during her last year of high school. To her this was a serious experience, but she did not think the boy was interested in her and she did not dare express her feelings to anyone. She was shy and self-conscious and sensitive to being "teased." She was easily hurt if she thought other people were criticizing her. Her response to people who hurt her was to try to hurt them in return, but for the most part she stayed away from other people. Loneliness was a common and painful experience.

There were sexual as well as social problem in these years, but Miss Conley could not discuss them in detail, except in a sodium amytal interview which is reported in the next section of this history. She was able to describe sex as one of her greatest problems and to relate it to her feelings of "godlessness" in her adolescent years. She did recall experiences with an "old man" who was an occasional visitor at the house and had her visit him. He tried to stimulate her sexually, and even though she resisted his advances she also received some satisfaction from him. She felt that somehow she was responsible for the relationship.

The most traumatic events of her life on the family farm, as Miss Conley recalled it, were her experiences with her father during her junior year in high school. By this time her father was very much obsessed with his religious ideas. He began to think that God wanted him to kill his family, and Mary lived in great fear that he would carry this idea into action, although at times she wished he would. One week stands out strongly in her memory. Her mother and her brother went for a visit in the northern part of the state, leaving Mary to go to school and keep house for her father. It was early spring, and a heavy snow caused her mother to prolong the visit to a week. Mary was convinced that she had been left at the mercy of her father. She was both resentful toward her mother for this and fearful toward her father. During the week Mr. Conley ate almost nothing and spent most of the time in prayer. Nothing out of the way happened, but it was a week of terror for Mary. The following summer Mr. Conley was committed to a mental hospital. Mary felt relieved that he had been committed, but she also felt that the worst thing that could possibly happen to a person had happened to her father and she had a deep sense of shame about his commitment.

During the following year Mary suffered a short period of illness in which her "mind went blank" and she could not study. She was soon well enough to return to school and was able to finish the year and graduate from high school. After graduation her symptoms of mental illness increased, and she went to live with her Aunt Grace for a year until she was well enough to go to college.

2. Data from the hospital record and family members.

Mrs. Conley and Mrs. Green (Aunt Grace) both spoke to the chaplain-pastor about the religiosity and severe discipline which Mr. Conley forced on his family. Mr. Conley discussed the discipline himself in one of his staff interviews recorded in the hospital record. He said that he was convinced his daughter had been "spoiled" and it was his duty to remedy this. He whipped the child frequently, but it troubled him when he whipped her in anger, and he adopted the practice of postponing the punishment until early morning of the following day. He said he felt differently toward his son who had been under his control since birth.

Mr. Conley also testified to the poor relations between himself and his wife. He said his wife had a "right violent" temper. He refused to eat with her when he thought he had begun to develop a "cancer" on his face. When he stopped eating with her, the "cancer" went away. He said, "She was bitter, and you know when a woman is bitter what it means, and I just felt I would rather eat by myself. I couldn't eat very well when this unpleasant feeling existed."

Mrs. Conley told the chaplain-pastor that she, too, had to make a distinction between her daughter and her son. Referring to the family situation after her husband was hospitalized, she said that she had to make a decision. She felt that her daughter had her Aunt Grace to turn to and her son had "no one but me, and I had to choose him." Mrs. Conley noted that she had always been concerned about her daughter and wanted to do what she could for her, but Mary had always been "high-strung" and "nervous" and "hard to get along with." She and her son could not permit Mary to stay in their home as long as Mary had her "temper."

Mrs. Green (Aunt Grace) described Mary during adolescence as a "shy and bashful" girl who stayed away from boys, although in her preadolescent years she had enjoyed fighting with them. She did not learn to dance and did not take part in social activities. She tended to remain by herself and had few friends. Menstruation began at thirteen and was apparently a "shock" to Mary, although her mother had told her what to expect. Her periods tended to be rather irregular. In general behavior she tended to show patterns somewhat similar to those of early childhood. She would run when she might have walked. She had frequent periods of emotional instability and "temper tantrums" when she wanted to break things and injure people she loved. She had occasional "spells" of depression during which she was inactive, "blue," and discouraged.

A sodium amytal interview conducted during one of her periods of hospitalization in later life supplied some details concerning Miss Conley's adolescent and childhood sexual problems. Sex was the chief topic of this interview. Miss Conley reported that masturbation had long been a problem and that she had had a few experiences with the opposite sex--one with a boy who wanted to "kiss her private parts" when she was eight or nine, and another with the "old man," noted previously, who tried unsuccessfully to have intercourse with her.

A Resume of Miss Conley's Life from the Time of Her First Illness to the Beginning of Her Interviews with the Chaplain-Pastor

This period covers approximately twenty years. The available material will be summarized and sources indicated.

First illness.--After graduation from high school Miss Conley suffered from "melancholia," as she called it, for about a year. She was depressed, apathetic, ate poorly, and had no interest in life. After a few months she began to take an interest in some of the activities of her earlier life, especially horseback riding. By the end of the year she felt well enough to go to college. As noted earlier, she lived with her Aunt Grace during this period of illness.

College.--Miss Conley completed two years of college and was in her third year when she became ill again and returned to her aunt's home. She felt that her college work was not satisfactory even though she was not failing any of her courses until she became ill. The fact that she completed as much college as she did, however, was a source of pride to her, and she wished many times that she could finish her college education. During part of her career in college she worked to earn part of her expenses, and she thought that the combination of trying to work and study was too much for her. She did have some time for friendships and had one close friend with whom she continued to maintain a relationship after college.

Second illness.--When Miss Conley returned to her aunt's home during her second period of "melancholia," she found the situation there much changed. Her aunt had married a man who had two children by a previous marriage. Mary had not approved of the marriage and was uncertain about returning to her aunt's home under these conditions, but she did not know anywhere else to go.

According to her aunt, Miss Conley suffered with "melancholia" for about eighteen months after her departure from college. She spent much time in bed for the first twelve months in a "deeply depressed" condition. She embroidered a little but otherwise was relatively inactive. She did, however, have some violent "temper tantrums" and on one occasion tried to set the house on fire.

During the time of her second illness, Miss Conley was an out-patient in the psychiatric clinic of a nearby hospital. In interviews at the clinic she described herself as "worn out" from trying to study and work too much at school. She said she wanted to do something like social service work, but she was afraid of life, afraid of the world, and afraid of people. She would have liked to marry, but she had a fear of men. Her view of herself was that she was too unstable and too objectionable to people to be able to do much of anything in life--she was socially and intellectually inadequate and felt like a "moron."

Attempts to adjust.--Miss Conley continued her contacts with the out-patient clinic over the next four years. She was not seen consistently by any one doctor and she developed no intensive relationship with a psychiatrist. Her visits to the clinic were irregular during part of this period. Some of the material recorded at that time is of interest.

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Miss Conley at one time described herself as "two people"--one person who had lived with her grandmother and aunt for the first seven years, and another person who had lived in her father's home. She said her present life seemed unreal and dreamlike. There were times when she did not believe in God and hated people, and there were other times when she felt happier, believed in God, and thought people were all right. She did not know where she should live and experienced conflict about whether to say with her aunt or to go to live with her mother and brother. The situation at her Aunt Grace's home was difficult, and she described her aunt's step-daughter as being "as fast as a girl can be" and complained about the step-son being disrespectful to her aunt.

Miss Conley also discussed her relations with her aunt's step-children in her interviews years later with the chaplain-pastor. She recalled that she was much troubled by their "immorality" during the years in which she lived with them; but she was also attracted to them. The stepdaughter, Connie, was especially attractive to her and she developed a "crush" toward her. This "crush" was carried into action during a period in which Connie, who was afraid of the dark, asked to sleep with Mary. Occasionally when Connie would come home intoxicated, Mary would embrace her and eventually masturbate her. In recalling these experiences, Miss Conley showed much internal agitation and difficulty in communication.

Another important sexual experience occurred during the years after Miss Conley's second illness. She told the chaplain-pastor of a neighboring man whom she considered "crazy," but whom she dated nevertheless. Her aunt and her mother disapproved of the relationship, but she continued it for some time and sexual contact proceeded to the point of attempted intercourse. The affair was ended when Mary hurt the man's feelings so deeply that he did not come back to see her.

With the coming of the second World War, Miss Conley developed some new interests beyond herself and her family. When her brother entered the Air Corps, she went to work in a silk mill saying, "If my brother has to fly, I can help make parachutes." Her family was against her doing this kind of work, but she was determined to see it through. She moved to the town where the silk mill was located and returned to visit with her aunt only on week ends. The work was hard for her. Being on her feet all day was an ordeal for her, and her back troubled her; and yet she stayed with it, working in the mill for eight years. Looking back at her working years, Miss Conley estimated that she was less tense in those years than at any other period of her life. She didn't like the work, but she liked most of the people with whom she worked, although she did not come to know any of them well; and she liked making her own money.

Third Illness.--Symptoms of illness appeared from time to time during Miss Conley's work years, particularly in the form of thoughts that people were talking about her; but more serious symptoms appeared after one of her visits to her aunt's home. On that visit, according to her aunt, a cousin angrily compared Mary's work to that of a "French prostitute." Mary seemed to become preöccupied with the idea of being a prostitute, thought everyone was thinking evil things about her, and lost interest in her work and her activities. The symptoms of her illness were brought to the attention of a physician in the family who referred her to a hospital for treatment.

Miss Conley went first to the out-patient clinic in which she had been seen previously, but hospitalization was recommended. The records of her hospital stay indicate that she remained in the hospital about three months and received both insulin coma and electroshock treatments. It was during this hospitalization that she participated in the sodium amytal interview which has been mentioned earlier. This interview included information about her sexual history, which has been noted, and some other details about her sexual concerns at the time of the interview. These concerns tended to focus on her ways of looking at men and women. She was interested in the arm pits, the breasts, and the buttocks. Concerning her ways of looking she said, "I seem to have a longing to look up things. I always start at the bottom of things. I always look at the bad of everything." She went on to say that she thought she might have been able to get along with her aunt and other people better if she had not always been looking at bad things. She said the reason she looked at "bad things" was "because I thought I would beat God at the game. I did not really believe He was punishing me. I have never really believed very much in God. I guess He stood for Daddy and Mother."

During this hospitalization, Miss Conley was given some psychological tests which showed rigidity of personality, sexual disturbance, paranoid trends, and a schizoid type of social adjustment. A copy of the psychological report is to be found in Appendix C.

Interim.--When she was released from the hospital, Miss Conley returned to her aunt's home because she did not know where else to go. She continued to live there for the rest of the year. Then she made an unsuccessful attempt to work at the silk mill again. She made several other efforts to find a place for herself away from her Aunt Grace, but all of these were short-lived. Her relationships with Aunt Grace and her family became increasingly difficult and she felt she could not remain there. Another aunt offered her a home, but symptoms of her illness continued to interfere with any satisfactory adjustment and increasingly she talked of going to the state mental hospital in which her father had been a patient. Finally, she threatened to commit suicide unless her family took her to the hospital, and steps were taken to have her committed.

Miss Conley's impressions of her relationships during this interim period will be discussed in relation to her interviews with the chaplain in the hospitalization which followed.

Second hospitalization.--Miss Conley's commitment papers stated that she was committed because she "threatens suicide and is dangerous to herself and others." She was described as having had delusions, being quick tempered, and suspicious; and it was stated that "she has turned against her family and has been sexually inclined, thinking that men are interested in her when they are not."

The course of her hospitalization can be described briefly. Physical examination, tests, and x-rays showed no abnormalities except a possible carcinoma of the cervix. The electroencepholographic report indicated a possibility of a "minor focal change in the left temporal area," but there was no confirmation of this possibility. The treatment program for Miss Conley included occupational and recreational therapy, sub-coma insulin, and various tranquilizers. After seven months in the hospital she was "furloughed" to live with her Aunt Rose, the aunt with whom she had been living prior to her commitment. After two months of "furlough" she returned to the hospital. Toward the end of her third year of hospitalization she received another "furlough" to live with a friend of her father's side of the family. She was out of the hospital six weeks at this time. Soon after her return to the hospital she was placed on "family care" with a family who lived on a farm a few miles from the hospital. This arrangement lasted for four months. After two more months in the hospital a "furlough" plan was worked out with another farm family. Miss Conley was to live with this family and help part-time in a shop operated by the family in town. This plan was in effect at the time of termination of her relationship with the chaplain-pastor six months later.

Miss Conley's Interpretations of Herself and Her World as Reported to Her Pastor

A few months after her admission to the state hospital, Miss Conley requested an interview with the hospital chaplain. After the first interview it was agreed that regular talks might be helpful. Miss Conley asked that no definite appointments be made and that she be free not to talk when she did not feel "up to it." Interviews were held weekly on Miss Conley's ward, unless she requested otherwise and it was agreed to omit one or more sessions. While she was on "family care" and during her last "furlough" period, Miss Conley returned to the hospital once a month to talk with the chaplain in his office.

Some of the more important interpretations of herself and her world which Miss Conley communicated in her interviews can be summarized here.

Miss Conley's initial focus was on herself as a "godless" person lacking a "religious" life. She felt that she could not "have faith like other people" and she was concerned about the many difficulties she had trying to live with herself and with other people. She was depressed much of the time and saw no hope for a better or happier life. At times she wanted to die or "go completely crazy" in order to suffer less. She had many physical complaints. "Acting funny" was one of her biggest problems. She could not state very clearly what this meant, but it was connected with the way she "grinned" and looked at people and seemed to have a sexual connotation. It was also related to the inward agitation she felt whenever she experienced strong emotion or desire. Sometimes her angry feelings would show and she would say and do things which she later regretted. Temper was one of her big problems, and she could not understand why she was such a resentful person and why her thoughts and actions were so often dominated by hate. At times she said it must be some kind of inherited "craziness," and at other times she thought she must be "possessed by the devil." In many of her interviews she expressed a readiness to give up trying to struggle with her problems any more, but she was almost always ready to look at them again the next week.

Her interpersonal world was a complex and rather unrewarding one. The most important persons were the members of her family, especially her Aunt Grace. She longed desparately to be able to return to live with her aunt, and even though she realized that this was impossible under the existing circumstances, she kept expressing this desire. No other plan of life could hold the same attraction for her. Many interpersonal problems, however, kept her from having a satisfying relationship with her aunt. Miss Conley expressed strong ambivalence toward her aunt. She could not decide whether her aunt was for her or against her. At times she saw her as a kind person who would do anything she could for her, and at other times she saw her aunt as dominating person determined to destroy her reputation wherever she went. Strong feelings were attached to both pictures. The problems in relation to Aunt Grace's husband and step-children complicated the whole picture. Miss Conley was convinced that Mr. Green, her aunt's husband, had been sexually interested in her and had tried to kiss her but now was intent on killing her. She was sure that his real interest in her was the money she had inherited from her paternal grandmother's estate after her father's death. Much of her concern focussed on this money and the role she felt it played in her relations with Aunt Grace and her family, who might get most of it if Miss Conley should die. The problems involved in these relationships had become so strong that she could not be in the same room with Mr. Green without becoming inwardly agitated, and sometimes her visits with her Aunt Grace in the hospital had a similar effect.

The other members of the family were less important than Aunt Grace but still of more significance than any non-family persons. Miss Conley longed for some kind of reconciliation with her mother and brother but felt that this was impossible. She tended to return again and again to problems in the past in relation to her mother and to show continued resentment toward her mother. She worried about her brother, who had not married and continued to live with his mother. Her fear was that he would go "crazy" unless he could establish an independent life.

In the hospital, particularly the section in which her father had been a patient, Miss Conley was often reminded of her father. Her memories of him were mostly unpleasant, but sometimes she felt that he did care for her in his way. She had some pleasant memories of members of his family and occasionally wondered if some plan of life might not be worked out for her with one of them.

Miss Conley could not conceive of life apart from her family, and yet she could not be comfortable with them when she did visit them. She agonized over her dependence upon her family but could not see any other pattern of life for herself.

Relationships within the hospital were also difficult. Miss Conley could not stay on any ward very long without finding one or more patients with whom she was in conflict.

Sometimes it was her quick temper that created problems. Other times it was a patient who seemed to be overly critical or one who became overly parasitic. On occasion it was an attendant or an occupational therapy aide with whom she felt conflict. When the interpersonal tension became strong, Miss Conley would begin to think about plans for life outside the hospital, but when faced with possible plans she would be unable to make a decision and would express her dependence upon the hospital. She felt that the hospital was a refuge for her and a place in which she could have some friendships and some activities which were pleasant. She did have some continuing friendships with a few patients, and a few of these developed into "crushes" which had to be hidden from everyone but the chaplain. There were also activities such as card playing, reading, sewing, and the church services that she enjoyed. The mixed activities in which she needed to relate to men were very difficult, however, and whenever she tried to participate in them she became very self-conscious and thought that other patients were talking about her.

In her periods of "furlough" or "family care" Miss Conley tended to be very lonely and to be depressed by the differences she saw between herself and "normal" people. At first she would feel a great gulf between herself and the family with whom she was staying. She felt that she had never been part of a "normal" family and did not belong in the same house with "normal" people. She missed her friends and the activities in the hospital and found it hard to develop interest in anything in the new situation. When she came to know the family with whom she was staying, however, she tended to become involved in their problems as well as her own in relating to them. Then she would feel overwhelmed and helpless to cope with the combination of problems. She tended to associate problems in her new environment with vaguely similar situations in her past and to show the same kind of reactions as she had in the past. Her general pattern was to try to keep her ideas and feelings to herself and to try to "hang on" and "stand things" and wait for some new development which might improve her situation. When she saw no hope of improvement, she wanted to return to the hospital or move to a new home.

Work outside the hospital was also a problem. Miss Conley could work around a kitchen, do some house work, or work in a store as long as she felt no one was watching her, but as soon as she thought some one was watching her she began to feel that she was doing poorly and wanted to stop her work. It was difficult for her to take instruction from anyone, and some types of work she strongly resented because of resemblances to hated tasks she had performed in the past.

All of Miss Conley's concerns with herself and her world tended to revolve around certain basic questions "How could she live apart and estranged from her Aunt Grace? How could she build a life of her own? What kind of reconciliation was possible with her family? How could she find relief from her sufferings? What was there to live for? How could she be a different kind of person? How could she come to have faith? These questions were approached in many different ways in her conversations with her pastor. The next chapter will attempt to interpret the meaning of such questions in Miss Conley's life and the nature of the help which the pastor and the church offered to help her find answers.

CHAPTER VIII

CORRELATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL AND THEOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO THE UNDERSTANDING OF A PERSON WITH FAITH PROBLEMS

Introduction

The pastor needs to understand the faith problems of persons under his care as fully as he can. An effort to interpret the faith problems of Miss Conley in the light of the theories of this study may provide an example of the ways in which such theories can be of help to the pastor. All of the previous chapters of this dissertation contribute to this task.

The Task of Correlation

In the first chapter of this study a possibility of the correlation and a theological and a psychological approach of faith was suggested. In Part I we developed a theological framework for the meaning of faith. In Part II we have formulated a psychological framework for description of the role of faith in personality and its development. The story of Miss Conley now provides an opportunity to draw this material together in an effort to understand her and her faith problems from both the theological and psychological perspectives. We propose a two-fold task of correlation--to make use of both the theological and psychological frameworks to understand the faith of Miss Conley, without violating the limits of either discipline; and to relate this understanding to the living relationships of the pastor with Miss Conley.

A Preliminary View of Miss Conley's Faith

The description and evaluation of Miss Conley's faith is primarily a theological task. From this perspective we can see that there were some positive elements in her faith but also many negative ones. Our first theological definition of faith was, "a personal relationship with a Christlike God, characterized by a trusting dependence upon God and manifested in a Christian quality of life." Miss Conley had a personal relationship with God, but a limited and distorted relationship to a predominantly un-Christlike God. At all levels of her being she was involved in a relationship with God, but this relationship was lacking in unity and had many conflicting elements within it. The god to whom she was related was more like the parent-figures in her life than like Christ. She had a relation of dependence upon this "god," but she did not really trust "him" and her dependence was more childish and fantastic than adult and realistic. The quality of her life was a complex mixture of Christian, pseudo-Christian, and un-Christian attributes. The negative and disjunctive elements were more apparent than the positive and integrated elements, but some deep strivings toward a more Christian kind of life were present.

From the standpoint of faith as "acceptance of personal existence before God" we might emphasize that Miss Conley could not differentiate between the elements of her life which were of God and those that had been learned in the distorting processes of her interpersonal relationships. She could not accept herself any more than she could accept God because she had no way of knowing the essential reality of either. She lacked an effective relationship with God in Christ in which she might come to know the Christlike God and her own self as created and redeemed. The differentiations of herself and her world which she had accepted or included in her organization of her personal existence were limited and distorted by the kinds of interactions which had taken place between her and her world. Theologically, the most important limitations were a lack of interpersonal relationships which could have helped her to develop a readiness to respond to God in Christ and a lack of the kinds of relationships with the Christian community which could have helped her to experience the reality of God's creative and redemptive activity. The inadequacies of her relations to God and herself were reflected in the problems of her relations with other people. Not having accepted herself realistically before God, she could not offer much love to other persons and she could find little hope for life in either its temporal or eternal dimensions. Her life was strongly dominated by the circumstances of her interpersonal world and by her own impulses and anxieties, but she kept looking for a more adequate world which would permit and encourage her to grow in faith.

In more psychological terms we can note some of the inadequacies of Miss Conley's phenomenal self and phenomenal field which contributed to her faith problems. An "adequate phenomenal self" is one which is able to accept in its organization any and all aspects of reality available to it (101, p. 136). For our purposes this would also mean the acceptance of reality in such a way as to promote optimum Christian growth. Miss Conley's phenomenal self was inadequate, as seen by her pastor, both functionally and normatively. Her self-organization was functionally inadequate in that important aspects of her "real" self and her relationships to her world could not be included in her phenomenal self and were suppressed to low levels of differentiation, denied, included in the "not-self" or in some other way excluded from the "self" portion of the phenomenal field. Her self-organization was normatively inadequate in that important aspects of her experience could not be included in realistic ways which would promote her Christian growth.

Miss Conley's phenomenal field was unusually limited in its scope. For many reasons she had not had the opportunity or had been unable to utilize available opportunities to experience important aspects of the "real" world.

The interactions between Miss Conley's phenomenal self and her phenomenal field were inevitably limited and distorted as an inadequate organization of the self had to be protected against the threats of experiences which were inconsistent with that organization. Perceptual and conceptual "sets" functioned to distort experience to protect the inadequate self; communication had to be limited or its meaning distorted in order to reduce threat; and the other phenomena which were discussed in relation to the experience of "threat" in Chapter V were operating to limit the reality of the relations of the self to its world.

Our task is to interpret some of the ways in which these theological and psychological dimensions of Miss Conley's faith problems developed. We want to make such interpretations in a way that will be meaningful for pastoral work; consequently we shall approach the various aspects of Miss Conley's development in somewhat the same manner as her pastor actually approached them. This means that we shall look first at the interpretations of her self and her world as she presented them to the pastor and then try to see what these interpretations mean in the light of her history. In the actual interviews of the pastor with Miss Conley this was a long and gradual process which followed her concerns of the moment rather than any conceptual pattern. We must force this material into a relatively organized system following the outline of our developmental approach, but we can, within the limits of this outline, adhere to the pastoral approach suggested above. We shall take the major questions of the developmental approach as topics under which to organize material for her whole life, rather than looking at them stage by stage.

A Pastoral Approach to Miss Conley's Development

1. Characteristics of her maturational development

Miss Conley saw herself as a person with many physical difficulties. She was convinced she could not learn and that she was "stupid." She also thought she must have some kind of inherited "craziness." The tests and examinations which were given her during her hospitalizations tended to discount her first two interpretations. She did have poor appetite and was underweight, but otherwise nothing could be found which was not within normal range or close enough to it to rule out the possibility that there were serious abnormalities in her physical development. Similarly, intelligence tests showed that she had above average intelligence. The possibility of hereditary influences in her illness needs to be recognized, but the "craziness" to which Miss Conley referred seems to mean emotional problems of anger, fear, guilt, anxiety, etc. from which she suffered; and these seemed to her pastor to be more learned than inherited.

Miss Conley's views of herself were the product of complex interactions with her environment over many years, but the available material on her maturation sheds some light on these views.

The pastor noted the birth difficulties and the possibility of anoxia or some other trauma in the prolonged labor. The appetite and sleep problems also may have affected physical development. The smallness of her stature and her physical problems constituted potential areas of difficulty which later became significant. Her energy patterns and her various illnesses may have had some relationship to her maturational processes, but the significance of these influences would need to be determined by a medical authority. In general, her maturation seems to have been within normal limits, and the significance of her physical, intellectual, and emotional problems needs to be seen in relation to other aspects of her development.

2. Changing characteristics of her environment as experienced by Miss Conley

As Miss Conley presented herself to her pastor, she was a person looking for a "home." She had an idealized picture of what "home" might mean and she could not accept many of the growth values of any environment in which she lived because of her attachment to her ideal. Yet, she tended to become dependent upon her environment and to look to it for protection and answers to her problems. She wanted very much to be part of a family, but she could not relate comfortably to her own family or identify herself with any other family. She wanted friends, but she found it hard to be friendly.

These and many other problems in relation to her environment cannot be understood fully by looking at the environments Miss Conley had experienced, but the limitations of these past environments do indicate some of the deviations of her experiential field from the norms suggested in Chapter VI. The scope of the environment in which she participated tended to be unusually limited and the kinds of changes were unfortunate, as well as the quality of the interpersonal environment in her family.

In the environment of her infancy and early childhood her experiences with her mother seemed to create problems from the very beginning of life. Her mother was not experienced by Miss Conley as an adequately nurturant person, and a sense of physical and emotional isolation from her mother seems to have developed very early. As she grew older she found her mother to be very demanding and critical and felt hopelessly inadequate to try to please her. Miss Conley found the other adults in her early environment to be much more affectionate and indulgent toward her. She came to feel that she was the center of their world, the "queen" in the household. They made demands upon her, but these demands were not too difficult to meet and there were many rewards. Aunt Grace and Uncle Herbert became the most important persons in her world, but they were not "real" parents and increasingly Miss Conley wished for a "real home." The fact was, however, that she remained in her grandmother's home for seven years. Because of her physical difficulties she was not permitted to go to school during those years and other children were a very small part of her world. The loneliness and the lack of opportunity to interact with other children in a wider world were important limitations of her childhood experience.

The environment of her late childhood and adolescence was, in some ways, a radical change. She was living with her parents, but she did not find them attentive to her, protective, or affectionate. Instead she found her father to be a stern and very demanding person who punished her severely for disobedience. He was cold but excitable and in his morbid religiosity forced a rigid and barren life upon her. Her mother was experienced as cold, critical, unprotective, excitable, morbid, and competitive. She was weak and ineffective in her attempts to meet her daughter's needs. The tension between the father and mother added to the disturbing aspects of the environment. When her brother appeared on the scene, he was experienced as an unwelcome competitor who had nothing to offer Mary.

The school environment widened the world when Miss Conley was able to attend, but school did not seem to make much change in the predominant characteristics of her world.

The academic opportunities were felt to be impossible demands which she could meet only under pressure. The social opportunities were very difficult for her to accept. The Church was part of the environment but was greatly overshadowed by the religious patterns of her parents.

The family constellation was broken when the father was committed to a mental hospital. The environment, however, became increasingly intolerable and sickness brought Miss Conley back to the "home" in which she had spent her early childhood. By this time the environment of her early years had been idealized and fantasized and had assumed great importance in her hopes and dreams. No actuality could fulfill that ideal.

College widened the world but was experienced as an intolerable burden after two and a half years. Again, there was some friendship but too many obstacles to be overcome.

The return to Aunt Grace in the second illness was a return to a world which was no more. Gone was the "queenly" relationship of childhood. In its place was a world which must be shared with three others, all of whom seemed closer and more important to Aunt Grace than she was. This was a world of strangers, and the attractiveness of these strangers made the experience even more difficult. The attractiveness had to be denied and the evils of the invasion of her Aunt Grace's home by these strangers had to be emphasized, but the conflict was intolerable, and life became a search for a new home, but no home could match the memory-dreams of early childhood.

Various environments were tried. The combination of rewarding, though difficult work, and a relatively independent existence served for a time; but this world, too, collapsed when inner pressures became too strong. The closest substitute to a "home" in later years has been the hospital. The hospital offers protective care and a minimum of demands. There are friends there and activities. Other people are too close in the limited confines of a hospital ward and conflicts arise, but there is always another ward. The pull of the hospital is strong, and Miss Conley has had real struggles trying to live in other environments. It has been through the help of supportive relationships that she found in the hospital that she has been able to live outside for a year now.

3. Interactions between Miss Conley and her world

Miss Conley's interpretation of her relations with the world of people and activities was summarized in the last part of Chapter VII. In brief it was a world of conflicts and suspicions. She presented a picture of a dependent person with no one on whom she could depend. She could not live with people, but could not live away from them either. And in her relations there were strong feelings and desires, confused and confusing, and no adequate methods of expressing or controlling them. And there was guilt, discouragement, and despair.

The complex interactions of many years cannot be captured in words, but an empathic reconstruction of some of the patterns of Miss Conley's relations to her world can show some of the difficulties she encountered in her strivings to actualize, maintain, and enhance her self.

Her reactions to the inadequate mothering she received in the first eighteen months of her life can only be estimated, but in terms of the theory of Chapter VI it seems probable that the lack of consistent and dependable need-satisfaction laid the foundation for her lack of trust of herself and her world. The failure of the interaction between the infant and her mother to establish dependable eating and sleeping patterns may have had many implications for learning. Perhaps the most important would have been difficulty in developing a sense of security and in learning the first lessons of socialized living. Exaggerated dependence upon others may have begun here as an effort to find satisfactions that never were forthcoming. A fragile kind of autonomy--a sense of being alone and isolated in a world that doesn't care about "my" needs--may also have had its beginnings here, accompanied by patterns of withdrawal from close contact with people.

On such a foundation the other relations of infancy and early childhood could only build a superstructure that followed the basic outlines of the first learning experiences.

Some of the needs for affection and dependence could be met by Aunt Grace and Uncle Herbert and the others, but their indulgences were interpreted in terms of exaggerated and insatiable needs. The close ties which are usually established between a child and his parents could not be established between Mary Conley and her parent substitutes after eighteen months of learning had begun to shape other patterns. She could identify with them, to some extent, and try to imitate them in a childish way and adopt their values, but such identifications could not be fully accepted as the "real" thing. She could be the "queen" in a house full of grown-ups in which there were no other children, but the price of being "queen" was to try to live up to the adult standards of people who could never really be her parents. This was a price that was too high, and some times it was fun to be like Uncle Herbert and make everyone upset. And she did not really feel like a "queen." No matter what she did she could not please her mother. She could not learn; she could not run and play with other children; she was weak and sickly; she was different from other children; she was homely and she was bad. In her loneliness and sadness sometimes it was better just to stay away from people, but other times she wanted to strike out and hurt someone or to do something bad or improper.

The world of early childhood endured too long. It was too protective and too limited. It developed patterns that would have been difficult to change even in a better world, and the world into which Miss Conley entered at the age of seven was not a better world. She entered a different world and in some ways became almost a different person, although the basic patterns of her personality remained much the same. She who had been important was no longer important, except as an object of criticism or punishment. She who had been cared for and protected, knew neither loving care nor protection. Her private world of play and fantasy, which had been important to her before, was now her chief solace. Her views of herself as bad and inferior were reinforced again and again. The conflicts between her own feelings and desires and her acceptance of adult standards became more intense. She argued, she became angry (with her mother), she struck out to hurt her mother; but most of the time she submitted to her parents and withdrew farther and farther into herself. The birth of her brother brought no relief. When she saw how close he was to her parents she knew how far away she was, but she did not dare to hate him, even though she wanted to destroy him. School did not help much either. It was another challenge she felt she could not meet, and meeting it was a struggle. There were some friends at school and it was nice to be able to go into their homes, but she could not share hers with them. Her desire was to have a home, too, a real home; but where? Perhaps her Aunt Grace would give her a home; but Aunt Grace didn't.

Adolescence was the time of new complications. An already unacceptable body, which was too small and thin and bony, began to change; and what was it like to be a woman? There were some girls that she liked, and her Aunt Grace was a woman; but girls went with boys and women married men. She did not dare date a boy. She might love one desparately from afar, but she did not dare go near him. She must keep her feelings to herself and struggle alone with her sexual desires. When she could not keep control of herself and masturbated, then she knew her father was right, she was "wicked" and "worldly." But all this must be kept hidden, and she must not let anyone come close to her private world. People who hurt her or teased her, she lashed with her tongue; but most of the time she avoided people and the activities which might have brought her into close contact with people.

By the time of the third year of high school the pattern of life had become almost intolerable. She was in a tension-ridden, unhappy home headed by a religious fanatic who believed God wanted him to kill his children. She did not know what was going to happen, but she had little hope that anything good was going to happen. She had brought all this trouble upon herself by wishing that the family could live together. Now she must "hang on" and try to "stand things" until something happened. Perhaps Aunt Grace would do something to help her yet. Then her father was committed to a mental hospital. She was relieved that he was gone, but she felt a deep sense of shame about his commitment. (Was she trying to punish herself for wanting to have him out of the way? Had she enjoyed some of his punitive attention to her more than she realized?) His commitment left her alone with her mother and her brother. Her world was beginning to fall apart. She managed to get through her last year of high school with only a brief period of confusion, but after graduation the guilt and hopelessness of it all descended upon her and she experienced the first of many periods of "melancholia."

The post-adolescent years have seen gradual modifications of old patterns in the direction of increasing perceptual distortion and communication failure. The patterns of sex and aggression have continued to be threatening and more and more of the threat has been projected onto persons in the environment. When the pressures become strong, guilt is everywhere. Everyone is against her, everyone is critical of her or laughing at her. And the pressure is strong much of the time. To be near a man or woman who arouses sexual interest is an agitating experience. To talk about sex or to hear other people talk about sex is agitating. Such agitation tends to find an outlet in resentment toward the people who seem to be stimulating it. A person who makes an off-hand remark about sex may be the object of a bitter rebuke. Any person who seems to be coming too close to Miss Conley's problems may experience her wrath. Little incidents in a card game, or a look or a smile can be misinterpreted and provoke her anger. She strikes out, out of her guilt and her shame and her despair that in spite of all her efforts to control her sexual desires she keeps on "acting funny." She looks at people in ways that seem sexual to her. She grins at them in a "sexual" way; and she tends to think that they know what she is doing. The experience is painful and she wants to strike out or withdraw, but either action brings unhappy consequences, and so she despairs.

The experiences with her Aunt Grace's family were the most difficult ones for her to meet. To have to share her aunt with those people with all their "immoralities" and then to find them attractive, this was too much. There were the sexual experiences with Connie, which raised a fearful threat of homosexuality. There were also sexual advances by Mr. Green (real or imaginary kisses?). Then Miss Conley, who had been deeply jealous of both Connie and Mr. Green, believed that her Aunt Grace was strongly jealous of her. She could not stay in the same house with her. Since that time she has thought more and more that her aunt was against her. The only reason she can determine for the Green's interest in her is her money. (What else does she have that anyone might want?) The money must be protected at all costs. She must stay away from Mr. Green because of all the conflicts she feels toward him. She wants a reconciliation with her Aunt Grace, but only on her terms--that her aunt choose her in preference to the Greens.

4. The Organization of Miss Conley's "self"

There are many problems in Miss Conley's relations with her world, but her biggest problem is herself, and to some extent she realized this. She wanted to be a more mature person, and if she could have learned to accept her feelings and desires and to express them in appropriate ways, many of her symptoms of illness would have begun to disappear. But this was only part of the problem of the organization of her self. She had never been able to develop a consistent picture of herself. From the beginning there were inconsistent elements--feelings of isolation and abandonment which could not be reconciled with experiences of indulgence and over-stimulation, inconsistent identifications, exaggerated positive and negative self-valuations, strong needs for satisfaction which conflicted with the expectations of important adults, needs for dependence which contradicted strivings for autonomy. There were many such inconsistencies in her self and her environments. Lacking strong basic identifications with her parents and experiences of acceptance by them around which to organize a strong self-image, Miss Conley did not have the inner strength to integrate the conflicts in herself and her world. She defended herself against them as best she could by distortions and limitations of her views of herself and her world. She integrated what she could and tried to force the more uncomfortable elements out of her organization of her self.

She has made her way through life seeking a mother, a home, and her own self-identity. She has not been able to accept the reality of her situation in relation to her family in order to be able to make the most of the love and concern that is there for her. She cannot accept the present because the past is too much a part of her world and colors all her relationships to the present too strongly. She cannot give up her desires for a life with her family which never existed and can never really exist, but neither can she separate herself from her family sufficiently to want an independent existence. Compromises are attempted, with the encouragement and guidance of other persons; but she cannot really decide on a plan or a way of life for herself. She does not know who she is. She cannot commit herself to people or to values beyond herself and her family. She continues to "hang on" and to try to "stand things" and to wait for something to happen, and to suffer.

5. Miss Conley's faith development

Miss Conley described herself to her pastor as a "wicked," "godless," "worldly" person who could not "have faith like other people." The material that has been presented provides some understanding of how she came to have these views of herself.

Many of the problems she had in accepting her personal existence before God have been noted in discussing her difficulties in accepting the realities of her self and her world. All these have to do with faith as defined here, but there is another dimension of faith that needs to be discussed--the dimension of her God-relationship. Actually the two dimensions cannot be separated. Problems in accepting the self and its world are reflected in problems in accepting God and His creative and redemptive activity. Lack of trust or confidence in oneself and one's world is reflected in difficulty in trusting God. But there are ways in which the God-relationship is different from any other relationships, and it needs to be discussed separately.

The reality of God-relationships is experienced in the same ways that any other kind of reality is experienced. The primary way is through interpersonal relationships which mediate something of the quality of the God relationship. Such interpersonal relationships within the Christian community, however, are recognized as limited and distorted by sin and serve to point beyond themselves to the God who transcends the limitations of sinful existence. Jesus Christ stands as the one person who combines in Himself both the immanent mediation of the God relationship and the transcendent judgment upon all immanent relationships. Development of a Christian faith relationship with God requires both participation in the experience of contemporary persons who have known and can mediate something of the reality of God and participation in the reality of God in Jesus Christ.

The faith problem of Miss Conley was that she had not really known either kind of participation in the reality of God. How this came to be can be reviewed briefly.

In her interpersonal world Miss Conley could not know the kind of close ties which might have made it possible to accept both the requirements of personal and social existence and the personal and social satisfactions and resources which make responsible living rewarding as well as demanding. She felt she must accept the values of the important adults in her world even though she could not live up to them, and the rewards of trying were not really satisfying. She could not integrate her family's values into her life, but she could not free herself from them either, even though she tried at times. Condemnation was experienced if she tried to meet the standards but failed. It was also experienced if she did not try or revolted. As her environment became less and less rewarding and more and more punitive, the conflict deepened. The only possible resolution for her was outward conformity to the standards and the "gods" of her family, combined with inward resentment toward her family and their standards and their "gods." To show such resentment, however, meant to suffer further condemnation, at first from others and later from herself.

In relation to God the conflicts were somewhat similar, except that Miss Conley could not really know God but only the "gods" of her family. Some glimpses of Him were seen in her Aunt Grace and her Uncle Herbert, who gave her more love and understanding and status than any other persons, but as the years went by she became very much aware that these people had "clay feet"--they could not and would not meet her needs, and they, too, became "hypocrites" in her eyes. This left only a God she did not know, except as she heard a little about Him in her church. But as much as she might want Him to help her, she could not really believe that He would, and she could not expect anything good from Him. Did not He too make demands that she could not meet? Did not He ask much from her, give her little, and punish her much for her failures? She did not and could not deserve anything good from Him. She was "godless" and "wicked" and "worldly" as her father had said she was. Actually she hated God and His demands, even as she hated her parent figures and their demands, and she wanted to defy Him, too; but in the anxiety and guilt of this hatred she could only condemn herself and despair.

There are many other factors which entered into her God relationship, but this brief statement has noted some of the more important aspects. Little wonder that she "could not have faith" and going to church was often a disturbing experience for her. Yet she kept looking and hoping that somehow in God she could find what she had not found in people.

6. The work of the pastor and the church

Miss Conley brought her faith problems to a pastor. She presented to him the person and the world which we have attempted to describe in these two chapters. What could the pastor and his church do to help her? Could the direction of her development be changed? How could theology and psychology be brought to bear upon her problems?

The actual work of the pastor with Miss Conley cannot be discussed in detail here, but the nature of his work with her can be interpreted in theoretical terms and the correlation of theology and psychology in his relationship to her can be illustrated.

Ideally, a psychiatrist or psychologist might have carried the major responsibility of helping Miss Conley to work through her interpersonal difficulties, and the pastor would have worked with her and offered the resources of the Church to her to help her find meaning and value for her life and to develop a more Christian relationship with God. The psychiatrist or psychologist would have been responsible for the psychological dimension of her struggles to accept her personal existence, and the pastor would have been responsible for the theological dimension. Both would have needed to establish a relationship with her in which some living experiences of acceptance were possible, however, and each would have needed to understand the work of the other.

There was no psychiatrist or psychologist available in the state hospital to work with Miss Conley, and both the theological and psychological tasks were in the hands of the chaplain-pastor, within the context, however, of her total treatment program. The efforts of the pastor will be interpreted briefly, and then an evaluation of the success of these efforts will be made.

Once there was an agreement between Miss Conley and her pastor that a counseling relationship should be undertaken, his job was to try to establish a relationship with her which was different from the interpersonal relationships she had known previously. This meant trying as fully as possible to understand her and what she was trying to communicate, trying to see her world as she saw it and to understand how she felt in her responses to her world. Her suspicions and her distortions were not to be challenged--in the early stages of the relationship, at least--but to be understood in terms of what they meant to her and why they were important to her. As understanding was communicated to her, she could begin to feel that she could talk about things to her pastor that she has not been able to discuss with people who, she was sure, did not understand. Gradually she could come to discuss things which she had hardly dared think about... But she did not have to talk. If she did not want to follow up a topic she had started, her feelings about talking were discussed and she decided whether to go ahead or not. If she did not want to talk at all, this was discussed and, again, she made the decision. If she felt disturbed about something she had communicated, this too was discussed. The task was to establish a relationship in which Miss Conley could feel that she could be herself--within the limits of a talking relationship. She could talk about anything she wanted to communicate; she could express any ideas or feelings that came to her; she could decide not to talk, if that was her desire. In such a relationship she could drop some of the defenses that she had needed against people who might not understand her and might condemn or punish her or expose her unmercifully to things about herself and her world that she did not want to accept. She could be more honest about herself and her world than she had been able to be with other people in her life.

The establishment of this kind of a relationship took time, but as it grew stronger Miss Conley was able to discuss the kinds of experiences in her past and present which have been summarized here. Gradually some of the meanings of her experiences and the feelings connected with them became clearer to her as she began to understand herself and her world in the give and take with her pastor. Relationships of past and present became more explicit. Present problems could be seen more clearly in the light of the learned patterns of the past and the learning situations in which they were acquired. Patterns of behavior which meant interpersonal and personal difficulties in the present could be examined in terms both of their relationship to the past and possible alternative patterns in the present.

Miss Conley, however, needed more than an understanding "mirror" in which she could see how she looked at life and herself in the past and the present. She needed experience with the kinds of reality which she had not been able to accept in the past--personal, social, and theological. She needed the kind of understanding concern which the chaplain could offer as an experience of being accepted as a person, but she also needed to learn how to live with other people and with God in new ways. As far as possible, the limitations of her early environments needed to be overcome by including in her phenomenal field experiences with people and God that she had not been able to include before.

The basic work had to be done in the counseling relationship. The pastor was a person toward whom Miss Conley developed feelings and expectations. These feelings and expectations needed to be explored and tested in relation to the reality of the counseling situation and the personality of the pastor. She needed to learn what she could expect from the pastor as a person and in his various roles--counselor, preacher, and priest. She needed to learn how much trust she could place in him. In addition she needed to learn what to do with the feelings she experienced toward him and the counseling relationship and the problems which arose in her hospital life because of this relationship. The various aspects of the relationship between pastor and parishioner needed to be included in the counseling relationship in the same manner that any other relationship was discussed there. This was a slow process which took a long time because present feelings and expectations were much more difficult to discuss than past problems. But as they could be included in the counseling process, the associations with past experiences could be examined and the exaggerations and distortions could be tested against the realities of the pastoral relationship. To the extent that such efforts could succeed, to that extent Miss Conley could experience re-education of her views of herself in relation to another person. The goal of such efforts was that a realistic relationship of trust and confidence might be established with the pastor which would provide a learning experience in establishing realistic relations with other persons and with God.

Miss Conley also needed to learn to perceive her relationships with other persons more accurately, to develop more effective communication, and to establish more effective and satisfying patterns of living with other people. Ideally, this would have taken place in the hospital situation in her day to day experiences in a "therapeutic community." Practically, it had to be attempted as the pastor discussed her present situation with her and explored the learning possibilities in her relationships. The understanding he had of the deviations in her development from the normal range could be of help here in defining needed areas of re-education and potential sources of such re-education. As the relationship of trust grew stronger between Miss Conley and the pastor, he could point out such opportunities to her, as she seemed to be ready for them, and help her make use of them. When she experienced difficulties in her experiments with new patterns of social interaction, the problems could be discussed and viewed in the light of the realities of the hospital situation. Similarly, efforts on Miss Conley's part to adjust outside the hospital could be discussed in order to try to understand them in relation to reality, past and present. Thus the pastor attempted to become a mediator of social reality for Miss Conley in order that she might come to include such reality in her own experience and reorganize her self and her world in relation to it. Such attempts also meant that in relation to the pastor Miss Conley experienced a new kind of critical judgment. The pastor as mediator of social reality was also a kind of judge of her social behavior, past and present. The counseling relationship presented an opportunity for Miss

Conley to learn to know such judgment in a framework of mercy, and to work out her difficulties in accepting such judgment.

The same kind of process was necessary for Miss Conley to be able to know and to accept the reality of God in her life. Through the exploration of her past and present patterns, the development of her value system and her God-relationship could be traced. The relationship with the pastor offered an opportunity to develop a more comfortable kind of identification with a religious figure than she had known in the past. Her experiences in the church services, which he directed, facilitated the development of more positive feelings toward the Church and a greater readiness to receive what the Church had to offer her. The experience of acceptance by the pastor made it easier to believe in the possibility of acceptance by God. And as the pastor sought to become a mediator of social reality to her, even so he sought to become a mediator of theological reality, as she seemed to be ready for such experience. Her value system and her God relationship both needed to be examined in relation to the Christian value system and the Christian norms of God-relationship, as understood by the pastor. This could take place as the values of Miss Conley were discussed in relation to problems of aggression, sexual desires, self-valuation, reasons for living, etc. The pastor, in counseling and all his other pastoral roles, sought to function, within his own personal limitations, as a representative of Christian values and a Christlike God. Some learning could go on through identification as well as through the communicating and testing processes of the counseling relationship. At appropriate points in the counseling the counselor could also share with Miss Conley what Christian values and the Christlike God meant to him as a person. Theological reality was as much a part of the counseling process as any other kind of reality and the task was to try to include it in the relationship in the same way as other aspects of reality--with respect for her and her needs and concern for her growth taking priority over any personal needs or concerns of the pastor.

Ideally such a pastoral relationship would not terminate. The time would come when a person like Miss Conley would no longer need the intensive kind of support to be found in counseling interviews. She would know that the pastor was available when she needed him, but, except for the crisis situations which all persons face, she would be able to live and to grow through her own resources, those of her church and community, and the strength of her relationship to God.

The church should provide the kind of group life in which people like Miss Conley, who are struggling against great odds to grow toward Christian life, can share their quest with each other and find understanding and encouragement in their communion with each other and with God. All of the services and activities of the Church should be directed toward making the Word of God meaningful and relational for persons like Miss Conley who want to find Christian values and a Christian God to give their lives meaning and purpose.

Practically, there may be no church or no community group into which a person like Miss Conley can be welcomed and find resources for continued growth (beyond an occasional church service that has meaning for her and possibly a women's group that she can attend). And pastors do not tend to stay in one place for life. Consequently, termination of the counseling relationship may be a necessity. The goals of such termination might be: the development of a realistic relationship between pastor and parishioner, including the acceptance of the fact of the "end" as part of that relationship; the development of a more realistic self-organization and more satisfying relationships with other persons; the development of a value system that is integrated with the total life of the individual in the direction of growth (Christian growth, for a pastoral relationship); and the development of realistic trust and dependence upon God. Such goals are ideal, of course, but termination should mean some progress in the direction of each of these goals.

Evidence is lacking for an objective appraisal of the actual progress of the relationship between Miss Conley and her pastor, which has been interpreted in theoretical terms.

A general estimate can be given in terms of subjective evaluations by both participants.

In the last months of her hospitalization Miss Conley made such statements as, "Things seem more real now;" "I don't feel like I'm to blame for everything any more," and "I think it may be possible for me to have a religion."

It is hard to know to what extent such statements reflect significant changes in her valuations of herself, her world, and her religious life. Some evidence may be seen in the content of the supportive interviews which she had with the chaplain-pastor after she had left the hospital. These interviews tended to focus on realistic problems of adjustment to her new environment. She seemed to be trying to perceive and evaluate her relationships as accurately as she could, and she was open to clarification of confusion between past and present in these relationships. The Church had come to mean more to her, and she continued to attend regularly after leaving the hospital. She enjoyed visiting with her friends in the hospital but was usually glad to be able to leave the hospital when the visiting hours were over. There were some satisfactions in her new environments, even though there was much loneliness and discouragement.

The limitations of her growth cannot be overlooked, however. Her attachment to the past was strong and there was not much that she could find in the interpersonal world to take the place of such attachment. Some of the distortions of her past and present experiences were firmly fixed in her organization of her world and, although they showed some flexibility, they changed but little. The relationship to her Aunt Grace continued to be a source of great concern and occasional disturbance. She could not accept the reality of her relationships with her family nor give up her dreams of what she wanted in those relationships. Nor could she find much sense of her own identity and her own value as a person. The struggles with sex and aggression continued, although perhaps with less intensity, and it was hard for her to find anything in herself that she could respect. She condemned herself less, but she could not accept positive values for living. The passive-dependent orientation toward life tended to persist, and despair was a frequent experience.

The counseling relationship was meaningful to Miss Conley, and she developed a relatively realistic relationship of trust and dependence. She could accept criticism from the pastor and tried to make use of it in her relationships. There were times when she was discouraged and believed that the counseling time was being "wasted" on her, and there were other times when she could not talk at all, but most of the time she welcomed the opportunity even when it meant undergoing painful experiences. Her feelings toward the pastor were among the most painful aspects of the counseling experience. She could express some negative feelings, but her positive feelings were very threatening to her, and she tended to become very self-conscious at times because of them. She believed that other patients were talking about her relationship with the pastor, and this disturbed her. The longest disruption of the interviews occurred at a time when such ideas and feelings were very troubling to her. Some of these aspects of the counseling relationship were discussed with the pastor and she was able to continue, but an adequate resolution of her feelings was not achieved. An effort was made to include Miss Conley in a group therapy project conducted by the pastor, but she attended only one session. Her feelings toward the chaplain and her jealousy of the other patients made her very uncomfortable, and she could not work these feelings through sufficiently to be able to return to the group.

An adequate termination of Miss Conley's relationship with the pastor was not accomplished. The counseling was terminated by his departure from the state hospital to work in another part of the country. Regular interviews had been discontinued a year earlier, but Miss Conley had returned to the hospital occasionally for interviews, at her request. Clarification of the relationship was attempted on various occasions, but Miss Conley was not able to verbalize much of what it had meant to her, except in occasional written communications to the chaplain-pastor. Some transference of her dependence to a psychiatric social worker was accomplished before termination, and some of her positive feelings toward the pastor were generalized to God and the church. The actual extent of her growth cannot be estimated, but it seems safe to say that the pastor and the church did help her to make some change in the direction of her growth.

Summary

In this chapter a "pastoral approach" to the correlation of theology and psychology has been suggested in relation to pastoral work with a person with faith problems. The correlation has been seen to reside in the pastor himself as he seeks to make use of psychology and theology to help him understand a troubled person and to relate to her in a redemptive way. Much more than theory is involved in such a correlation. The use of psychological, theological, and other resources in supervised experiences in pastoral relationships is essential for developing competence in such relationships. Theory has important contributions to make, however, and theories have been presented here which are important for the understanding of faith development and the use of such understanding in pastoral work.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSIONS

Pastoral Theology and Psychology

This study of the meaning of faith has come to a focus on the correlation of theology and psychology in the thought and work of the pastor. The pastor needs to understand theological and psychological contributions to the meaning and development of faith if he is to understand people with faith problems. The pastor needs to be in himself a "walking correlation" of theology and psychology if he is to be able to be of help to people with faith problems.

In the first chapter of this dissertation we proposed to define what it means "to have faith" within the Christian tradition. We proposed also to make use of psychological contributions to provide meaning for psychological terms involved in theological concepts of faith, to promote understanding of actual problems involved in the faith response, and to suggest possibilities for more effective communication of the content of faith. To accomplish the first task we surveyed some of the important emphases in Christian thought concerning the processes involved in "having faith;" we suggested two definitions and related them to a conceptual framework and to other aspects of the Christian life. In order to accomplish the second set of tasks we formulated a "pastoral approach" to personality in psychological terms, defined faith in this psychological context and outlined an approach to the study of faith development, and then illustrated the contributions of such psychological material to the understanding of a person with faith problems and to the communication of faith to her. Our emphasis in the second part of the study has been on the relation of theory to practice.

This dissertation is a venture in pastoral theology and psychology. It is an effort to define a significant aspect of Christian experience in theological terms and to use such a definition to relate psychological contributions to the thought and work of the pastor who wants to help people grow in Christian experience. It suggests an approach to theology and psychology which tries to respect and make use of the contributions of both disciplines for pastoral work. If this approach has value, it can be used to study other aspects of Christian experience.

An Evaluation of This Study

Some of the values and limitations of the approach to the study of Christian experience just described can be seen in this dissertation. The correlation of theology and psychology can provide more meaning for faith experience than one discipline can provide alone, and this meaning can have more relevance for pastoral work through the combined approach. Correlation, however, can easily mean that what is being correlated is not really psychology nor theology. It is difficult to be adequate to two disciplines. In the study of faith the kind of definition suggested here has meant the study of such a wide range of psychological theory and data that it has been difficult to set managable limits. Similar problems might arise in a correlational approach to other aspects of Christian experience such as sin, grace, love, and community.

Implications of This Study

For Theology.--This study suggests that pastoral theology is an important part of the total study of theology. Pastoral theology, making use of the contributions of secular disciplines such as psychology, can help to give concreteness to the contributions of theology and to establish relationships between theory and practice in pastoral work.

The psychological point of view taken here proposes that theological norms need to be defined in developmental terms. It is as important to define faith or love in ways that are relevant to late childhood, for example, as it is to define them for adulthood.

Some important questions concerning the relations of the doctrines of creation and redemption have been raised by this study. The problem of continuity-discontinuity in Christian growth is one which merits more attention than could be given to it here.

For Psychology.--The place of values in psychology has been a serious concern in our study of faith. We said in

Chapter I that psychology is not concerned with values for living, but there are psychologists who are concerned with the growth of the total personality. How can growth of the total person be studied without asking the direction of growth? Direction of growth implies some kind of norms, and how are such norms derived? These are not questions which need concern all psychologists, but they should concern some, and the Christian psychologist of personality might well be concerned with the relations of Christian norms for growth to growth processes.

There are other problems which arise when the question of values in personality growth is asked: What is the role of the value system of the individual in his growth and what kind of value system is to be considered normative? What do the discrepancies between values and performance mean in individual behavior and how can they be accepted or overcome? These are questions with which theology and ethics are very much concerned. They are serious questions for human behavior. Should psychology be concerned with them, too?

The approach which has been attempted in this study of the faith aspects of Christian experience can be described as a method of studying the psychology of religion from the point of view of faith. It raises the question whether religious phenomena can be defined theologically in order to suggest variables for psychological study. The material of this study suggests many such variables which need further study, but it also poses a warning that study may be more rewarding if variables are selected which can be operationally defined without too much difficulty. This project would have been more managable if a variable such as trust or identification had been the focus of a correlational effort.

For the Church.--Implications for the work of the Church have been noted at various points throughout Part II of this dissertation. The most important have to do with the nature and purpose of the Church as the community of the Word of God. The individual cannot grow in faith unless he has a meaningful experience of the reality of the Christlike God. It is the task of the Church to provide opportunities for learning experiences for people of all ages which will help them to participate in both the interpersonal and transpersonal aspects of God relationships. The interpersonal view of faith development which has been presented here means that the Church needs to understand and improve the communal aspects of its life and to take a more active role in the strengthening of the family and other groups which are important for growth in faith.

For the Pastor.--The implications of this study for the pastor have been the focus of concern in Part II. The nature and purposes of the ministry in this country mean that certain kinds of approaches to human behavior are more relevant to his work than others. The structure of the pastoral role needs to be analyzed and psychological theories formulated which are pertinent to that role. An effort in this direction has been made here, but the task needs to be done more systematically and more thoroughly.

The pastor, as seen here, is the key person in the correlation of theology and psychology. The pastoral relationship with persons in need of his care is the testing ground of such correlation. The opportunity of the pastor has been glimpsed in the study of Miss Conley's faith problems. God could not come into her life in a real way unless someone could help her remove the barriers she had erected against God and learn to open her life to Him. Before she could accept God she had to learn the difference between God and the false gods of her life. Only a pastor could combine psychological and theological resources to help her in these tasks. This was the pastor's opportunity.... This is the pastor's opportunity with everyone truly seeking God who comes to his church or his study or who is ready to receive him in hospital or home. Every person seeking to be a Christian has faith problems. Every person with faith problems needs an informed and trained pastor. Counseling is only one form of pastoral care. The pastor has many roles and many resources to offer. He needs to understand them and to learn to use them effectively--before God.

Problems for Further Study

A broad study such as this one raises more questions than it answers. The basic question to be explored further is the value of the correlational method which has been used here to bring together theological and psychological material around a central topic. Can a similar method be used to correlate theological and psychological theories and data in a search for the meaning of love, grace, communion, community, sin, and other aspects of Christian experience?

Many subsidiary problems are also open for further study. A few of these can be listed: (1) Continuation of the developmental study through all stages of life; (2) Further study of the developmental tasks of religious growth as a guide to Christian education in church and home; (3) Detailed study of some of the important developmental variables noted in this dissertation. We would emphasize the need for further studies of the development of perception, especially the perception of persons (including oneself); also development of the interpersonal aspects of communication, the organization of the self, the value system, identification, trust, and commitment; (4) A study of the kind of counseling theory which was suggested in Chapter VIII; (5) Experimental study of the relations of anxiety and certain faith variables--confidence, identification, communication, etc.; (6) Further development of concepts of pastoral theology which have been suggested here. Many other topics could be listed, but these present some of the possibilities.

APPENDIX A.

THE TRIUMPHANT FAITH OF JESUS

In order to clarify the concept of a victorious faith which holds together the dialectics of human anxiety, we present a brief interpretation of the faith of Jesus.

At any moment of life most or all of the basic anxieties of existence which have been described, plus others not described, may be important in a man's state of being. At certain times, however, particular forms of anxiety are evident. In the record of the life of Jesus there are episodes which can be related more easily to one kind of anxiety than to another, even though to do so is to create unrealistic abstractions. Any attempt at interpretation of the thoughts and feelings of Jesus must be both oversimplified and inaccurate. Such interpretation involves questions of New Testament scholarship far beyond the studies of the writer, but we dare to make interpretations in order to make clearer what we mean by the "optimum" possibility of faith. Much of what we suggest can be labeled as "projection" into the life of Jesus of what we want to see there, but perhaps some of it can be accepted as possessing a degree of objective validity.

Jesus' call and baptism.--Whatever the nature of Jesus' call and at whatever time it came, we can imagine that Jesus participated in the threefold nature of the anxieties of such a call and the questions arising from such anxieties: (1) the anxiety of one's own being--Who am I that I should be called? Am I adequate to the call? Am I mistaken about the call? What will happen to me if I accept the call? Will acceptance of this call and its possible fulfillment result in the fulfillment of my being or my destruction? (The shadow of the Cross) (2) the anxiety of one's being in relation to other persons--Will the acceptance of the call mean that I shall be at one with my fellow men or will it separate me from them? (3) the anxiety of one's being in relation to God--What will happen to God's purpose if I accept His call? Can His purpose be realized in me or will it be defeated? Will God accept me whether I succeed or fail?

These can be suggested as three aspects of Jesus' call, to be found in various ways in every divine call to human service. We venture to suggest (and this is not an original idea) that Jesus' baptism is the confirmation of his call. Whether or not he felt the call and decided the time had come to fulfill it when he heard the preaching of John the Baptist, the baptism by John was an important experience opening a new chapter in the life of Jesus. Our interpretation is that the baptism was an experience of faith overcoming the three aspects of anxiety noted above.

1. The anxiety of his own being is overcome by an act of faith, the baptism, in which he affirms his acceptance of God's call and receives the confirmation of his action in God's acceptance of him, symbolized by the dove and the

words "This is my beloved Son, with whom I am well pleased" (Matthew 3:17).

2. The anxiety of his being in relation to other persons is overcome by an act of faith, the baptism, in which he accepts a baptism for the remission of sin, even though he was without sin, and in so doing identified himself with all sinful persons. (This actually is what has to happen in group psychotherapy for a member to begin to find "communion" with his fellow participants. Each member takes a step toward group union when he finds it possible to identify himself with weakness he sees in other group members and is able to drop some of his defenses against this weakness as he sees it in himself. This identification with the weaknesses or anxieties of others is accompanied by a decrease of anxiety.) The question arises, "How could Jesus identify himself with sinful men if he was without sin?" The view of anxiety which we have suggested in this thesis would make this possible. Anxiety poses a potentiality for sin. Sin occurs when man succumbs to anxiety and is unable to be himself before God. Jesus, being aware of the potentiality for sin in himself, could identify himself with those who have succumbed to this potentiality without having succumbed himself. (We can suggest an analogy--the therapist can empathically identify with schizophrenic patterns in a mental patient because of the potentiality of such patterns he sees in himself without becoming schizophrenic himself.)

The fact that for Jesus, this was an identification before God, would suggest to us that Jesus could identify himself with sinful men and yet had a criterion in his God relationship for differentiating between sin and not-sin, other men and himself. (The therapist has a working criterion to differentiate himself from the sick patient--concepts of self, not-self and health, not-health--which concepts are ultimately based on concepts of value; i.e. a "God" concept.)

3. The anxiety of his being in relation to God was overcome by his act of acceptance of his relationship to God, the baptism, and the confirmation of that faith in the experience symbolized by the dove and the voice quoted above. Here, in a crucial experience of his relationship with God, Jesus experienced the divine agape. The tentative faith in his "sonship" expressed in the act of accepting baptism found a more objective foundation in the experience of "Sonship." The son experienced the unconditional acceptance of the Father.

The temptations:--There are many problems involved in the interpretation of the temptations and there are many facets of interpretation. From the standpoint of the concept of anxiety presented in this thesis it is possible to interpret the temptations as Jesus' victory over the basic problem of human anxiety--the problem of an adequate criterion of one's being by which the dialectics of personality can be held in balance. For example, if man is a unique synthesis of the finite and the infinite, then if he is to be able to realize his finitude-infinitude he needs a criterion for his being in every moment which is adequate to both aspects of the synthesis. Inevitably he must face conflict because of the ambiguities involved in the relationship of his finitude to his infinitude. In the temptations Jesus faced this conflict and found in his faith relationship to God a criterion of his being which made it possible for him, for the moment, to overcome this anxiety--and the tempter "departed from him until an opportune time." (Luke 4:13).

In the first two temptations, as described by Matthew, the devil poses the temptations in terms of the question of being, "If you are the Son of God..." Thus Jesus faced the question, "Who am I?" We assume that he had experienced God's call and had accepted it (the baptism) and had experienced a confirmation of his unique relationship with God. He was aware of a mission and he was aware of powerful potentialities available to him to fulfill this mission. Above all he was aware of God and his relationship to Him. Before he could begin his mission, however, he must find the kind of answer to the question "Who am I?" which would overcome the anxieties which tempted him to be both more than he was and less than he was.

The devil first took advantage of Jesus' physical need for food to add the power of hunger to the power of the anxiety which Jesus faced. The temptation might be stated, "If you are the kind of person you think you are, then you should be able to turn stones into loaves of bread." Although Jesus may have had the power to do this (as the later stories of the loaves and fishes would suggest), to have acquiesced would have left Jesus continually at the mercy of the anxiety because the need to see finite evidence of the nature of his being would continue to reassert itself. The only answer adequate to meet the anxiety was a re-assertion of faith in the infinite ground of his being. To have acquiesced would have been to confess a conditioned trust in God, a trust conditioned on God's making certain things possible. Jesus' answer is to assert an unconditional trust, a trust based solely on God Himself and what God revealed of Himself in his relationship to Jesus--"Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceeds from the mouth of God"--(Matthew 4:4).

The second and third temptations are basically the same and the answer is the same. In the second, the devil tempts Jesus, "If you are the kind of person you think you are, then you should be able to throw yourself down from the pinnacle of the temple" (paraphrasing Matthew 4:6). The devil adds to the power of the anxiety itself the authority of Scripture, quoting from Psalm 91:11-12 to support his argument. Again Jesus refused to put limits on his trust in God. He chose to define his being in terms of his relationship to God rather than in contingent terms, and he suggested that, as a finite being, he would accept limits imposed upon him by God--"It is written, 'You shall not tempt the Lord your God'. (Matthew 4:7).

In the third temptation, the tempter more explicitly poses the problem of a finite versus an infinite ground of being. He confronts Jesus with the potentiality of demonic worship. The potentiality is that in return for the surrender of his infinitude he will have the fullness of finite power. The temptation is powerful because the tangible fruits of worship can be seen (In modern terms, "Faith will bring success."), but Jesus reiterates his faith in God and refuses to exchange an unconditional trust for a "mess of pottage"-- "You shall worship the Lord your God and him only shall you serve." (Matthew 4:10).

Thus Jesus three times overcame the temptation to define his being in terms of finite criteria which were not adequate to the criterion which he possessed in his relationship with God. By so doing, he won a victory which made it possible for him to go ahead sinlessly (without succumbing to anxiety) in his ministry. He could, although tempted at many other points, continue the way he had begun to be faithful both to the finite and infinite aspects of his nature.

What was the nature of the criterion of his being which made this possible? The "criterion" is what Niebuhr has called "a norm which transcends all norms." It is first of all, the unconditioned trust in God which we have noted,--a faith which needs no cause except God Himself (for a finite mind, this includes partly, and only partly, the knowledge of God and the kind of relationship to Him which He makes possible in His self-revelation). It is secondly, a trust of self (and, on the same terms, trust in other persons) because of the relationship of self to God and the potentialities of the self before God. Both faith in God and faith in self are primarily trust. They are not knowledge; that is, they are not dependent upon facts or tangible evidence. There is some content for this trust, of course, varying with individuals, but the content is not the basis for the trust. The basis for the trust is and remains--God. The content includes, but only partially defines, a criterion for differentiating God from demons and self from not-self. There is also in the very nature of the relationship itself a distinction between God and self which can be illustrated by the fact that the self is dependent upon God for the relationship, whereas the reverse is not true for God.

Not much more can be said here about the criterion Jesus had for overcoming the anxieties of his being. We have suggested the "form" of this criterion without saying much about the content. If the content could be clearly and completely defined, then we would destroy the "form" because we would have tried to give a finite definition for something which cannot be reduced to finite terms. There are other problems, of course, because the content of Jesus' consciousness is not available to us except in limited (and perhaps unreliable) instances.

There are many other experiences of Jesus recorded in the Gospels which could be studied in the manner we have used here. However, these examples may serve to illustrate our view of the nature of Jesus' triumphant faith. The most obvious example of this faith, which we note in closing this section, was Jesus' reaction to the anxiety of death itself. In facing and enduring the Cross, Jesus faced again many of the anxieties he had known before but in more crucial form. The Cross threatened him not only with physical death but with the possibilities of mistaken choice, failure of his mission, separation from his friends, and the loss of the meaning of his life. In the face of these anxieties Jesus once more affirmed his unconditional trust in God in the words "Father, into thy hands I commit my spirit" (Luke 23:46).

APPENDIX B.

A DEVELOPMENTAL OUTLINE

I. General characteristics of the developing individual.
    A. Physical.
    B. Intellectual.
    C. Emotional.
    D. Perceptual behavior.
    E. Communicative behavior.

II. Changing characteristics of the environment as experienced by the individual.
    A. Changes in scope.
    B. Changes in differentiation and organization.
    C. Changes in the quality of the interpersonal environment.

III. Significant interactions between the individual and his environment.
    A. Social behavior in relation to various groups.
    B. Mastery over self and environment.
    C. Development of self-organization.
    D. Status and role interactions.
    E. Development of a value system.
    F. Areas of conflict and anxiety.

IV. Patterns of organization of the self and self-world relationships.
    A. Summary of significant patterns.
    B. Developmental tasks.

V. Significant developments for faith.
    A. Developments which affect the acceptance of personal existence.
    B. Developments in the God-relationship.

APPENDIX C.

A PSYCHOLOGICAL REPORT ON MISS CONLEY

TESTS ADMINISTERED: WECHSLER BELLEVUE, FORM I

Full I.Q.	115
Vocabulary I.Q.	116
Verbal I.Q.	116
Performance I.Q.	114

RORSCHACH: see below
FOUR PICTURE TEST: see below

COMMENTS:

General Behavior.--Miss Conley became quite upset at times during the testing. When things became difficult for her she would become extremely irritated, upset, and refuse to try them. She apparently lacks patience and adult control. At inappropriate times she would frequently produce a very silly laugh. Her behavior throughout the testing is best described as peculiar and abnormal.

Interpretations of tests.--The results of the Wechsler Bellevue indicate that intellectually Miss Conley is functioning on a high average level. Scatter analysis reveals impairment in attention and anticipation and planning ability. In many ways the scatter is comparable to the pattern given by paranoid schzophrenics.

The Rorschach results indicate reduction in intellectual efficiency. In her approach to the cards she selects small, irrelevant details to respond to, indicating that she is quite analytical and spends much time fussing about small unimportant details of life. She is afraid to meet the whole situation and instead takes flight into the minute. Compulsive features are quite pronounced on the test. It was extremely hard for the patient to give up a card until she had covered every area.

The patient's record further indicates that she is extremely immature and incapable of adult rapport. She tends to repress a great deal of feeling, but at times when her rigid control breaks down she is explosive and impulsive. All her feeling contact with the world is in the form of immediate, instinctual responses. There is only one response which shows that she can be regardful of the world. Consequently her relationship with people is very poor.

The numerous space responses suggest that the patient is paranoid. Her test for conformity of thinking is quite high which shows that she is trying hard to maintain her control. Her test for reality, however, is right on the borderline. On one occasion she gave a confabulatory response which is found only in the records produced by extremely sick individuals.

The space responses are indicative of feelings of hostility and negativism and denote a capacity for overt rebellion is present.

We further find an oral interest and neurotic association, animals kissing. The delayed reaction time to Card VII might be considered as significant of difficulty related to the mother figure.

In summary, the Rorschach has a very definite paranoid coloring. The patient is compulsive, very analytical, emotionally explosive, and shows poor relationship with the maternal figure.

On the Four Picture Test Miss Conley projects herself as being very lonesome, cold, and having poor social relationships. The main character is withdrawn from his environment. It is not a good story for there is little revealed which gives much insight into the patient's personality. The organization would suggest that her intellectual functioning is below normal. In the end, the main character proved that he is good and capable of recognition, which is considered to be a paranoid element, for this type of personality feels continually called upon to prove something to himself or to others.

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